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I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation depends on information. In the last few decades,
discovery in civil cases has been dramatically extended in order to
move toward a position in which litigants' files are open to other
parties with very few restrictions.' This movement in civil cases has
been relatively smooth, for its merits in terms of economy and
efficiency can be fortified by pointing to its even-handed mutuality
and reciprocity. In criminal cases, by contrast, courts at one time
thought that any considerable expansion in discovery must be rejected
because the constraints of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination
clause would bar the exercise of compulsion against the defendant,'
while the unilateral imposition of greater discovery duties on the
government would upset the adversarial equipoise. A narrower
understanding of the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment
has dulled this objection, and discovery in criminal cases consequently
has been substantially broadened.3  The scope of civil discovery
1. "Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure now permit extensive discovery in civil cases. Rule 26(b) provides that discovery must
encompass "any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter ...if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
F.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). This exchange of information is effected by means of interrogatories,
depositions, and the compelled production of documents. For example, under F.R.C.P. 34(a), a
party "may serve on any other party a request.., to produce and permit the party making the
request ... to inspect and copy, any designated documents." F.R.C.P. 34(a).
2. Critics perceived a Fifth Amendment problem in that the defendant would be compelled
to divulge objects, documents, or reports that might be incriminating or lead to incriminating
material, or might indirectly disclose a potential defense, the scrutiny and investigation of which
might lead the prosecution to incriminating material. The development of the law on this issue is
discussed fully with references to the literature and analysis of the leading cases in Wayne R.
LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 19.3-19.4 at 474-531 (West, 2d ed. 1984).
3. The turning point was Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), in which the Court held
that a Florida rule requiring a defendant to give notice of an alibi defense in advance of trial was
not constitutionally objectionable. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now
occupies a centrist position as to pretrial discovery in criminal cases; the rule is more advanced
than some states' rules but not as advanced as others. The Rule allows pretrial discovery by the
defense of statements made by the defendant under certain circumstances; the defendant's prior
criminal record; and documents, objects, and reports of examinations and tests that are material
to the preparation of the defense or will be used by the government as evidence at trial. F.R.Cr.P.
16(a). Statements by and the identity of witnesses generally are not subject to disclosure. The
government generally has a reciprocal right to the same categories of pretrial discovery, which is
triggered by a demand for that discovery by the defendant. An exception provides that, with
respect to documents, objects, and reports of examinations and tests, the government may not
compel defense disclosure solely on the ground that the objects would be material to the
preparation of the prosecution's case, but only when the defense intends to introduce the material
in its case in chief. F.R.Cr.P. 16(b).
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remains considerably wider than discovery in criminal cases, but the
gap has been narrowed.'
Discovery is the acquisition of information by one party from
another after an issue has been joined in litigation. Discovery rules
govern the flow of information between parties formally defined as
adversaries and represented by counsel. But access to information is
also vital in pre-litigation settings.5 In the criminal context, the
government may suspect that a crime has been or continues to be
committed; outside the criminal area, government may suspect that
regulations are being violated in a way that could lead to a civil
penalty or some other administrative sanction. Or government simply
may wish to probe a regulated activity in order to review the propriety
of operations in that area. What powers should government have to
investigate a suspicion or merely to probe at random before litigation
is launched or an administrative sanction imposed? Is there or should
there be a counterpart in this context to the civil-criminal dichotomy
that has long dominated and still influences the discovery process?
-If the initial scent is a criminal one, government may follow
two classical paths. The first possibility, procuring a search warrant,
is restricted by the Fourth Amendment's requirement of showing
probable cause before a magistrate.6  A search warrant thus is
unsuitable in cases of mere suspicion. Furthermore, by its nature, a
warrant is confined to the seizure of goods, effects, and papers and
cannot be used to compel testimony.7 In addition, a search warrant
may seem too harsh and intrusive a means of obtaining information
from third parties (not themselves targets of the investigation) who
may be willing to surrender documents or objects on demand.
4. The difference in scope between criminal and civil discovery remains a source of tension
and difficulty when the government contemplates or brings parallel civil and criminal proceedings
against a party. The sharpness of this contrast 15 years ago is brought out in Robert B. Mitchell,
Comment, Federal Discovery in Concurrent Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 769
(1978). While criminal discovery has broadened in the last two decades, problems still remain in
parallel proceedings. For a useful overview of these special problems, including a bibliography,
see 6 BNA Crim. Prac. Man. 801 (1992).
5. See Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at Work 14-
18 (Yale U., 1985) (presenting the struggle to obtain and control information as the principal
factor in the preparation of complex white-collar criminal cases).
6. Warrantless searches are proper when made as an incident to a valid arrest, United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), or in exigent situations, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 759 (1979). The latter exception covers a number of vehicle searches. Sanders, 442 U.S.
at 760 n.7, 761. Even so, police must have probable cause. However, when the state plans an
investigatory search for evidence, it generally must obtain a warrant from a magistrate.
7. However, the special warrant procedure for electronic surveillance, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2521 (1988), may yield crucial evidence including admissions from a party who turns out to be the
defendant in a criminal case.
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In federal criminal cases, these problems with search warrants
are somewhat alleviated by the presence of an alternative
procedure-the use of a grand jury subpoena to compel either
testimony or the production of documents. Grand jury subpoenas
need not be supported by probable cause;' they may be used to compel
testimony as well as the production of documents;9 and they present a
polite and discreet way of obtaining documents from third parties. In
the federal jurisdiction in particular, the grand jury has become an
indispensable engine of information-gathering and case-building in
complex criminal cases.
However, the grand jury has always been somewhat
embarrassingly at odds with the often-proclaimed self-image of
American criminal procedure as an adversarial system. With its
direction of compulsory process to the citizen who, unassisted by
counsel,1" faces a conviction for contempt if she does not answer
questions under oath in an inquisitorial setting, the grand jury stands
out as the "peculiar institution" of American criminal procedure.",
Perhaps because of sensitivity about this unabashedly inquisitorial
aspect, the grand jury has always been treated with strong
ambivalence. On the one hand, its historical freedom to begin an
inquiry based on mere hearsay, rumor, or even whim has been stoutly
8. This rule is based on the Supreme Court's refusal to equate grand jury subpoenas and
their consequences with the searches and seizures that are the subject of the Fourth Amendment.
See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the grand jury had subpoenaed 20
persons, seeking to compel them to give voice samples that could be compared with a recording.
The state could not show probable cause with respect to the individuals subpoenaed. Reversing
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court found no impropriety in the
subpoenas, holding that compulsion to respond to a grand jury subpoena does not amount to a
Fourth Amendment "seizure." Id. at 9. The Court observed, "Since neither the summons to
appear before the grand jury, nor its directive to make a voice recording infringed upon any
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment, there was no justification for requiring the grand
jury to satisfy even the minimal requirement of 'reasonableness' imposed by the Court of
Appeals." Id. at 15.
9. The subpoena for testimony is called a subpoena ad testificandum, while the subpoena
to produce documents is termed a subpoena duces tecum.
10. 'A witness 'before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on
being represented by his counsel' .... Under settled principles the witness may not insist upon
the presence of his attorney in the grand jury room." United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,
581 (1976) (citation omitted). The federal practice, followed in some states, permits the witness to
have counsel in an anteroom and to leave the grand jury room to consult with counsel. Id, Some
states permit certain witnesses to have counsel present in the grand jury room. See LaFave and
Israel, 1 Criminal Procedure § 8.13 at 705 (cited in note 2).
11. "Peculiar institution7 was the euphemistic term used to describe slavery in the ante-
bellum South. The terms exact origin is uncertain, although John C. Calhoun referred to the
'peculiar domestick institution" in 1830. See 5 Dictionary of American History 241 (Scribner's
Sons, 1976).
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defended and upheld in modern cases.12 In the same vein, successful
challenges to its jurisdiction or to the evidence it may receive are
extremely rare.' 3
In compensation, however, the sweeping nature of grand jury
powers has led to two crucial limitations. First, the breadth of the
grand jury's range of inquiry and powers of compulsion has been
viewed as justifiable only in the context of a criminal investigation.
Consequently, the grand jury may not initiate compulsory process for
any purpose other than to pursue an investigation into criminal
conduct. It must not be used as a pre-litigation discovery engine for
civil matters.'
4
The second, and related, limitation stems from the traditional
insistence on secrecy with respect to grand jury proceedings. The
fruits of the grand jury's subpoenas (whether documents or testimony)
are not automatically open for inspection by all government officers or
agencies. Both because they are records of the court 15 and because the
grand jury's proper function is narrowly perceived as the investigation
of criminality, a presumption of secrecy applies. Thus, inspection of
grand jury materials by other government officers is hedged about
12. "The jurors may act on tips, rumors, evidence offered by the prosecutor, or their own
personal knowledge." Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15.
13. "Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings
would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and
expeditious administration of the criminal laws." Id. at 16. In United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974), the respondent refused to answer grand jury questions on the ground that they
were based on the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. The Court held that this objection could
not be interposed by a grand jury witness. A witness "'is not entitled to urge objections of
incompetency or irrelevancy, such as a party might raise for this is no concern of his.'" Id. at 345
(quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919)). This approach applies even when the
witness's objection has a constitutional basis, as with the objection in Calandra, which rested on
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. While the grand jury itself may not violate a witness's
constitutional rights, it need not conduct an exclusionary rule inquiry into the possibility of a
prior violation. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-54.
14. The Supreme Court expressed this principle in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
356 U.S. 677 (1958), in which the Court stated that use of the grand jury's subpoena power for the
purpose of adducing evidence to be used in civil litigation would amount to "flouting the policy of
the law." Id. at 683. This policy, among others, underlies the detailed rules about grand jury
secrecy contained in F.R.Cr.P. 6(e), which is discussed at length in notes 148-49 and
accompanying text.
15. In Procter & Gamble, Justice Whittaker in his concurrence stated:
The grand jury minutes and transcripts are not the property of the Government's
attorneys, agents or investigators, nor are they entitled to possession of them in such a
case. Instead those documents are records of the court. And it seems clear that ... their
secrecy, which the law wisely provides, may be as fully violated by disclosure to and use
by the government counsel, agents and investigators as by the defendants' counsel in such
a civil suit.
Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 684-85 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
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with restrictions and may only be obtained on application to the
court.'6
These historical developments created a doctrine that, but for
the particular course of Anglo-American legal history, might appear
curious and paradoxical. Before litigation was initiated, criminal
investigators had available in the grand jury a virtually untrammeled
compulsory process, whereas in civil matters, even those in which the
government would be the plaintiff, compulsory process for
investigatory purposes did not exist at common law. By contrast, once
litigation was joined, civil discovery procedures were comparatively
broad while criminal discovery was quite narrow.
If left with no other avenues of investigation, this restriction of
compulsory process to the grand jury as a special tool of criminal
investigation would have intolerably inhibited modern regulatory
government. Particularly in the federal sphere, departments,
agencies, and commissions have proliferated, each charged with
regulating and supervising large and vital sectors of commercial life.
The legislation that creates or supports the administrative state
increasingly defines numerous specific breaches of regulations (or any
breach of regulations)17 as a criminal offense or, in the alternative or
incrementally, imposes a civil penalty or administrative sanction for
breach,8 In this way the historic rule-making function of
administrative agencies has been supplemented by a penalty-setting
law-enforcement function, which in turn has led to a massive
strengthening of these agencies' investigative role and capacity.
If all breaches of regulation were viewed strictly in criminal
terms, it would be impossible for United States Attorneys, working
with limited resources through the cumbersome mechanism of grand
16. F.R.Cr.P. 6(e). See notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
17. 'It has become the common statutory pattern in the United States for a statute
establishing an administrative agency to provide that any willful violation of the rules adopted by
the agency constitutes a federal felony." John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the
Criminal Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L. J. 1875, 1880 (1992).
Professor Coffee cites as examples the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff
(1988); the Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1988); the Investment Company Act of
1940, § 49, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1988); and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 217, 15 U.S.C. §
80b-17 (1988).
18. For a valuable discussion of this phenomenon, and the concomitant blurring of the
distinctions between criminal and civil proceedings, see Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:
The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L. J. 1795 (1992). For a list of
federal statutes and regulations that impose criminal as well as civil penalties for violation of
regulatory provisions, see Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil Sanction. and the Double Jeopardy
Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings After United States v.
Halper, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1251, 1278 n.145 (1990).
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juries, to make substantial inroads into the mountain of referrals they
might receive from agencies. Even if grand jury investigation were
made possible by a very large increase in the number of prosecutors
and operating grand juries, such a path would often be inexpedient,
because pursuing a criminal prosecution may not be the preferable
course of action, even in the case of a technical violation that amounts
to a crime. The statutory alternative of a civil penalty often will be
more attractive. The civil suit or administrative procedure may afford
a sanction virtually identical to the criminal penalty; in addition, in
civil or administrative proceedings the burden of proof is less onerous,
discovery rules are more favorable, and the party may submit to the
penalty rather than contest it, as is likely in a criminal prosecution.' 9
If civil penalties have become the preferred sanction in many
regulatory cases, these penalties now play an important deterrent and
perhaps punitive role that, in earlier times, was the exclusive province
of the criminal law. ° Their invocation and their impact often may be
hard to distinguish from the imposition of a criminal sanction.2' But
once we recognize this high degree of fungibility between civil and
criminal penalties, the reservation of the grand jury's compulsory
process for purely criminal investigations becomes difficult to justify.
If no other process were provided, the stark severity of this restriction
would leave a large area of regulatory and punitive authority deprived
of necessary access to information indispensable for investigation.
19. Kenneth Mann suggests that:
[plunitive civil sanctions are replacing a significant part of the criminal law in critical
areas of law enforcement, particularly in white-collar and drug prosecutions, because they
carry tremendous punitive power. Furthermore, since they are not constrained by
criminal procedure, imposing them is cheaper and more efficient than imposing criminal
sanctions. As a result, the jurisprudence of sanctions is experiencing a dramatic shift.
Mann, 101 Yale L. J. at 1798 (cited in note 18).
20. The punitive nature of many civil penalties may lead to the conclusion that at least
some of the guarantees for defendants associated with the criminal process must be observed. In
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the Court held that the double jeopardy clause must
be applied to a civil proceeding under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988), which
resulted in a large, punitive fine and was brought after a previous criminal conviction based on
the same conduct. See Mann, 101 Yale L. J. at 1840-43 (cited in note 18); Mary M. Cheh,
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives, 42 Hastings
L. J. 1325 (1991); Gliclkman, Note, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1251 (cited in note 18); Elizabeth S. Jahncke,
United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines
Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 112 (1991).
21. For example, under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
(FIRRE) of 1989, the civil penalty for violation of certain sections of the banking laws can be as
much as one million dollars, and continuing violations are punishable by fines as much as one
million dollars a day, with a maximum fine of five million dollars. The penalty may be higher if
any person derives pecuniary gain from the violation or imposes pecuniary loss on another. 12
U.S.C. § 1833a(b) (1988). The penalty is enforced by a civil action brought by the Attorney
General, who has full administrative subpoena power in connection with investigations in this
area. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(d), (f).
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The law abhors such a vacuum. Over the last few decades, the
response has been to fill this gap by statute, through the repeated
creation of powers, conferred on agencies and departments, to make a
civil investigative demand-in effect the vesting of subpoena power for
civil investigatory purposes in administrative officials.22
As a result, the grand jury is no longer a unique body vested
virtually exclusively with the awesome power of the investigatory
subpoena. Compulsory process powers are now rife in many agencies
of government. This dramatic development gives rise to important
questions about the relationship between this burgeoning field of civil
process and the traditional grand jury subpoena for the investigation
of crime. Most fundamentally, it directs us to ask what, generally,
justifies the use of compulsory process by government. When is such
process appropriate outside the classical case of a criminal
investigation?
We must also ask whether any justifiable principles or policies
lead to the conclusion that the fruits of criminal investigations
generally should not be available for the pursuit of civil remedies, or
conversely that the fruits of a civil investigation should not be
available for criminal prosecutions. Are we or should we be moving
toward a more integrated theory of compulsory process, in which
information is shared freely between government agencies, whether
their interest ultimately may be in criminal prosecution or civil or
administrative sanctions? Is there any danger of abuse or oppression
when criminal and civil investigations become mixed? More
particularly, can we perceive any abuses that rise to the level of
constitutional violations? This Article will discuss some of these
questions.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
Civil penalties are, for the most part, directed against
corporations or other commercial entities in the context of regulation
by a government agency. The sanction usually consists of a financial
penalty, an order to desist from certain activity, or a barring of the
entity from dealings with government. Because a commercial entity
cannot be imprisoned, and because these civil sanctions are sometimes
very damaging and even destructive, they often appear at least as
22. See Part V.
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punitive as any sanction that could be imposed on the entity through
a criminal prosecution.2 As noted above, this development
surprisingly has not been accompanied by the rapid growth of
compulsory process in civil and administrative proceedings, creating
an uneasy juxtaposition with the traditional criminal investigation
subpoena issued by the grand jury. Resolution of the tension depends
on the development of a general theory of compulsory process and
persuasive rationales for justifying or curbing its use.
Subjection to compulsory process is without doubt a substantial
intrusion into privacy and autonomy. It demands the disgorging of
papers or the revelation of information that the subject otherwise
would often choose not to disclose. To be generally free from such
compulsion is surely one of the marks of a liberal and humane society.
Just as surely, public necessity can displace this liberty. The grand
jury subpoena provides the classic example.
The exercise of compulsory process by the grand jury is
justifiable in two ways. First and foremost, society has a great
interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime. We can
certainly imagine a society that operates without compulsory process
even in criminal investigation. In England and Wales, much inquiry
into criminal activity must proceed without the powerful aids of a
grand jury and a general, criminal-investigation subpoena power
vested in magistrates or prosecutors.2 4 Perhaps the volume of crime,
the high degree of mobility, and a greater reluctance by citizens to
cooperate with the police make the use of compulsory process in the
investigation of serious crimes a more urgent need in the United
States than in England. For whatever reason, the grand jury
subpoena, modified by the constitutionally mandated privilege against
self-incrimination, has become deeply entrenched in our criminal
procedure.25
23, Civil and criminal actions may be brought consecutively or concurrently. Such "parallel
proceedings* force the defendant to make a complex series of tactical decisions that have been
likened to "playing multiple games of chess at the same time." Brand, Problems and Strategies
for Handling Parallel Proceedings, in Handling Complex Cases 453, 469 (Georgetown U. L. Ctr.,
1990).
24. England and Wales finally eliminated the grand jury in 1948; the jury had been little
used except in a purely formal capacity since 1933. Even when the jury was used to indict, it does
not appear that it was ever employed as an elaborate mechanism of investigation. See Alfred M.
Nittle and Martin H. Belsky, Grand Jury Indictments and Investigation-The British Experience,
reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International
Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1575 (1977).
25. This is not to say that there is any lack of criticism of the grand jury. Many states do
not use grand juries for charging purposes or for investigation. Jerold H. Israel, Grand Jury, in
Sanford H. Kadish, ed., 2 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 810, 814-15 (Free Press, 1983).
However, in the federal system, in which investigation into highly complex crimes predominates,
1994]
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A second justification resides in the traditional perception of
the grand jury as a citizen corps in which, as with the trial jury,
peerage and communal participation are positive virtues that endow
the process with a special legitimacy.6 However much critics repeat
that the grand jury is largely a creature of the prosecutor, that it in
effect issues her subpoenas, listens to her witnesses, receives her
explanation of the law, and most often is responsive to her tacit urging
of an indictment,27 nevertheless the grand jury occasionally asserts its
independence and does not appear to have exhausted its store of good
will as a democratic institution.
Neither of these justifying attributes applies to the civil
investigative demand, especially when it encompasses compelled
testimony and so is virtually coextensive with the historic powers of
the grand jury. In the civil context, the same large sweep of power
exists but, at least at the outset, the urgent necessity of an obviously
criminal investigation and the participatory democratic aspect of the
grand jury are lacking. Civil compulsory process thus calls for a
somewhat different justification.
That justification stems largely from the concept of a special
relationship with government. For example, those who engage in
licensed activities receive a privilege from the state that is properly
hedged with conditions that entail important waivers. Thus,
enforcing the socially necessary system of licensing the drivers of
motor vehicles would be impossible unless drivers must produce their
licenses and registration papers on demand, assuming that the initial
stop by the police is a legal one.2 8 Modern perceptions of the dangers
the investigative grand jury retains a conspicuous role. One critical survey of the grand jury
concludes that it should be reformed rather than abolished and that, in any event, its subpoena
power is indispensable for investigation and would have to be exercised by another organ (such as
a prosecutor or a magistrate) if the grand jury were abolished. Marvin E. Frankel and Gary P.
Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial 119 (Hill & Wang, 1977).
26. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 347 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that the grand
jury has "no axes to grind and [is] not charged personally with the administration of the law. No
one of them is a prosecuting attorney or law-enforcement officer.... It would be very difficult for
officers of the state seriously to abuse or deceive a witness in the presence of the grand jury.").
27. On these matters, see generally Frankel and Naftalis, The Grand Jury (cited in note
25); Israel, Grand Jury, in Kadish, ed., 2 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice at 810 (cited in note
25).
28. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court held that a random vehicle stop,
for no reason other than a desire to examine the driver's license and registration, violates the
Fourth Amendment, since it is not based on any articulable suspicion and involves a suspicious
reliance on police discretion. However, dicta in Prouse suggest that, when the initial stop is based
on articulable suspicion of some traffic violation or other offense, the police may ask to see the
driver's license and registration. Id. at 661-63. Dicta in the case also suggest that a roadblock
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of vehicular traffic require further waivers of customary rights and
privileges, so that the state has the power to set up drunk-driving
roadblocks 29 and, at least when based on articulable suspicion, to
require submission to a blood-alcohol test with a refusal usually
triggering the severe sanction of losing one's driver's license.30 In this
situation, of course, the purpose is avowedly to identify criminal
behavior or the possibility of criminal behavior. However, even when
criminal conduct is not as likely to be involved, as in the investigation
of routine traffic accidents, reporting duties that could be viewed as
extinguishing the privilege against self-incrimination nevertheless are
validly imposed.31
Likewise, parties engaged in especially dangerous or socially
sensitive activities (such as liquor retailers or operators of mines, gun
shops, or automobile repair shops) may be subjected to administrative
inspections or searches without probable cause and without warning.3 2
The common thread in this context is that, by way of implicit contract,
a citizen waives her privacy when she embarks on a closely regulated
commercial activity.
method, which eliminates reliance on police discretion, would be proper for license inspection
even in the absence of articulable suspicion with respect to any particular vehicle. Id. at 663.
29. The Supreme Court approved this practice in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444 (1990), provided that the method utilized has safeguards to minimize intrusiveness and
to eliminate police discretion. Several scholars have found the case for allowing drunk-driving
roadblocks unpersuasive. See James B. Jacobs and Nadine Stroessen, Mass Investigations
Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving
Roadblocks, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 595 (1985).
30. The penalty of license suspension annexed to a refusal to take the test is
constitutionally unobjectionable. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979). Indeed, the refusal to
submit to a blood-alcohol test, after the police have articulable suspicion of drunkenness, may be
admitted into evidence at a trial for drunk driving. In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553
(1983), the Court held that such a practice does not violate the Fifth Amendments privilege
against self-incrimination since (1) under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), a blood
test does not amount to taking "testimony," and (2) the refusal to take the test is not compelled by
the state. The Court further held that the Constitution does not require that the motorist be
warned specifically of the adverse consequences of a refusal to submit to the test. Id. at 564.66.
31. In California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court upheld, against a self-
incrimination challenge, a California statute that required motorists involved in accidents to stop
and provide their names and addresses. Commenting on Byers, the Court remarked in a later
case that "the ability to invoke the privilege [against self-incrimination] may be greatly
diminished when invocation would interfere with the effective operation of a generally applicable,
civil regulatory requirement.' Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 557
(1990).
32. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor dealers); Donovan
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining companies); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
(gun dealers); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (automobile junkyards). The government
may inspect a "closely regulated" business without a warrant if the regulatory scheme is in aid of
a substantial public interest, the warrantless inspections are necessary to further the regulatory
aims, and the ordinance or statute authorizing the inspection provides reasonable restrictions on
arbitrary action. Burger, 482 U.S. at 708-12.
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This theme applies to many commercial activities that are
conducted under governing statutes and codes of regulations that
require the keeping of certain records. Such "required records," which
are kept at the state's direction and for the state's regulatory
purposes, can be subpoenaed routinely without even the possibility of
asserting a privilege against self-incrimination 33
This body of law applying to licensed activities and to the
keeping of required records provides a foundation for a wider principle
of compulsory process applicable to all those who engage in regulated
commercial activity. A decision to enter into a field of commercial
activity that is validly regulated by government entails an implicit
contract in which the private party agrees to observe standards and
practices imposed by government. This arrangement would be hollow
and unworkable if government could not effectively probe into
questions of compliance and breach. One necessary corollary of the
relationship is, therefore, that those who engage in these activities
have implicitly contracted to open their books to the government and
also have agreed to be examined as to the conduct of these activities,
at least when government has some basis for conducting an inquiry.
In recent years, the need to enforce regulations has led to
further contractions of privacy rights and the imposition of reporting
obligations, not only on those engaged in special areas of commerce,
but on members of the public generally. Such developments have
been notable, for example, in the effort to trace the laundering of
money received from illegal activities.3 4 All these developments are
linked by a common theme-the inability of government to enforce its
regulatory or fiscal policies (often closely related to crime control)
without wide powers to gather information from those whose activities
it seeks to regulate and, indeed, at times even from the general public.
33. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), held that a statute could properly require
certain businesses to maintain records and make them available for inspection on request. The
doctrine is discussed in Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1986). The narrow required-records
doctrine most importantly operates to nullify the privilege against self-incrimination; it also
reveals a broader justification for a wide field of subpoena power in the nature of civil
investigative demands, namely, public necessity. The self-incrimination privilege may be retained
in other contexts, also justified by public necessity, in which compulsory process is exercised.
34. One of the earliest pieces of legislation, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, imposed an
obligation on financial institutions to ifie Currency Transaction Reports with the Internal
Revenue Service on all cash transactions of more than $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988). This
provision later was strengthened to require, in addition, that all persons engaged in a trade or
business who receive more than $10,000 in cash in a single transaction or related transactions
must file a form with the IRS within 15 days. 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1988).
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To achieve governmental regulatory aims to the fullest extent,
even extensive requirements of recordkeeping (backed by the
subpoena duces tecum) or requirements to report certain transactions
have become inadequate. Crucial information with respect to
regulatory violations (which, as noted above, very often also may
amount to criminal offenses) may be in the hands or minds of those
who are not the custodians of required records and who do not have
any sua sponte reporting duties. Unlocking the storehouse of
information held by these third parties, perhaps the employees of a
commercial entity that is being investigated, may be the only way to
uncover serious irregularities. In this context, the strongest form of
civil compulsory process-the power to compel testimony-is needed
and has often been granted by statute.
This case most closely resembles the traditional grand jury
subpoena for testimony, for it cannot be justified by pointing to any
special relationship between the witness and the government. Here,
as with the grand jury, the only special characteristic of the witness is
that she may have pertinent information that would be helpful to
government in its inquiries. But if the inquiring agency is a civil one,
and no criminal prosecution is contemplated initially, what can be the
justifications for stretching the subpoena power so far?
As with the grand jury subpoena in a criminal investigation,
the justifications must rest on the strength of the public interest
involved. First, the administrative, regulatory nature of modern
government serves goals that are often as urgent as the traditional
special importance perceived in criminal investigations. Health,
environmental pollution, commercial probity, and protection of the
public from abuse of contractual relations with the government are
examples of areas in which the public interest is scarcely any less
potent than in those sectors protected by traditional criminal law
prohibitions. Second, the increasing attachment of criminal liability
for conduct that breaches administrative regulations makes a criminal
prosecution at least conceivable in most cases. Third, civil and
administrative penalties in themselves, even in the absence of express
criminal offenses, often are so punitive and so deterrent in their aim
and impact that any differentiation between civil and criminal
sanctions, and the accompanying investigatory processes, becomes
less and less convincing.
When the breach of administrative regulation is made a
criminal offense, the offense often will be governed by strict liability,
in which traditional criminal concepts of mens rea have been largely
discarded. In this way conduct not only often constitutes both a civil
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violation and a criminal offense, but the elements of proof that would
establish civil or administrative liability usually amount to the same
case that would prove criminality.
The result is that, in many cases, the distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings has less and less to do with distinctive social
goals or even with the elements that must be proved, and more and
more to do with the procedural forms that must be followed. As noted,
breaches of regulatory schemes are for these reasons increasingly
likely to lead to a cluster of parallel civil and criminal investigations
and legal processes.3 5 This striking development has called into
question the restriction of constitutional guarantees to procedures
that are initiated by traditional criminal forms of charging, which
depend on statutory classifications that appear increasingly more
formal and less functional.36
For the same reasons, these developments also call for scrutiny
of traditional shibboleths about abuse of process. Whether people are
abused by misuse of process is a question that should be decided in
light of modern realities and not by appeal to historically rooted
slogans and forms. If a strong case can be made for the propriety of
compulsory process in the civil investigation of regulatory violations
and the frequency of overlap between such civil investigations and the
potential criminal prosecution, then the historical assertion of the
distinctness of grand jury process as well as the concomitant secrecy
provisions attached to grand jury proceedings are placed seriously in
doubt.
35. One example arises from the investigation of the failure of the Lincoln Savings and
Loan Association. This event led to the following proceedings: (1) numerous civil lawsuits brought
by bondholders of the parent company, (2) a federal civil fraud action brought by investors, (3) two
civil actions brought by the state of California, (4) a federal civil suit brought by the Resolution
Trust Corporation, (5) a cease and desist action brought by the Office of Thrift Supervision, (6) a
California state criminal prosecution, (7) a federal criminal investigation, (8) a Securities and
Exchange Commission investigation, and (9) various congressional investigations. 6 BNA Crim.
Prac. Man. at 801 (citation omitted) (cited in note 4).
36. In a decision of far-reaching significance, the Supreme Court in United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989), held that the penalty sought in a civil suit that followed a criminal
prosecution for the same conduct violated the Double Jeopardy Clause when the civil penalty
would be grossly in excess of any loss sustained by the government or any collection expense
incurred by the government and thus could only be seen as a purely punitive and deterrent
penalty. Id. at 440-46. In Halper, a case arising out of Medicare fraud, the government lost $585;
the defendant was first sentenced to two years imprisonment in a criminal prosecution. Id. at
437. The government later sought $130,000 as a fine in a civil false claims suit. See generally
Glickman, Note, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1251 (cited in note 18).
One federal appeals court has held that Halper has no application in cases of civil forfeiture
preceded by a criminal conviction. United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992,995 (4th Cir. 1992).
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III. CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMANDS
Subpoena power vested in civil agencies has accumulated in
recent decades and is now widespread.31 In recent years, the law
pertaining to judicial scrutiny of these civil investigative demands3 8
has been patterned on older principles applicable to the grand jury
and, indeed, now almost exactly mirrors the standards for challenging
a grand jury subpoena. This development attests to the already
considerable assimilation of civil and criminal compulsory process.
By contrast, the early cases on administrative subpoenas
displayed judicial reluctance to grant broad enforcement. 39 In FTC v.
American Tobacco Co.,40 the Court in 1924 held that agencies could
not demand documents merely to inspect operations in a regulated
field. With references to the relevance of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court condemned "fishing expeditions" by agencies and appeared to
require something akin to a showing of probable cause to believe that
some breach of regulation had been committed.4' The Court took the
same narrow view in Jones v. SEC,42 a 1936 case in which the Court
declined to enforce an SEC subpoena for books and records with
respect to the accuracy of a registration statement. Because the
corporate entity, when faced with the subpoena, had withdrawn the
statement, the Court held that the SEC could no longer show a proper
purpose for the inquiry.
A dramatic change appeared by 1943, the date of the next
Supreme Court decision in this field, perhaps explicable by reference
to a new perception of the central, social importance of administrative
agencies engendered by experience with the New Deal and World War
II. This 1943 decision, Endicott Johnson v. Perkins,43 which has
become the foundational case for the modern approach, evinced a
growing recognition of the absolute necessity to provide agencies with
37. The first major conferral of civil administrative subpoena power was found in the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 10101-11901 (1988). The power to issue a subpoena sometimes is contained in the
parent statute (see the examples in the text accompanying notes 80-115) and sometimes in
regulations promulgated by the agencies themselves. See, for example, 14 C.F.R. § 305.7(a)
(1981).
38. Administrative subpoenas of course are not self-enforcing. The issuing party must have
recourse to the district court. Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir. 1980).
39. The development of the law in this area is traced in Steve R. Johnson, Note, Reasonable
Relation Reassessed. The Examination of Private Documents by Federal Regulatory Agencies, 56
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 742 (1981).
40. 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
41. Id.at305-06.
42. 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
43. 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
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broad access to information. A civil subpoena, the Court declared, will
be enforced if the "evidence sought... [is] not plainly incompetent or
irrelevant to any lawful purpose."" The subpoena in Endicott
Johnson was issued by the Secretary of Labor in administrative
proceedings. Shortly thereafter, in the context of a subpoena issued in
the course of an investigation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Court set out three conditions for the validity of an administrative
subpoena.45  The administrative subpoena must be sought for a
"lawfully authorized purpose," documents requested must be "relevant
to the inquiry," and adequate specification of those documents must be
provided.4 While Endicott Johnson stated that an agency may not act
arbitrarily or in excess of its statutory authority, it also emphasized,
relying significantly on language in an old grand jury case, that "this
does not mean that [the] inquiry must be 'limited ... by forecasts of
the probable result of the investigation."'41
The Court again reviewed the question of the proper scope of
an inquiry into the validity of an administrative subpoena in United
States v. Morton Salt Co.," in which the Court refused to scrutinize a
subpoena under any strict standard of relevance. Morton Salt upheld
broad powers of administrative inquiry, expressly likening the proper
scope of an administrative subpoena to the traditional wide powers of
inquiry enjoyed by the grand jury. Repudiating the earlier cases, the
Court announced the propriety of "fishing expeditions" intended only
to seek assurance that regulations are not being breached. 49 In a
44. Id. at 509. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(tracing the development of this doctrine).
45. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). The subpoena was
issued under the Fair Labor Standards Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. §§ 49-50 (1934).
46. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 209. The third requirement-sufficient particularity in
description-applies also to grand jury subpoenas. "Legality," in the context of administrative
subpoenas, requires a minimal showing of statutory power in the area under investigation and
compliance with the administrative requirements of the statute or regulations, while 'relevance"
also requires no more than a minimal showing that the material sought could have a conceivable
bearing on a subject into which the agency is authorized to investigate. See text accompanying
notes 48-51.
47. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 216 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282
(1919)).
48. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
49. Morton Salt dealt with the investigatory powers of the Federal Trade Commission. In a
crucial passage, the Court stated that:
[t]he only power ... involved here is the power to get information from those who best can
give it and who are most interested in not doing so. Because judicial power is reluctant if
not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it
does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are
enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. It has a power of
inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial function. It
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major affirmation of this position, the Court in United States v. Powell
stated that an agency (like the grand jury) need not show probable
cause but only must demonstrate that its purpose is legitimate under
statute, that the inquiry is relevant to that purpose, and that the
required administrative steps have been duly followed.w° As with
grand jury subpoenas, an unreasonably broad or burdensome
administrative demand may be quashed or modified, but the party
challenging the demand bears the burden of proof.51
Thus, with respect to standards of judicial scrutiny, the Court
in recent decades has virtually assimilated the grand jury subpoena
and the civil investigative demand.
IV. ABUSE OF PROCESS
The Supreme Court has stated, rather cryptically, that a party
or witness may challenge an administrative subpoena "on any
appropriate ground."52  The privilege against self-incrimination is
clearly one of those grounds;0 other grounds include the attorney-
client privilege,m the free exercise of religion25 freedom of
is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for
power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being
violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and
accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too, may take
steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.
338 U.S. at 642.43 (emphasis added). These statements may need slight modification in light of
the Supreme Court's latest pronouncements on the scrutiny of grand jury subpoenas in United
States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991). In R. Enterprises, the Court considered Rule
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a court may quash or
modify a subpoena if "compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive," and interpreted this
language to impose some relevancy requirement. A court should uphold the subpoena "unless the
district court determines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the
Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's
investigation." Id. at 301. Since this burden would be very difficult for the moving party to
discharge, the Court added that a court may be justified in 'requiring the Government to reveal
the general subject of the grand jury's investigation before requiring the challenging party to
carry its burden of persuasion." Id. at 302. The Court also stated that grand juries "are not
licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions .. . . Id. at 299. It seems probable that the
same standard will be applied to administrative subpoenas; however, this standard likely will not
make a practical difference of any great consequence.
50. 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (involving an IRS summons). The rule that a summons need only
bear a reasonable relation to a statutory purpose is now codified in the Administrative Procedure
Act, which provides that a subpoena must contain a "showing of general relevance and reasonable
scope of the evidence sought." 5 U.S.C. §555(d) (1988).
51. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862,882 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
52. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
53. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
54. Reisman, 375 U.S. at 449.
55. United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1980).
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association,- and Fourth Amendment issues.57 With the exception of
the Fourth Amendment ground, no significant difference appears
between this list and the grounds for attacking a grand jury
subpoena.5
In a warning familiar also in grand jury cases, Powell
cautioned against the abuse of process that may exist, in the Court's
examples, if a purpose to harass or to pressure settlement of a
collateral matter could be shown.69 Abuse of process in the context of
administrative subpoenas, however, may demand a somewhat wider
inquiry than in the grand jury area. The grand jury carries cultural
and social connotations that link it firmly in the public mind with the
prospect of criminal prosecutions. Thus, even though formal target
warnings are probably not constitutionally required for a grand jury
witness,6 0 the possibility that one is a target and the consequent
danger of prosecution will be readily apparent to many recipients of
grand jury subpoenas. This awareness is likely to encourage
prudence, perhaps leading to consultation with a lawyer and, in the
case of oral testimony, reflection on the advisability of asserting the
privilege against self-incrimination. These considerations may be less
readily apparent to the recipient of a subpoena from a civil agency.
The convergence of criminal and civil process thus raises the
question of the obligation to issue suitable warnings to those who are
the subjects of civil subpoenas or investigative demands, either to the
effect that they are targets or at least that the investigation may
result in prosecution. Historically, this issue first arose in IRS cases.
These cases hold that the IRS has no general duty to disclose that an
investigation may lead to a criminal prosecution, even in cases in
which the taxpayer has clearly become a target,61 but IRS agents must
56. United States v. Citizens.State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (8th Cir. 1980).
57. United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 934-35 (3d Cir. 1969).
58. On the Fourth Amendment question, see the discussion of SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec., Inc.,
645 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), in the text accompanying notes 65-69.
59. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964). The party contesting the subpoena
bears the burden of showing an abuse of process. Id.
60. The Supreme Court left this point open in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564
(1976), but four of the six Justices who commented on this question took the view that warnings
were not required. In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977), the Court held that
failure to give a grand jury witness target warnings (as distinguished from Miranda.type
warnings, which the witness in Washington had been given) did not amount to compelled self-
incrimination.
61. "[lit is unrealistic to suggest that the government could or should keep a taxpayer
advised as to the direction in which its necessarily fluctuating investigations lead! United States
v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1959). Thus, an IRS agent need not warn a taxpayer that
an investigation may have prosecutorial objectives. See also United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13
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answer truthfully when the taxpayer (or her counsel) makes an
express inquiry about this matter.
62
With respect to administrative subpoenas generally, a
requirement of special warnings seems quite inappropriate in a large
category of cases. For example, when the documents subject to
subpoenas duces tecum or agency requests for production are public
records that the entity is required by statute to keep and produce for
agency inspection, the agency has an absolute right to the documents.
Accordingly, the privilege against self-incrimination simply does not
apply. No conceivable warning could be apt in this situation.6 3
When the documents are not clearly public records and the
party arguably might be able to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege,
courts appear to have followed the same approach developed in the
(9th Cir. 1973); Truitt v. Lenahan, 529 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1976). This rule applies even if the
investigation has revealed that a fraud has been committed. Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d
898 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1975). United States v. Light,
394 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1968), accepted the same principle with respect to an SEC investigation; the
defendant had complained that records voluntarily surrendered to the SEC were turned over to
the United States Attorney improperly.
62. In United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977), a taxpayer's accountant asked
an IRS agent whether a Special Agent (that is, a criminal investigator) was involved in the
inquiry. The agent responded that this was not the case, although he knew that the investigation
had been initiated at the request of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Justice
Department. Id. at 299. On the basis of this assurance, the taxpayer disclosed certain documents
to the IRS. The court found that the agent's conduct amounted to impermissible deception,
characterizing the conduct as a "sneaky deliberate deception by the agent . .. and a flagrant
disregard for appellants rights." Id. at 299. For that reason, the Tweel court suppressed the
evidence based on its having been seized through an invalid consent search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 300. However, it must be noted that Beckwith v. United States, 425
U.S. 341 (1976), held than an IRS criminal investigator need not give a taxpayer Miranda
warnings prior to a non-custodial interview. Taking account of Beckwith, the court in United
States v. Irvine, 699 F.2d 43 (lst Cir. 1983), held that a Special Agent's omission to state that he
was a criminal investigator (in a case in which the subject had been given self-incrimination
warnings) should not lead to suppression of evidence, even if the omission constituted a breach of
IRS regulations. Irvine confined Tweel to "fairly serious affirmative misrepresentations." Id. at
46 (emphasis in original). IRS regulations do require Special Agents to administer a self-
incrimination warning that closely resembles Miranda warnings. See IRS guidelines
promulgated in IRS News Release IR-897, Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 6832 (1967), and IRS
News Release IR-949, Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 6946 (1968). On its facts, Tweel may be compared
with United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the court found no
impropriety when IRS agents, although already suspecting fraud, responded to an inquiry about
the length and focus of the investigation by saying that they were investigating discrepancies to
determine whether those discrepancies were the result of innocent errors.
63. Courts have recognized this point. See United States v. Light, 394 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.
1968); United States v. Mahler, 254 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). These cases involved the
Securities and Exchange Commission; the governing statute expressly provides that the
documents at issue may be turned over to the Attorney General to enable her to consider whether
a criminal prosecution should be initiated. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3, a-4
(1993).
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IRS context. 64 In SEC v. ESM Government Securities, Inc.,65 the SEC
had sent to the appellant's offices agents who, even after the appellant
had been identified as a target, pretended to be interested only in
acquiring information about the working of that branch of the
securities industry. Under this ruse they obtained several documents
from the appellant and, on the basis of information gathered during
their pretextual visits, later served a subpoena for further records.
When the appellant appealed the denial of its motion to quash the
subpoena, the government argued that the decision in United States v.
Calandra66 which held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
did not apply to proceedings before a grand jury, should govern the
case.
Although the court did not decide this question, it did observe
that there were stronger reasons to hope for significant deterrence by
applying the exclusionary principle in an administrative setting than
in a grand jury setting.67 The court preferred to approach the case
through the concept of abuse of process 6 and remanded for a finding
on whether the agents had seriously deceived the appellant and
whether the subpoena was the fruit of that deception, indicating that
the subpoena should be quashed if that were the case. 69
64. In SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc), the court
observed that an SEC subpoena issued while a criminal prosecution was pending was valid unless
.specific evidence of agency bad faith or malicious governmental tactics" existed. Id. at 1375. In
United States v. Medic House, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1531 (W.D. Mo. 1989), the respondent argued
that "friendly overtures" by agents of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services and their failure to disclose a formal investigation invalidated the Department's
subpoena. The court, citing IRS cases, among others, ruled against the respondent on the ground
that he had failed to demonstrate any specific bad faith or malicious tactics. Id. at 1538.
65. 645 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
66. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
67. In ESM Gov't Sec., the SEC itself had committed the violation, unlike the situation in
Calandra, in which the violation was committed not by an agent of the grand jury but by the
police during a prior search. In the administrative setting, there is no division of function akin to
that between the police and the grand jury. Further, the administrative agency may resort to a
civil rather than a criminal procedure so that questions of the admissibility of evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds at a later trial stage might be more difficult to raise. The Supreme Court in
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), stated that "the Court never has applied [the
exclusionary rule] to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state." Id. at 447. The
Court acknowledged, however, that other courts have applied the principle in civil proceedings
when the officer conducting the illegal search was an agent of the sovereign that sought to use the
evidence. Id. at 455.
68. It should be noted that since the agency must turn to the court to seek judicial
enforcement of its subpoenas, the situation not only raises questions of the agency's abuse of its
own process but ultimately questions of abuse of the process of the court.
69. The court stated:
We believe that a private person has the right to expect that the government, when acting
in its own name, will behave honorably.... [Tihe individual should be able to rely on the
agent's representations. We think it clearly improper for a government agent to gain
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The abuse of process issue thus raises questions about
deceptive practices similar to those that may arise from questionable
consent to police searches or arguably improper acts by police
investigators that give rise to grand jury subpoenas. But the
sensitivity of these questions is sharpened in the administrative
process because, as in ESM Government Securities, the citizen has less
reason to be alert to the possibility of incrimination when the
government officer has no obvious connection with the criminal
process. An appropriate remedy would be a generalized statutory
requirement that warnings or cautionary statements be administered
once an investigation with a possible prosecutorial outcome is focusing
on the party.
V. THE SCOPE OF THE DEMAND
Although administrative subpoena power is sometimes
restricted to compelling the production of documents, it increasingly
and now typically includes the power to compel testimony under oath.
While often attended by some rules as to confidentiality,7° the power to
communicate the product of an administrative investigation to other
government agencies generally is a good deal broader than with the
results of a grand jury investigation. The growth of this investigative
power (and the accompanying growth of investigative departments in
agencies to exercise the power) is of the greatest significance.
The investigative power and the civil penalties that may ensue
from the investigation must be viewed as an important co-belligerent
with the criminal law, carrying punitive and deterrent force that may
access to records which would otherwise be unavailable to him by invoking the private
individual's trust in his government, only to betray that trust. When that government
agency then invokes the power of a court to gather the fruits of its deception, we hold that
there is an abuse of process.
ESM Govt Sec., 645 F.2d at 316.
70. For example, the Attorney General has power, "prior to the institution of a civil or
criminal proceeding,* to issue a civil investigative demand for documentary materials in
connection with a racketeering investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1968(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The
statute requires the Attorney General to designate a racketeering investigator as custodian of the
documents and provides that the custodian shall deliver the documents to any attorney
designated to appear on behalf of the United States before any court or grand jury in any
racketeering case or proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (f)(3), (4). Apart from such a release, the
custodian shall not reveal documents "without the consent of the person who produced such
material.' 18 U.S.C. § 1968(0(3). This provision provides a good example of the intertwining of
criminal and civil remedies and criminal and civil compulsory process. In effect, the Attorney
General in this context has been deemed a one-person grand jury for criminal matters (at least as
far as documents are concerned) and compulsory process in the criminal context is deliberately
commingled with compulsory process for civil purposes.
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be more destructive in their impact on the subject than formal
criminal proceedings:' Again, the very distinction between criminal
and civil proceedings becomes blurred in areas of enforcement of
regulatory law. Moreover, the product of investigations carried out by
civil agencies by means of civil compulsory process may end up in the
hands of a prosecutor and thus provide the underpinnings for a
conventional criminal prosecution. 2 In this way, the importance of
the grand jury and formal prosecutorial agencies as investigative
machines is diminished as more of their work is done by the staffs of
civil agencies.
The right to issue a civil investigative demand (that is, an
administrative subpoena) exists only by statute, but such powers are
now widely distributed among executive agencies of government 3 and
generally include both the power to call for documents and the power
to compel testimony under oath. A significant exception is the
subpoena power conferred on Inspectors General, which is confined to
the production of, documents and does not extend to compelling
testimony.7 4  A specific, though not very onerous, restriction is
contained in the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 5 which provides that
a government authority76 may have access by subpoena to the
financial records of a customer in the possession of a financial
institution only when there is reason to believe that the records
sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.77
As the above discussion reveals, there are no differences likely
to be of much practical consequence in the standards employed to
scrutinize the enforcement of administrative subpoenas as compared
with grand jury subpoenas. The assimilation of the two kinds of
71. This point is fully developed in Mann, 101 Yale L. J. at 1795 (cited in note 18).
72. The information also may end up in the hands of another civil agency and thus form the
basis for civil penalties in another area.
73. The power to issue subpoenas and to compel testimony extends from the broadest to the
narrowest field of regulation. For example, subpoena powers exist with respect to the regulation
of veterans benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 5711 (Supp. IV 1992); noise control, 42 U.S.C. § 49 15(d) (1988);
the reporting of energy information, 15 U.S.C. § 796(b)(1) (1988); the protection of endangered
species, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(2) (1988); antarctic conservation, 16 U.S.C. § 2407(b) (1988); halibut
fishing, 16 U.S.C. § 773i(e),(f) (1988); and honey research, 7 U.S.C. § 4610a(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
74. See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 106-15.
75. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
76. "Government authority" includes the Securities and Exchange Commission. 12 U.S.C. §
3422 (1988).
77. Id. § 3405. A copy of the subpoena must be served on the customer, who must be given
the opportunity to move to quash the subpoena. Id. The statute, as amended in 1986, does not
preclude any financial institution or officer or employee thereof from notifying a government
authority that it possesses information that may be relevant to a violation of any statute or
regulation. Id. § 3403(c).
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compulsory process in this important context is virtually complete.
However, one procedural advantage of substantial importance applies
to a party's challenge to an administrative subpoena but is not
available when a grand jury subpoena is challenged. The denial of a
motion to quash an administrative subpoena may be appealed,
78
whereas no such appeal is available when a motion to quash a grand
jury subpoena is denied. 79 This difference may sometimes make the
grand jury subpoena procedure more attractive to the government.
VI. SOME EXAMPLES
A. Antitrust
A typical and important example of the statutory bestowal of
compulsory process may be found in the antitrust area. The Antitrust
Civil Process Act, 0 broadened in 1976 by the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act, now confers on the Attorney General
and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department power to compel the production of
documents, to compel written answers to written interrogatories, and
to compel oral testimony whenever they believe the person may have
information relevant to a civil antitrust investigation. 8'
The demand may be made prior to the institution of any civil or
criminal proceeding.82 The demand must state the nature of the
conduct constituting the alleged antitrust violation or the activities
that may result in a violation.m Any objection that would be a proper
ground for refusing to comply with a grand jury subpoena also will
serve as a valid ground for refusing to comply with the civil antitrust
78. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
79. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971). However, any contempt conviction
consequent upon a refusal to comply with the subpoena can be appealed. Id. If appropriate,
objection might be made pre-trial in any subsequent criminal prosecution to the introduction at
trial of evidence obtained through the subpoena if the moving party can show that the evidence
was tainted, perhaps as the product of illegal electronic surveillance.
80. Pub. L. No. 87-664 (1962), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1312-1313 (1988).
81. Prior to 1976, the Act did not bestow power to compel oral testimony or to compel
answers to interrogatories. The 1976 amendments were intended to 'increase the effectiveness of
antitrust investigations." Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, H.R. Rep. No.
94-1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2606 (1976); see S. Rep. No. 94-803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1On (1976).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1988).
83. Id. § 1312(b).
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subpoena. 84 If the subpoena demands oral testimony, the examination
is held in private, but, unlike the grand jury situation, the person
being examined may be accompanied by counsel85 and later may
obtain a copy of the transcript of her testimony.8 The statute
expressly recognizes the privilege to refuse to answer questions on
constitutional grounds, including the privilege against self-
incrimination.87
In antitrust matters, information obtained under the subpoena
power often will be highly sensitive and potentially damaging to the
economic or business position of the witness if made widely available.
Under the statute the Antitrust Division must designate an
investigator as the custodian of material obtained under the subpoena
power.8 Prior to 1976, the statute absolutely prohibited disclosure of
material to third parties. The 1976 amendments provide that such
material generally shall not be made available to third parties
without the consent of the person from whom they were obtained.89
However, this provision is subject to crucial exceptions: The material
may be furnished to any attorney of the Department of Justice who
has been designated to appear before any court, grand jury, or federal
administrative or regulatory agency in any case or proceeding. 9° Also,
officials, employees, or agents of the Justice Department may use such
material in connection with the taking of oral testimony under the
statute.91 Further, such material may be delivered to the Federal
84. Id. § 1312(c)(1)(A). This interesting provision reveals the assimilation of the scope of the
grand jury subpoena and the civil investigative demand. However, under the antitrust
provisions, as noted, the subpoena must indicate the nature of the alleged or suspected impending
violation. Grand jury subpoenas are not required to include any such revelation.
85. Id. § 1312(i)(7).
86. Id. § 1312(i)(6).
87. Id. § 1312(i)(7). As in the grand jury context, an invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination may be countered with an offer of immunity. The provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-
6004 (1988) provide that, whenever a witness refuses to testify before "an agency of the United
States," the agency may grant formal immunity with the approval of the Attorney General when
the agency judges that the witness's testimony may be necessary in the public interest. However,
immunity, in this context as well as before the grand jury, may leave important interests of the
witness unprotected: "There may be unwanted legal consequences, such as disbarment, treble
damage civil liability, and tax penalties and interest, because immunity affords no protection
against the use of the testimony in any administrative or civil proceeding, state or federal.
Immunized witnesses also risk loss of job, economic retaliation, social stigma, and
embarrassment." -Seymour Glanzer, et al., Responding to Subpoenas, in Milton Eisenberg, ed.,
Lawyers' Deskbook on White Collar Crime 27 (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for Pub. Interest, 1991).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1988).
89. Id. § 1313(c)(3).
90. Id. § 1313(d)(1).
91. Id. § 1313(c)(2). Section 1314(b), which provides that a petition for an order modifying
or setting aside a demand can be filed in the district court, may provide some relief. See
Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 1343 (D.C.D.C. 1978), in which the
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Trade Commission in response to a written request in connection with
an investigation under the Commission's jurisdiction. 92  These 1976
provisions allow substantially more liberal disclosure than do the
rules with respect to materials obtained by the grand jury9 3
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice itself may
initiate prosecutions 94 so that, in this instance, civil and criminal
investigatory, remedial, and punitive powers converge dramatically.9 5
Indeed, the power to issue civil subpoenas in the antitrust context has
been challenged for this very reason. The rejection of the challenge96
demonstrates the legal system's acceptance of a high degree of
integration of criminal and civil compulsory process; the antitrust
provisions perhaps point to a future model of convergence and
cooperation between civil and criminal authorities.
B. SEC
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has broad
powers to investigate any possible violation or impending violation of
securities laws, with a view to either civil or criminal law enforcement.
The Commission may require any person to file a statement under
petitioner had provided thousands of pages of documents containing sensitive and confidential
business information in compliance with a civil investigative demand. The court held that the
case was controlled by 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c), which provides, inter alia, that no demand may require
material that would be protected from disclosure under the standards applicable to discovery
requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that the application of these
standards is consistent with the provisions and purposes of the statute. Aluminum Co. of
America, 444 F. Supp. at 1346. Relying on this provision, the court issued a protective order to
the effect that the petitioner must receive notice of the disclosure of certain sensitive categories of
material and be given an opportunity to object. Id. at 1343.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (1988).
93. See the discussion in notes 227-57 and accompanying text.
94. 28 C.F.R. § 0.40 (1993). For fuller discussion, see 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCI) 8522
(1988).
95. Another vivid example of a union of civil and criminal investigatory power is found in
the operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has both criminal
investigatory and civil regulatory powers. The DEA, acting through the Attorney General, has
power to issue a civil investigatory demand, including the power to compel the testimony of
witnesses. 21 U.S.C. § 876 (1988). Critics have alleged that the DEA uses subpoenas aggressively
to conduct large-scale fishing expeditions against generally legitimate businesses, such as nursery
and gardening enterprises, whose services may be used by those engaged in marijuana
cultivation. See the report in 5 BNA Crim. Prac. Man. at 555 (cited in note 4).
96. In Hyater Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964), the court held that the civil
subpoena power was not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that civil subpoena power is
conferred on the Attorney General, who also has the power to prosecute. Id. at 186. Indeed,
courts have recognized that the policy underlying the statute is to permit the Antitrust Division
to conduct antitrust investigations effectively without being required to commit themselves to
litigation, which often would be necessary if they enjoyed only the discovery powers that attach
when litigation commences. Associated Container Tranp. (Australia) Ltd. v. United States, 705
F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1983).
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oath97 and may also subpoena witnesses and require the production of
books and documents.9 8 The Commission has broad authority to share
the information it obtains with other governmental agencies. First,
the Commission may transmit its findings to the Justice
Department.99 Concurrent investigations by the SEC and the Justice
Department are not in any way improper. 100 More generally, the
Commission may furnish information in its investigative files to other
agencies, even if a violation of law does not appear.o'' While
information gathered initially is protected by a presumption of
confidentiality, the Commission may authorize a disclosure if it finds
that disclosure is not contrary to the public interest. 10 2  The SEC's
Rules of Practice and Investigations authorize certain officers to
engage in discussion as to investigations with representatives of
domestic and foreign governmental authorities. °3  Finally, the
Commission may, without notice under the Financial Privacy Act of
1978, transfer financial records that it has obtained to any state
securities agency or to the Department of Justice.' °4 These provisions
contrast dramatically with the severe restrictions on divulging
information obtained by a grand jury.
10 5
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (1988).
98. Id. § 78u(b).
99. Id. § 78u(a); id. § 78u(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
100. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1993).
102. Id. § 240.0-4.
103. Id. § 203.2. One commentator has summarized these provisions:
Today any Assistant Director of the Division of Enforcement (a second level supervisor)
can authorize discussions with a prosecutor concerning any SEC investigations. 17 C.F.R.
§ 203.2. Full access to SEC files is routinely granted by the Director of the Division of
Enforcement without any review by the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-4(a)(7). The
practical consequence is that criminal prosecutors have immediate and complete access to
any SEC investigation that the Staff wants to show them.
Romatowsld, Basics of SEC Investigations: What Every Criminal Lawyer Should Know, White
Collar Crime 1992 at 349, 353-54 (ABA, 1992) (quoted in 6 BNA Crim. Prac. Man. at 814 (cited in
note 4)). This development has met with judicial approval. Approving the SEC's contacts with the
Justice Department early in an investigation, one court recognized that:
[a]llowing early participation in the case by the United States Attorney minimizes statute
of limitation problems. The more time a United States Attorney has, the easier it is for
him to become familiar with the complex facts of a securities fraud case, to prepare the
case, and to present it to a grand jury before expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations. Earlier initiation of criminal proceedings moreover is consistent with a
defendant's right to a speedy trial. We decline . . . to interfere with this commendable
example of inter-agency cooperation.
United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1978).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(h)(9)(B) (1988).
105. See the discussion in text accompanying notes 227-57.
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C. Inspectors General
In the field of administrative investigation and compulsory
process, a crucial development over the last fifty years has been the
creation of offices of Inspector General in major government
departments to combat fraud, waste, and abuse. 1°m The Inspector's
office centralizes audit and investigative functions.107 The subpoena
powers of Inspectors General are set out in the Inspector General
Act 08 and extend to all documentary material "necessary in the
performance of the functions assigned by this ...Act."'' °9 But the
subpoena power does not extend to compelling testimony. This
controversial restriction might be thought anomalous, for, while the
secretary of the govdrnment department generally will have civil
subpoena power that extends to compelling oral testimony with
respect to the general mission of the department, the Inspector
General in her special investigatory and monitoring role lacks this
power."0
Despite this restriction, the investigatory role of Inspectors
General has become very substantial and the Department of Justice
has encouraged use of the Inspector's office for investigating purposes,
in part to avoid problems that may arise from grand jury secrecy
rules."' This situation provides a striking instance of the rapid
106. Congress passed the Inspector General Act of 1978 in response to revelations of
substantial waste and corruption in the operations of the federal government. Inspector General
Act of 1978, S. Rep. No. 95-1071, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2679 (1978).
107. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2-3,9 (1988) (Inspector General Act of 1978).
108. The Act of 1978 generalizes the powers of new Inspector General offices created under
the statute. Earlier statutes exist as to Inspector Generals in certain departments but the powers
of subpoena conferred by those statutes are virtually identical with those conferred in the 1978
statute.
109. 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(4).
110. See United States v. Iannone, 610 F.2d 943 (D.C.Cir. 1979) (holding that the
Department of Energy Inspector General may not compel the attendance of witnesses). In
lannone, the Inspector General had subpoenaed oral testimony and argued that this request was
a proper exercise of the Secretary's subpoena powers delegated to the Inspector General. Id. at
944. The court of appeals, affirming the district court, held that the office of Inspector General is
not departmental (the Inspector is appointed directly by the President) and that the Inspector's
powers are limited to those expressly conferred by the statute and cannot be enlarged by a
delegation from the Secretary. Id. at 946. The Department of Justice has expressed the view that
Jannone may be confined to the Department of Energy, since the case was decided under a
particular statute related to that Department rather than under the Inspector General Act.
Inaspector General Subpoenas 26 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Crim. & Civil Div., 1987). This position is
not persuasive; no cases recognize that an Inspector General may acquire by delegation the power
to compel testimony.
111. As one source has explained:
The Department [of Justice] endorses and supports the use of Inspector General
subpoenas during audits and investigations conducted by the Offices of Inspector General.
The Inspectors General are encouraged to investigate matters within their jurisdiction as
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increase in the employment of civil subpoenas for investigations that
likely may result in criminal prosecution and exemplifies the tendency
to unify civil and criminal compulsory process.
The Inspector General's undisputed power to inquire into
criminal acts1 2 and to issue subpoenas to parties who have no direct
relationship with the department or agency facilitates the unification
of civil and criminal compulsory process.113 Once the facial propriety of
the subpoena is established as falling within the Inspector General's
statutory mandate, a successful attack by the party subpoenaed is
unlikely. As noted above, the party subpoenaed would bear the heavy
burden of showing abuse of process;114 attacks upon subpoenas on the
ground of abuse of process have been notably unsuccessful.1
D. Information Sharing
As the above examples indicate, the government has not
articulated a single, uniform position with respect to the sharing of
information acquired by civil subpoena with other government
agencies. Certainly, nothing compares with the formidable barriers
erected to prevent the disclosure of grand jury information, discussed
in Part IX. Typical statutory provisions assert a prima facie
presumption of confidentiality but provide a large exception to make
fully as possible before the initiation of grand jury proceedings, unless doing so will
compromise the potential success of the investigation and subsequent criminal
prosecution. The use of an Inspector General subpoena for this purpose will provide
several benefits. A. It avoids grand jury secrecy problems. B. It avoids "parallel
proceeding" problems. C. It insures that the Inspector General's investigative work
product can be used to support the full extent of the United States' interest in a given
matter. This includes the pursuit of any applicable civil, administrative and contractual
remedies as well as criminal prosecution.
Inspector General Subpoenas at 2 (cited in note 110).
112. The Inspector General Act defines the duties of the office, which expressly include the
duty "to prevent and detect fraud and abuse," 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(2)B; the Act empowers the
Inspector General to coordinate his activities with other agencies, including the Department of
Justice. 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(a)(4)(A), (B) (1988). The question is reviewed in United States v. Medic
House, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1531 (W.D. Mo. 1989), which affirmed the Inspector General's power
under the 1978 statute (5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-11), as amended in 1988, to conduct criminal
investigations (citing and relying upon United States v. Educ. Dev. Network Corp., 884 F.2d 737,
740-44 (3d Cir. 1989), and United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 831 F.2d 1142, 1145 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)). Furthermore, it is not improper for the Inspector General to issue a subpoena when a
criminal proceeding is likely. Indeed, unlike the Internal Revenue Service (see the discussion in
Part VU.A), an Inspector General may refer a case to the Department of Justice for prosecution
and yet continue to use her subpoena power for further civil and administrative investigatory
purposes. United States v. Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D.N.J. 1980).
113. Art Metal-U.S.A, 484 F. Supp. at 887.
114. United States v. Balanced Financial Mgmt., Inc., 769 F.2d 1440, 1444 (10th Cir. 1985).
115. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 788 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1986).
1994] ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS 601
disclosure in the public interest and without the necessity for a court
order.116
VII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL COMPULSORY
PROCESS
The convergence of criminal and civil sanctions in the context
of regulated activities and the growth of civil investigative demands
have created tension between the classical grand jury process in the
criminal case and the possibly concurrent use of civil process. A
dispute over these issues may arise when a party subjected to the
government's civil process argues its impropriety on the ground that a
criminal prosecution has been initiated, or that a criminal
investigation is under way or is likely to be launched. One of the
oldest and most frequent contexts (and therefore a useful starting
point) is the use of a summons by the Internal Revenue Service.
A. The IRS Cases
As early as 1864, the Internal Revenue Service acquired
statutory power to issue a summons to investigate a suspected
fraudulent return.117 The Tariff Act of 1913 n1 and the Revenue Act of
1918119 extended this power. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939,120
from which the current provision is derived, reaffirmed this summons
authority, which vested in the Commissioner the power to inquire into
any criminal offense connected with the internal revenue laws.121 The
116. See, for example, the rule with respect to information gathered in investigations by the
Small Business Administration, which provides that the materials obtained shall be deemed
confidential but provides generally that the Administration may authorize the disclosure of this
information as long as it is not contrary to the public interest. 13 C.F.R. § 110.5 (1993). It is clear
that agencies routinely share information with a prosecuting authority when a violation of law is
suspected.
117. Act of June 30, 1864, § 14, 13 Stat. 226.
118. Tariff Act of 1913,38 Stat. 178-79.
119. Revenue Act of 1918, § 1305,40 Stat. 1142.
120. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 3614(a). The 1939 Code "contemplated the use of the
summons in an investigation involving suspected criminal conduct as well as behavior that could
have been disciplined with a civil penalty.' United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298,
310-11 (1978). In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the Court observed that "[uit is now
undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602, to issue an Internal
Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with civil and possible criminal consequences." Id.
at 326.
121. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1988). The present statute confers power to issue a summons "[flor
the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, malting a return where none has been
made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax... or collecting such
liability," id. § 7602(a), and continues by providing expressly that "the purposes for which the
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summons power extends to examining any books, papers, or records
and also authorizes summoning persons to give testimony under
oath. 122
The IRS summons vividly demonstrates the difficulties of an
attempt to achieve a strict division of compulsory process into
separate civil and criminal channels. An IRS inquiry may be wholly
civil, either in the sense that, .when all the facts are uncovered, no
criminal penalty is applicable or in the weaker sense that, as a matter
of policy, the IRS does not contemplate a recommendation to
prosecute. But the weaker sense leaves at least a theoretical
possibility of criminal prosecution and perhaps a practical one if more
serious matters should emerge from the investigation. The initiation
of an investigation and the issuance of a summons in a purely civil
climate of inquiry often will not rule out possible penal consequences.
When, on the other hand, the investigation of a taxpayer has
an avowed criminal inclination, in the sense that serious fraud is
suspected, the civil and criminal aspects are "inherently
intertwined,"123 since it is unlikely that a taxpayer could commit a tax
crime that would not have civil consequences in the assessment of tax
and in civil penalties.124 Cases may arise, however, in which the
inquiry appears exclusively criminal in the sense that the IRS already
has all the information it needs to establish civil claims, and the
investigation could only be intended to build a stronger case for
criminal prosecution. Or a case may arise in which a summons is
directed to a third party as to whom there is no question of tax
liability, and in which the purpose of the summons is to gather
evidence for a criminal case against a target as to whom questions of
civil tax liability have been settled. Such cases plainly raise the
question of the propriety of using a subpoena power outside the
traditional channel of the grand jury solely to further a criminal
investigation.
In 1964 the Supreme Court stated in dicta that an IRS
summons properly could be challenged on the ground that "the
material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for
Secretary may [issue a summons] include the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with
the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws." Id. § 7602(b).
122. Id. § 7602(a).
123. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 309.
124. The LaSalle Court noted that "[flora fraud investigation to be solely criminal in nature
would require an extraordinary departure from the normally inseparable goals of examining
whether the basis exists for criminal charges and for the assessment of civil penalties.' Id. at 314.
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use in a criminal prosecution.' ' 1 5 The Court clouded its position a few
years later when it stated that IRS summonses were valid if issued "in
good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution."' 126
This holding left open the central question: whether a summons
would always be held to be in good faith if a recommendation for
prosecution had not yet been made.
The Court had an opportunity to settle this question in United
States v. LaSalle National Bank,121 in which a Special Agent of the
IRS Intelligence Division obtained a summons issued in connection
with his investigation of possible criminal violations of the Internal
Revenue Code. Although the Court earlier had held that "Congress
clearly has authorized the use of the summons [by the IRS] in
investigating what may prove to be criminal conduct,"12 in LaSalle
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the
summons invalid on the ground that "the use of an administrative
summons solely for criminal purposes is a quintessential example of
bad faith."1 29 Reversing the Seventh Circuit, the Court reasoned that
an initial determination by the IRS that fraud might be involved and
that a criminal prosecution thus was likely fell far short of
demonstrating bad faith because the Service always retained its
legitimate civil interest in assessing tax and enforcing civil penalties,
regardless of the immediate aim of the investigating agent.130
The Court clearly stated, however, that a summons is improper
and will not be enforced if the Service already has recommended to
the Department of Justice the initiation of a criminal prosecution.
The Court believed that, at this point, the issuance of an IRS
summons would be improper because the IRS has no power to
prosecute and accordingly must entrust the criminal aspect of the case
to the Department of Justice. The use of an IRS summons
impermissibly would enhance the Department's powers of discovery in
a criminal case and would infringe on the territory of the grand jury.31
125. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
126. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971). The Court also had found it
undisputed' that an IRS summons may issue 'in aid of a tax investigation with civil and possible
criminal consequences." Couch, 409 U.S. at 326.
127. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
128. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 535.
129. 554 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1977). The court of appeals took the position that the district
court had made a finding of fact that the investigation was conducted 'solely for the purpose of
unearthing evidence of criminal conduct." Id. at 305.
130. The Court pointed out that the agent had no ultimate authority to recommend a
prosecution since his own recommendation would be subject to review within the Service.
LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 314-15.
131. Id. at 312.
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Since the IRS and the Department of Justice almost inevitably would
cooperate in the preparation of a criminal case, the Court felt it would
be unrealistic to expect that further discovery by means of an IRS
summons would not find its way into the hands of the Department.1 32
The Court, perhaps clinging to poorly explicated but strongly
traditional views of the separation of criminal and civil process,
discussed the further possibility that "bad faith" might be
demonstrated in a particular case, even when no recommendation for
prosecution had yet been made. 3 3  The opinion suggested that bad
faith could be shown when the Service had made an "institutional
commitment" to prosecution but was delaying an actual
recommendation because it "merely would like to gather additional
evidence for the prosecution."13 4 The Court conceded that the burden
of showing such a commitment would be a "heavy one" and foresaw
that the Service "rarely will be found to have acted in bad faith."135
Subsequent to the decision in LaSalle, the Internal Revenue
Code has given statutory force to the proposition that a summons is
not authorized once the IRS has made a referral to the Justice
Department.136  The Code does not go beyond this rule, leaving
132. Id.
133. Id. at 316-17. The Court remanded for a further inquiry into this question. Id. at 316.
LaSalle went no further in elucidating "bad faith" than to refer to the elements of good faith set
out in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), which had reasoned that:
[the Service] must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate
purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is
not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps
required by the Code have been followed.... [A] court may not permit its process to be
abused. Such an abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper
purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral
dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular
investigation.
Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58 (quoted in LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 313-14). This explanation of the
elements of good faith, although not vacuous, seems largely unconnected with the blend of
criminal and civil investigatory strands in the exploitation of the summons, unless one takes the
extreme view that an exclusive or predominant purpose to inquire into criminality itself would
constitute bad faith. Perceiving this dilemma, four members of the Court in LaSalle dissented
from the remand and concluded that the respondents demonstration of a predominantly criminal
purpose for the summons raised no question of good faith. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 319-21 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
134. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 316-17. Presumably an "institutional commitment" would exist
only after higher officials of the Service had approved an agent's recommendation of referral to
the Justice Department. The party seeking to quash the summons then must show that the
agency had no "valid civil tax determination or collection purpose." Id. at 316.
135. Id.
136. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c) now provides that the IRS may not issue a summons with respect to
any person if a Justice Department referral has occurred-that is, when the Secretary has
recommended to the Attorney General a grand jury investigation or a criminal prosecution of that
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unsettled the question of whether the LaSalle ban on a summons
after an "institutional commitment" to prosecution still has force or
whether it has been implicitly restricted by the statute to situations in
which the Service has made a formal referral to the Justice
Department. The question is of some importance since the party
summoned clearly will have a somewhat stronger chance of having
the summons quashed under the wider language of LaSalle than
under the more precise and narrower statutory formula. 137
As a solution to the questions surrounding the points of contact
between civil and criminal compulsory process in the IRS context,
both the broader and the narrower positions seem less than satisfying.
Under the narrower position, which asserts that a summons to inquire
into criminal conduct generally is proper and becomes unauthorized
only after an actual referral to the Justice Department, the test
appears almost purely formal. The IRS, under this approach, can
simply postpone its referral in order to exploit its civil process to the
fullest.s8
In terms of institutional commitment to prosecution, the
broader LaSalle test at first might appear more principled and less
susceptible to manipulation, but it is unclear what principles the test
person, or when the Department of Justice has made a request to the IRS, under 26 U.S.C. §
6103(h)(3)(B) (1988), for any return or return information relating to that person.
137. This issue provoked clear disagreement in an en banc court of the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Michaud, 907 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Seven judges concluded that the
broader LaSalle test was unimpaired by the statute and that a district court properly could quash
a summons even before formal referral if the court found that the Service had made an
institutional commitment to prosecution. Id. at 752. This standard could be satisfied by showing
that the Service pressed further discovery by way of summons after all questions of tax liability
had been exhausted. Id. at 754. Four judges in dissent concluded that the wider test of
impropriety in LaSalle had been limited by 26 U.S.C. § 7602(b), which states that an IRS
summons legitimately may issue for the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the
administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws. Id. at 755-57. According to this view,
a summons would be improper only after the IRS has made a formal referral. The disagreement
among the judges was fueled by a statement of the Supreme Court in United States v. Stuart, 489
U.S. 353 (1989), to the effect that in enacting 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c), which bans a summons after a
referral has been made, Congress "apparently shared our concern [expressed in an earlier
decision] about permitting the IRS to encroach upon the rights of potential criminal defendants."
Id. at 363. Writing for the dissenters in Michaud, Judge Posner remarked that "[p]erhaps it is
time the Supreme Court made all this crystal clear, for we are not the only court to have been
confused by Stuart." Michaud, 907 F.2d at 757. Another court has taken the view that the
statute now has codified the "bright-line" position of the dissenters in LaSalle. See Moutevelis v.
United States, 727 F.2d 313, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Pickel, 746 F.2d 176, 184 (3d
Cir. 1984).
138. Opportunities for manipulation are not unfamiliar in the criminal justice process. The
right to counsel attaches only when formal criminal proceedings have been commenced or a
critical stage in the process has been reached. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). Thus,
it maybe possible for the police, perhaps acting in collaboration with a prosecutor, to stave off the
right to counsel by delaying the initiation of formal charges.
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purports to defend. First, powers of discovery would not necessarily
be enhanced if the IRS could issue a summons after a commitment to
prosecution or even after a Justice Department referral. The IRS
cannot procure anything by way of a summons that a grand jury
cannot obtain by use of its subpoena power. Civil summons power
simply is not any broader than a grand jury's criminal discovery
through compulsory process, which extends to anything of conceivable
relevance to the investigation and prosecution of a criminal case.
Do more general due process reasons or specific grounds in the
Bill of Rights explain why the IRS should not infringe on the historical
role of the grand jury?139 The citizen does not receive any less
protection in the IRS summons context than before a grand jury.
After all, the summons is not self-enforcing; it may be challenged in
court and can only be enforced by the IRS through a court.'40 At this
stage, the same range of challenges and objections can be made to the
summons as to a grand jury subpoena. 4, Both the statute and the
Supreme Court's opinion in LaSalle seem faintly redolent of anxiety
for protection of the citizen but fail to explain exactly how the citizen
is better protected by being kept exclusively in the hands of the
139. In Michaud, Judge Coffey in a concurring opinion remarked, 'If as the dissent asserts,
section 7602(b) overturns LaSalle and allows for the use of administrative summonses solely for
the purpose of ctninal investigation, the section's constitutionality is suspect-would this not
legislate away the due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment?" Michaud, 907 F.2d at 754
n.1 (Coffey, J., concurring). It is not clear what aspect of due process Judge Coffey refers to in
this statement. His opinion appears to suggest that due process requires that the investigation of
possibly criminal conduct be reserved to certain agencies of government. However, while an
agency clearly might exceed its statutory powers by embarking on a criminal investigation, courts
should offer a further explanation of how this activity becomes a component of due process.
Perhaps with this statement in mind, another federal court explained Michaud by citing it for the
proposition that "civil proceedings cannot continue after criminal proceedings begin without
violating the privilege against self-incrimination." United States v. Premises Located at Highway
1315, 747 F. Supp. 641, 652 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 749 (11th Cir.
1991). If the target of criminal proceedings retains at all times his power to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege (and if proper warnings are administered), however, no violation of the
privilege appears. Of course, concurrent or closely consecutive criminal and civil proceedings may
create strategic and tactical problems for the defense, but this situation is not equivalent to a
constitutional violation.
140. 26 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988).
141. See the discussion in Part VIII. Indeed, the citizen may be somewhat better off in
challenging a civil summons or investigative demand than in challenging a grand jury subpoena.
In the case of a civil summons, the agency must comply with statutory procedure exactly. See
Henderson v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 274, 277 (D.S.C. 1991) (holding, under the authority of
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), that an IRS summons would not be enforced since the
Service had failed to serve an "attested copy" of the summons as required by 26 U.S.C. § 7603).
Compare United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that exclusion of
evidence obtained by a grand jury subpoena that had been improperly issued by the prosecutor
without grand jury involvement was not an appropriate remedy).
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Department of Justice and a grand jury.14 Indeed, a comparison of
the Court's pronouncements in LaSalle and in the earlier case of
Procter & Gamble reveals a curious tension. While LaSalle
emphasizes that the citizen may be prejudiced when the civil process
is applied despite a prosecutorial goal, Procter & Gamble asserts that
the criminal grand jury process may disadvantage the citizen by
gathering evidence for civil purposes.'- 3
These positions could be reconciled formally by a simple diktat
that the grand jury pertains to criminal matters and civil process to
non-criminal matters and never the twain shall meet. But such an
enforced separation would make no sense. With the current
proliferation of civil investigative demands, the range of civil and
criminal subpoena powers often is exactly the same and thus provides
no reason to demand segregated investigations. The sole exception
occurs when criminal charges have actually been initiated and a
formal adversarial relationship has been defined. In this situation, as
noted, the government will have a less favorable position with regard
to discovery than it would enjoy in a civil case. An attractive
argument certainly can be mounted that this limitation should not be
subverted, and that the use of civil subpoenas after charging, in order
to strengthen a prosecutor's case, would be as improper as the
continued use of grand jury subpoenas.'" However, this persuasive
point does not turn on a distinction between civil and criminal
investigations but rather on the asserted general impropriety of using
any compulsory process to fortify a criminal charge after it has been
filed.
The history of the IRS summons in this context thus
constitutes a paradigm of the fundamental mistake that has crept into
the field of compulsory process. With the advent of civil investigative
demands, the valid reason for restraining all process once a criminal
142. Indeed, when testifying under compulsion in response to an IRS summons, the subject
may be accompanied by counsel, a privilege not applicable when a subject appears before the
federal grand jury. On the other hand, the grand jury's proceedings and, to an extent, the
documents or testimony it elicits are protected by secrecy provisions that do not apply as clearly
to IRS summonses and other civil investigative demands.
143. In a concurring opinion in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1957),
Justice Whittaker referred to the need "to eliminate the temptation to conduct grand jury
investigations as a means of ex parte procurement of direct or derivative evidence for use in a
contemplated civil suit." Id. at 685 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
144. The D.C. Circuit recognized this point in SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368
(D.C. Cir. 1980), in which the court acknowledged that, after indictment, agency investigation has
the potential of 'undermin[ing] the party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
expand[ing] rights of criminal discovery beyond the limits of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(b), expos[ing] the basis of the defense to the prosecution in advance of criminal trial, or
otherwise prejudic[ing] the case." Id. at 1376.
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charge was filed was wrongly understood as a reason for shackling
civil process just because a criminal investigative purpose
concurrently existed. This sloppy assimilation of different cases
accounts for the confused and confusing development of the law
generally and specifically with respect to IRS summonses.
In the narrow IRS context, a broad view of LaSalle seems hard
to defend in light of the plain declaration in 26 U.S.C. Section 7602(b)
that the purposes for which a summons may be issued "include the
purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the
administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws." This
statutory declaration typically signals the movement of civil process
into the field of criminal investigation. Suppose the IRS wishes to
investigate suspected criminality by a tax return preparer. The
inquiry may contain no element of civil liability because the Service is
not concerned with the preparer's own return and already may have
settled the tax liability of taxpayers whose return the subject
prepared. Thus, the investigation would have a solely criminal aspect.
Such an investigation is clearly proper, however, and dicta in earlier
case law that the IRS may not engage in an investigation with a
solely criminal purpose is now obsolete and inaccurate. 145 In such a
case, a broad reading of LaSalle would result in the position that once
the Service's suspicions have hardened into the belief that probable
cause for prosecution exists, they must desist from further
investigation and hand the matter over immediately to the Justice
Department. The idea that one agency of government may carry on a
criminal investigation up to the stage of finding probable cause but
must then step aside and hand the matter over to another agency
would serve no constitutional or valid policy interest. Indeed, in
LaSalle itself the Court acknowledged that "Congress has not
categorized tax fraud investigations into civil and criminal
components" and confessed that it would be "unrealistic to attempt to
build a partial information barrier between the two branches of the
executive."146
One might make arguments in favor of the LaSalle position
based on efficiency, economy, and the rational distribution of tasks
between different branches of government. Once the Justice
145. On these facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisively concluded that an IRS
summons was entirely proper. United States v. Abrahams, 905 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
146. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 311, 312. The application of this principle also would involve an




Department, the prime federal prosecutorial agency, has launched a
grand jury probe, a parallel pursuit of information by the IRS may
controvert the Justice Department's strategies and confound its
operations. Government should not trip over its own feet. But such
arguments have nothing to do with individual rights (other than an
arguable right not to be subject to concurrent parallel probes), and
little if anything to do with the historic understanding of the grand
jury. These arguments raise questions of efficiency and economy that
ought to be resolved by statute, regulation, or administrative
agreement and are not convincingly addressed by references to the
historical distribution of compulsory process. Thus, LaSalle lacks a
clear rationale; in addition, if the statute has curtailed LaSalle, the
principled basis for the division of function as to compulsory process
hardly appears more rational.
The LaSalle decision gives undue deference to the traditional
historical role of the grand jury and pays too little attention to the
growth of subpoena power in other government agencies in contexts
that have strong criminal connections. LaSalle also may be explained
by reference to the fact that a very large section of the population is
vulnerable to the IRS summons, while only those who deal with the
government in a regulated context are subject to government
subpoena power in other fields. This fact renders IRS cases
particularly sensitive. But, as the non-IRS cases show, LaSalle's view
of the grand jury as the primary organ for developing a criminal
investigation and its perception of a consequent need to restrict the
inquiries of other government agencies has become increasingly out-
dated.
B. The Non-IRS Cases
The IRS cases are tethered to a particular statute and to a
long-standing acceptance of the proposition (now contained in the
statute) that an IRS summons is invalid after the Service has made a
recommendation to prosecute. Outside the IRS area, by contrast,
courts for some time have found unobjectionable the use of civil
process to further an investigation that from the first likely will have
a criminal outcome.
This new generation of cases reveals an important, if quiet and
little-noticed, institutional development in the practice of federal
criminal law: the grand jury has lost a good deal of its importance in
modern federal law enforcement in areas involving regulated
activities. The center of activity has shifted to regulatory agencies.
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This natural shift reveals no obvious impropriety. Specialized and
experienced agency staffs can best evaluate the gravity of violations
and develop an investigation. Because these investigations
frequently, perhaps mostly, involve conduct that may be criminal and
that sometimes will result in a criminal prosecution, agency staffs also
develop a good deal of expertise in the preparation of a criminal case.
Even more importantly, an agency staff often will make the decisive
evaluation as to whether violations are serious enough to warrant
prosecution. The United States Attorney's Office and the Department
of Justice rarely disagree with the agency recommendation.
Prosecutorial resources are scarce and, when an agency decides that
civil penalties are adequate, a prosecutor or the Department of Justice
rarely will overrule this conclusion and press for a criminal
proceeding.
Thus, in a substantial proportion of federal crimes, agencies ' 47
make critical decisions as to whether to prosecute and participate to a
great extent in the preparation of criminal cases.148 Upon instituting a
prosecution, the product of the investigation must be handed over for
presentation to the grand jury. Even at this stage, agency attorneys
and experts likely will assist the prosecutor in his presentation and
147. The term "agencies" includes such units as the Inspector General's Office in
departments of government.
148. One source has noted' that "[o]ften agencies themselves instigate grand jury
investigations by bringing matters uncovered during agency inquiries to the United States
Attorney's attention. Furthermore, United States Attorneys increasingly request agency
assistance in presenting a case to grand juries, thereby revealing some information about ongoing
investigations." Note, Facilitating Administrative Agency Access to Grand Jury Materials, 91
Yale L. J. 1614, 1614 n.2 (1982). F.R.Cr.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(li) empowers the prosecutor to disclose
matters occurring before the grand jury to "such government personnel . . . as are deemed
necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the
performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law." This provision removes all
obstacles to the use of agency personnel in preparing cases for the grand jury. The Advisory
Committee Note to this Rule states:
Attorneys for the Government in the performance of their duties with a grand jury must
possess the authority to utilize the services of other government employees. Federal
crimes are "investigated" by the FBI, the IRS, or by Treasury agents and not by
government prosecutors or the citizens who sit on grand juries. Federal agents gather
and present information relating to criminal behavior to prosecutors who analyze and
evaluate it and present it to grand juries. Often the prosecutors need the assistance of
the agents in evaluating evidence. Also, if further investigation is required during or
after grand jury proceedings, or even during the course of criminal trials, the Federal
agents must do it. There is no reason for a barrier of secrecy to exist between the facets of
the criminal justice system upon which we all depend to enforce the criminal laws.
F.R.Cr.P. 6 Advisory Committee's Note (quoting Senate report on 1977 amendments). If this Note
were updated, it should acknowledge that federal crimes often are investigated by the staffs of
agencies and Inspectors General of federal departments.
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testify before the grand jury. 149 Agency attorneys may, indeed,
present the case to the grand jury since the Attorney General has
statutory authority to designate agency attorneys to assist in
conducting proceedings before the grand jury.15°
This development has rendered the separation between civil
and criminal compulsory process more and more artificial, 151 a
phenomenon that courts have recognized by largely abandoning the
traditional notion that criminal investigations are the sole prerogative
149. Under F.R.Cr.P. 6(e)(3)(B), any person to whom matters occurring before the grand jury
are disclosed "shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting the
attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal
criminal law." This Rule further provides that the government attorney shall provide the district
court with the names of persons to whom disclosure has been made and shall certify that those
persons have been advised of their obligation of secrecy.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) provides, "The Attorney General or any other officer of the
Department of Justice, or any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law,
may, when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any kind of legal proceeding,
civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings...." This power was scrutinized and upheld in
In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 55-61 (2d Cir. 1975), and United States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362, 364-67
(8th Cir. 1975). The practice has been challenged on conflict-of-interest grounds, generally
without success. See the discussion in General Motors Corp. v. United States, 573 F.2d 936, 942-
45 (6th Cir. 1978), appeal dismissed en bane, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), in which an IRS
attorney who had made a criminal referral to the Department of Justice was designated to assist
in the presentation of the case to the grand jury. The panel found that he should be disqualified
based on a conflict of interest, 573 F.2d at 942-45, but members of the en banc court, which
.dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, expressed the opinion that no conflict existed. 584
F.2d at 1371-73 (Edwards, J., and Lively, J., concurring). Both In Re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 263-68
(7th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 561-63 (3d Cir. 1979), adopted this
latter view. In a particular case, an agency attorney's involvement in the prosecution may be so
great or may have such improper aspects that a court should conclude that a conflict of interest
exists. See United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. ]I. 1979), in which an Environmental
Protection Agency attorney acted as a special assistant to the prosecutor, testified himself before
the grand jury, and then examined other witnesses. Id. at 1345-52. Young v. United States, 481
U.S. 787 (1987), is of some relevance in this context. In Young, a plurality of the Court held that
counsel for the beneficiary of a court order in a civil suit improperly was appointed to undertake
the prosecution for alleged violations of the order. Id. at 809-14. In FTC v. American Nat
Cellular, 868 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1989), however, the court stated that Young did not intend "to
disqualify automatically any FTC attorney as 'interested' simply by virtue of employment with the
Agency that brought the underlying suit." Id. at 319. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
agency attorney was properly involved in the prosecution because he was not effectively in control
of the case. Id. at 319-20. See also United States v. Hart, 779 F. Supp. 883, 891-92 (E.D. Mich.
1991).
151. This development is further illustrated by the creation of joint criminal and civil
investigative task forces in certain regulatory areas. One source cites the creation in the health
care field of a working group that includes representatives from the FBI, the Criminal and Civil
Divisions of the Department of Justice, and the Department of Health and Human Services; the
source states that in an effort to prevent and detect procurement fraud, the Department of
Justice and the Department of Defense have agreed in a joint memorandum to share information.
6 BNA Crim. Prac. Man. at 813 (cited in note 4). See also Becker, et al., Defending the Health
Care Fraud Case: Parallel Proceedings and Collateral Consequences, in White Collar Crime 1992
at 433 (ABA, 1992).
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of the grand jury.152 Little appears to be left of the old incantation
that pursuit of a criminal violation through civil process would be an
illegitimate usurpation of the role of the grand jury. If the governing
statute clearly bestows on a regulatory agency or on the investigative
arm of government the power to investigate criminal violations, the
statute will prevail, since courts have rightly acknowledged that no
constitutional right is endangered. At the same time, as the cases
discussed below demonstrate, the civil agency often may make its files
and the fruit of its compulsory process fully available to a prosecutor,
at least until an indictment has been returned. If civil process were
more intrusive than grand jury investigation, a sensitive situation
would arise, but since the grand jury is the most powerful inquisitorial
engine in our system, no problem exists.
This trend first became evident in 1969 with the Supreme
Court's decision in the landmark case United States v. Kordel.'5' In
Kordel the defendants were convicted of offenses under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.5 4 Prior to their indictment, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) had investigated the violations and
recommended civil seizure of two of the defendants' products. The
United States Attorney instituted a civil in rem action against the
products and served civil interrogatories, prepared by the FDA, on the
defendants. At the same time, the defendants were served with a
statutory notice that the agency contemplated a criminal proceeding
against them with regard to the violations that were the subject of the
civil action.55 The defendants moved to stay further proceedings in
the civil action or, alternatively, to extend the time in which to answer
the interrogatories until after the disposition of the criminal
152. On the increase in the use of information obtained through administrative subpoenas
for the prosecution of criminal cases, see Marvin G. Pickholz, et al., Guide to White Collar Crime
(BNA, 1986). The Justice Department monograph, Inspector General Subpoenas at 1 (cited in
note 110), recommends the use of such procedures for the express purpose of avoiding the secrecy
requirements imposed on the grand jury. Referring to a memorandum of the Attorney General to
United States Attorneys dated July 16, 1986, this monograph reminds government attorneys of
the importance of coordinating criminal and civil investigations and quotes the Attorney
General's memorandum as recommending that, 'where possible, documents should be obtained by
methods other than grand jury subpoenas" in order to avoid grand jury secrecy problems. Id. The
monograph suggests that Inspector General subpoenas should be used as an alternative:
'[D]ocurnents obtained by Inspector General subpoenas may be used by both criminal and civil
attorneys in evaluating different aspects of the case." Id.
153. 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
154. 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988).
155. 21 U.S.C. § 335 requires that "[b]efore any violation of [the Act] is reported ... to any
United States attorney for institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such a
proceeding is contemplated shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his
views, either orally or in writing, with regard to such a contemplated proceeding."
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proceeding; they argued that a response to the interrogatories at this
stage would "enable the Government to have pretrial discovery of the
respondents' defenses to future criminal charges."'5 After the motion
was denied, the defendants responded to the interrogatories and, in
the later criminal proceeding based on an indictment "prepared in [the
FDA] office,"'15 were convicted.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
convictions on the ground that the defendants had been compelled to
incriminate themselves under the threat of forfeiture of their property,
which inevitably would have followed from their refusal to answer the
interrogatories. The Court of Appeals was impressed by the intensity
of what they perceived as the defendants' trilemma. The defendants
could have refused to answer and faced forfeiture, could have lied and
risked a perjury prosecution, or could have answered truthfully and
thus helped the government build a criminal case against them. They
chose the latter course, which the Court of Appeals concluded was "a
'compelling' which is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment."1'
Although the Court of Appeals did not condemn in general
terms the practice of a government agency's pursuit of a civil remedy
on grounds that also might involve a possible criminal prosecution,1 59
it is clear that the court's holding, if left undisturbed, would have
powerfully chilled such a practice. If disclosure, either through
general rules of discovery or through civil compulsory process, were
defined as "compelled" in a Fifth Amendment context because of the
likelihood of a civil sanction being imposed, with the consequence that
its fruits would be excluded from a subsequent criminal prosecution,
then government itself would encounter an acute dilemma. A
criminal prosecution would have to precede disclosure through civil
process or the successful prosecution of the criminal case otherwise
might be imperiled.1 ° Prompt pursuit of the civil remedies, however,
might be urgently necessary for the public interest.
No doubt perceiving this significant threat to the enforcement
of administrative regulations and the concurrent pursuit of civil and
156. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 5.
157. The opinion of the court of appeals, United States v. Detroit Vital Foods, 407 F.2d 570,
573 (6th Cir. 1969), brought out this point.
158. Id. at 573.
159. Id. at 575.
160. According to the court of appeals, presumably a taint hearing would be required in
many cases, under the principle established in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), to
decide whether evidence the government proposed to offer in a criminal case was derived directly
or indirectly from information the defendant had been compelled to produce or testify to in the
civil proceeding.
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criminal penalties, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the convictions. 161 The Court of Appeals, the Court
said, erred in finding a Fifth Amendment violation since, at all times,
the defendant could have asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege but
failed to do so. This analysis verges on the disingenuous because the
court of appeals had based its holding precisely on the ground that the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege would have had such
disadvantageous consequences for the defendant in the civil
proceeding that he was in effect coerced into waiving the privilege.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself had used this line of reasoning some
years earlier in Garrity v. New Jersey,162 in which the Court found a
violation of the Fifth Amendment when policemen were questioned
after being warned that refusal to answer would result in the loss of
their jobs. 163
Why did the Court reach a different result in Kordel than in
Garrity? What differentiates the substantial economic loss resulting
from failure to respond to a civil discovery demand from the
substantial economic loss threatened for failing to answer a public
employer's questions? The cases can be distinguished on the ground
161. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12-13.
162. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). In Garrity, police officers were questioned in a state investigation
concerning alleged fixing of traffic tickets. The state warned the officers that anything they said
might be used against them in a criminal prosecution but also were told that refusal to answer
would result in dismissal. Their answers were used against them, over objection, in subsequent
prosecutions. Id. at 494-95. The Court held that the threat of dismissal from a public office
rendered the statements 'compelled" under the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege
and therefore inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Id. at 500.
163. Id. The implications of Garrity still are not entirely clear. State action taken as a
consequence of a person's invocation of the self-incrimination privilege sometimes has been
condemned as unconstitutional. See Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59
(1956) (preventing a city from dismissing a college teacher in response to his assertion of the
privilege before a congressional committee); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner,
392 U.S. 280 (1968) (holding unconstitutional the discharge of sanitation workers for invoking the
privilege when questioned by a commissioner of investigation); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 279 (1968) (finding unconstitutional the discharge of a police officer for refusal to waive
immunity and testify before a grand jury).
However, the Court also has stated that public employees "subject themselves to dismissal if
they refuse to account for their performance of their public trust, after proper proceedings, which
do not involve an attempt to coerce them to relinquish constitutional rights." Sanitation Men, 392
U.S. at 285. One court has noted that, as a result, "[t]he fact that a public employee might face
the unpleasant choice of surrendering his silence or losing his job is no bar to an adverse
consequence so long as the consequence is imposed for failure to answer a relevant inquiry and
not for refusal to give up a constitutional right." Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 982 (2d
Cir. 1992) (en bane). In this case, a divided Second Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en bane and
proceeding on this abstruse distinction, held that it was not improper to revoke a convicted
defendant's supervised home release because he refused to answer a program supervisor's
questions on Fifth Amendment grounds when his original conviction was still being challenged by
way of federal habeas corpus. Id. at 982-83.
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that the compulsion stems more clearly from state action in Garrity, in
which the state threatened loss of employment if the defendants failed
to answer. This distinction would be strained, however, since in
Kordel the sanction for failure to answer would have been a judicially
imposed disadvantageous inference in a suit brought by the
government, in which judgment against the defendants would have
resulted in loss of property. The different outcome in large part
results from the overwhelming public interest in allowing
government-initiated civil litigation to proceed in order to enforce a
regulatory scheme, in tandem with the public interest in not
inhibiting a criminal prosecution. To hold open both possibilities
requires a certain sacrifice of traditional understandings of the Fifth
Amendment. Indeed, this message emerged strongly in the Court's
opinion as a policy justification for its holding, which was not
encumbered with much Fifth Amendment analysis. 164
Kordel illustrates the difficulties defendants face on the rugged
terrain of "parallel proceedings." 165 The term "parallel proceedings"
indicates civil and criminal proceedings brought concurrently,
overlapping each other, or brought sequentially.16 As Kordel
164. The Supreme Court explained:
The public interest in protecting consumers throughout the Nation from misbranded
drugs requires prompt action by the agency charged with responsibility for administration
of the federal food and drug laws. But a rational decision whether to proceed criminally
against those responsible for the misbranding may have to await consideration of a fuller
record than that before the agency at the time of the civil seizure of the offending
products. It would stultify enforcement of federal law to require a governmental agency
such as the FDA invariably to choose either to forgo recommendation of a criminal
prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate
outcome of a criminal trial.
Kordel, 397 U.S. at 11. In response to the court of appeals's reasoning, the Supreme Court flatly
stated that, while it agreed that government may not use evidence that it coerced under threat of
a penalty of forfeiture in a criminal case, "on this record there was no such violation of the
Constitution." Id. at 13. Compare Leffhowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973), in which the Court
voided a statute that prohibited any person who refused to waive immunity before a grand jury
from obtaining public contracts for a period of five years. The Court did suggest, however, that
the statute might have been valid if it provided immunity for the party who raised the Fifth
Amendment privilege. Id. at 84.
165. On parallel proceedings, see Marvin G. Pickholz, The Expanding World of Parallel
Proceedings, 53 Temple L. Q. 1100 (1980); Joseph M. Hassett, Ex Parte Pre-Trial Discovery: The
Real Vice of Parallel Investigations, 36 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1049 (1979); Parallel Grand Jury and
Administrative Agency Proceedings (ABA, 1981); Craig H. Zimmerman, Parallel Criminal and
Civil Proceedings, 25 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 522 (1988); Milton Pollack, Parallel Civil and Criminal
Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201 (1989).
166. A governmental policy may influence the likelihood of parallel proceedings being
brought concurrently. For example, Department of Justice Guidelines, Directive No. 5-87 (Land
and Nat. Res. Div., Oct. 13, 1987) provides that criminal proceedings generally should be brought
first, when both civil and criminal actions are possible, although the Guidelines list exceptions for
cases, inter alia, in which civil violations are ongoing and of great concern to the public health or
environment, in which assets may be dissipated, or in which a statute of limitations deadline
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demonstrates, such a configuration, now very common, can pose
daunting strategic and tactical problems for a defendant. Aware of
these problems, the Court in Kordel did suggest that when the subject
of civil discovery (and presumably a subpoenee) could point to a real
and appreciable risk of self-incrimination, 67 a court might afford relief
by entering a protective order under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 6 8 or an order granting a stay of the discovery or of the
civil proceeding for a fixed time or until the termination of the
criminal proceeding or investigation. 169  Although the Court did not
looms for the civil suit. See also U.S.E.P.A. Policy and Procedure on Parallel Proceedings at the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, Jan. 23, 1984). On this topic, see 6 BNA Crim. Prac.
Man. at 802-04 (cited in note 4).
167. F.R.C.P. 36(b) also affords some protection as to admissions of facts in civil actions; the
Rule provides that "[a]ny admission made by a party pursuant to [a] request [for admission of
facts] is for the purpose of the pending action only and neither constitutes an admission by him
for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any other proceeding.' F.R.C.P. 36(b).
Nevertheless, "that does not prevent the use of facts set forth in the admission by the criminal
prosecutor as a confirmation that facilitates the preparation of the criminal case, or perhaps as a
lead to other evidence, which is part of the protection of the constitutional privilege [against self-
incrimination]." Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Gordon, Circuit Judge
Leventhal noted that "tihere may be cases where the requirement that a criminal defendant
participate in a civil action, at peril of being denied some portion of his worldly goods, violates
concepts of elementary fairness in view of the defendant's position in an inter-related criminal
prosecution. On the other hand, the fact that a man is indicted cannot give him a blank check to
block all civil litigation on the same or related underlying subject matter." Id. at 580.
168. The circuits disagree as to the impact of a protective order on materials produced in
response to civil discovery requests (or presumably in response to administrative subpoenas). In
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1988), the court held that when a protective
order has been granted as to a deposition in a civil case, the grand jury nevertheless may obtain
the deposition by subpoena. The court reasoned that the deponent could have invoked the
protection of the Fifth Amendment and cannot indirectly procure so large a protection through a
court order. Id. at 1473-76. Refusing to accept this position, the Second Circuit in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated April 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991), following its
earlier decision in Martindell v. Intl Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), held that a
grand jury subpoena in such circumstances should not be enforced absent a showing that the
protective order was granted improvidently. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 945 F.2d at 1226.
These issues are discussed in Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle: The Fifth Amendment
Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 Yale L. J. 1062 (1982).
169. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 9. The district court has discretion to grant such a stay "when the
interests of justice seem to require such action." Id. at 12 n.27. Such a stay would benefit the
party in a number of ways. For example, government discovery would be curtailed and the
defendant would escape dilemmas as to the exercise of her self-incrimination privilege. See Cheh,
42 Hastings L. J. at 1391 (cited in note 20). In SEC v Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (en banc) (discussed in text accompanying notes 170-87), the court stated that parallel
investigations should not be blocked unless "'special circumstances' demonstrably [prejudiced]
substantial rights of the parties or of the government." Id. at 1377. See Pollack, 129 F.R.D. at 203
(cited in note 165) (suggesting that the best case for a stay usually occurs after criminal
proceedings actually have been commenced, since this situation raises problems of self-
incrimination most sharply, while the delay need not be protracted since the criminal case is
under way). Courts usually apply a balancing test that weighs harm to the government or the
public against harm to the moving party. See In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 92
F.R.D. 358, 359 (D. Md. 1981); United States v. McKenzie, 697 F.2d 1225, 1226 (5th Cir. 1983). For
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS
rule out such measures of relief, it was clearly intent on repudiating
the notion that compulsory process (or its substantial equivalent in
civil discovery) could in itself and without more constitute a violation
of the Fifth Amendment, even when the product of the process is likely
to confer considerable advantages on the prosecutor in the preparation
of a criminal case.
In Kordel a government agency, using civil process, prepared
and carried to its conclusion an entire criminal investigation. The
prosecutor simply presented the neat package to the grand jury for its
endorsement by way of indictment. The Court's validation of this
process and its demonstrated commitment to allowing the government
to pursue concurrent civil and criminal sanctions without major
obstacles make Kordel a crucial building block in the modern
phenomenon of breaking down the barriers between civil and criminal
compulsory process.
Later decisions of lower federal courts carry this development
forward. An important case decided by an en banc federal court of
appeals is SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,170 in which the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) had issued a formal order of
investigation into alleged illegal payments by United States
corporations to foreign government agents. Concurrently, the
Department of Justice was investigating the same allegations and had
issued a grand jury subpoena for documents. The SEC, which had
earlier forwarded its file to Justice, 171 then proceeded to issue its own
a review of the law in this field, see United States v. A Certain Parcel of Land, Moultonboro, 781
F. Supp. 830 (D.N.H. 1992) (granting a stay of civil discovery). A movant may make an
application for a stay of discovery more attractive by offering to set aside documents in a court-
supervised depository pending the expiration of the stay. See 4 BNA Crim. Prac. Man. at 588
(cited in note 4).
The ABA Criminal Justice Section Committee on White Collar Crime has drafted a proposed
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would empower a judge in a criminal
case to request a stay of parallel civil proceedings and would direct that efforts should be made to
this end unless the stay would have 'an adverse impact on the overall administration of justice."
See Weingarten and Barr, The Hazards of Parallel Proceedings in the Securities Context, in White
Collar Crime 1992 at 369, 386 n.10 (cited in note 151). Sometimes the government may move for
a stay of parallel civil proceedings in order to prevent the defendant from employing the civil
rules of discovery to uncover the government's criminal case. See Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d
478, 483 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Phillips, 580 F. Supp. 517, 518 (N.D. I. 1984). For
example, when civil litigation and a grand jury investigation are proceeding concurrently, a
defendant in the civil case may notice for deposition witnesses who have testified before the grand
jury. In this situation the government likely would move to intervene in the civil case and stay
discovery to avoid adverse impact on the criminal investigation. See the remarks of an attorney
in the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section, reported in 4 BNA Crim. Prac. Man. at 587
(cited in note 4).
170. 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
171. Two SEC attorneys had participated in the Department of Justice taskforce
investigating the illegal payments. Id. at 1372.
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administrative subpoena demanding documents that included those
already requested by the grand jury. The subpoenaed party, relying
in large part on the authority of LaSalle, moved to quash the SEC's
subpoena on the grounds that it abused the civil process for the
purpose of criminal discovery and infringed the role of the grand jury.
In a wide-ranging opinion, the circuit court rejected all the
subpoenaed party's contentions. The court distinguished LaSalle
because of the special nature of the statute governing the IRS, which
confined the IRS power of investigation to narrow purposes, 72 and
because of the administrative practice of the IRS, according to which
the IRS halts its civil investigation until a pending criminal
investigation and prosecution has been completed. 173 Outside the IRS
statutory setting, parallel criminal and civil investigations and
proceedings mounted by the government with respect to the same
conduct generally are not objectionable. 174 The terms of the regulatory
statute are decisive with respect to the proper use of civil subpoena
power. 75 In the case of the SEC, these powers are widely drawn. 176
As in many areas of regulation, the court declared, public
policy requires that neither civil nor criminal process should await the
other in an SEC matter. If the civil process is delayed, the public may
172. The LaSalle Court stated, 'In § 7602 Congress has bestowed upon the Service the
authority to summon production for four purposes only: for 'ascertaining the correctness of any
return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for
any internal revenue tax.., or collecting any such liability." LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 317 n.18.
173. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1379.
174. This point was, indeed, made by the Supreme Court as early as 1912 in Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912), in which the Court stated that the
government could bring civil and criminal proceedings under the Sherman Act either
"simultaneously or successively.' Id. at 52.
175. The validity of summonses or subpoenas "depend[s] ultimately on whether they were
among those authorized by Congress." LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 307.
176. "These statutes explicitly empower the SEC to investigate possible infractions of the
securities laws with a view to both civil and criminal enforcement, and to transmit the fruits of its
investigations to Justice in the event of potential criminal proceedings." Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1376
(referring to 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(a) (1976)). In some cases the governing statute confers no power on
the agency to conduct an investigation into criminal violations. See United States v. Cahill, 920
F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1990), in which the investigation was being conducted by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), which made a criminal referral to the United States Attorney. On
appeal from his conviction, the defendant argued that the fruits of the FHLBB investigation,
obtained after the criminal referral, had been improperly presented to the grand jury that
indicted him. Id. at 428. The court of appeals held that since the FHLBB itself has no power to
investigate criminal cases, the court must presume that the civil process was directed to a proper
civil end unless the defendant can show that the investigation's purpose was solely to procure
evidence for the prosecutor. If the inquiry is legitimate, the defendant can raise no objection to its
fruits being disclosed to the prosecutor. Id. Thus, a defendant hardly seems to be any better off
even if the agency lacks power to inquire into criminality, since only in a rare case will the
defendant be able to show that no legitimate civil purpose existed.
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suffer great harm; if the criminal process is delayed, the statute of
limitations may run out.'77  In order to perfect its civil case, the
government must be allowed to employ its civil compulsory process
even if a criminal investigation also is proceeding. To mitigate the
harshness of this rule in some cases, Dresser points out that a civil
court always retains the discretion to postpone discovery or to stay the
civil proceedings. A postponement or stay, however, cannot be
asserted as a matter of right.'17
The Dresser court correctly judged that, in any event, the
general policy arguments advanced by the appellant contained little
substance. The government's right to discovery hardly is broadened
by making concurrent use of civil process, since the grand jury has
subpoena powers just as broad as the civil agency. Indeed, a party
subject to civil investigation has greater protections than one
subpoenaed by a grand jury, since in the civil process he is entitled to
the assistance of counsel and, with some reservations, to a transcript
of his testimony.' 9 In the grand jury context, counsel for a witness
may not be present in an examination before a federal grand jury.
Furthermore, a transcript of the party's testimony is not available
unless he becomes a defendant.c ° Thus, civil process can hardly be
viewed as more extensive, more intrusive, or more oppressive than
grand jury process.
This argument is persuasive on the facts of Dresser, in which
no indictment had been returned; however, as noted, it becomes
harder to defend if civil process continues after the return of an
indictment. A jury's continued use of compulsory process to
investigate a case after the return of an indictment constitutes an
abuse of the grand jury process.18' The government might overcome
177. This problem also may arise on the civil side if the civil investigation is delayed in order
to await the outcome of criminal proceedings.
178. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1375-76. Dresser lists some difficulties that parallel proceedings
can bring upon a defendant: "The noncriminal proceeding, if not deferred, might undermine the
party's privilege against self-incrimination, expand rights of criminal discovery beyond the limits
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b), expose the basis of the defense to the prosecution in
advance of criminal trial, or otherwise prejudice the case." Id at 1376. On the other hand, the
government might be impelled to seek postponement of the civil proceeding to prevent the
criminal defendant from broadening his rights of civil discovery against the government. Id. at
1376 n.20.
179. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "a person compelled to appear in
person before an agency... is entitled to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or,
if permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative." 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1988).
180. Under F.R.Cr.P. 16(a), a defendant is entitled to a copy of his recorded testimony before
a grand jury insofar as it relates to the offenses with which he is charged. F.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(A).
181. "[It is the universal rule that prosecutors cannot utilize the grand jury solely or even
primarily for the purpose of gathering evidence in pending litigation." United States v. Moss, 756
F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Doe (Ellsberg), 455 F.2d 1270, 1275 (1st
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this barrier by continuing an investigation after indictment through
its civil arm and then making use of the information acquired to
strengthen its criminal case, thereby evading the restricted rules of
discovery governing a criminal prosecution.'82  Generally, "civil
discovery may not be used to subvert limitations on discovery in
criminal cases either by the government or by private parties."1", This
improper purpose, however, likely will be clearly demonstrable only
when an indictment has been returned, in which case the
government's use of the grand jury must cease. In such a case, a court
could avoid the impropriety (if it is such)184 by staying the civil
discovery process until the termination of the criminal process or, if
urgent public policy needs call for pressing on with the civil process, by
Cir. 1972); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26,
29 (2d Cir. 1985). In Simels, the defendant's counsel was served with a trial subpoena requesting
information as to the source of his fee-an issue relevant to the crime with which his client was
charged. Id. at 29-30. The government later withdrew this subpoena and substituted a subpoena
requiring the attorney to appear before the grand jury to testify on this question, ostensibly for
the purpose of seeking a superseding indictment against the defendant. Id. The Simels court
held that this subpoena must be quashed since its predominant purpose was to procure evidence
for use at trial. Id. However, this line of attack often does not succeed since courts generally
apply a presumption of regularity in grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Woods, 544
F.2d 242, 250 (6th Cir. 1976). The government usually can allege with some plausibility that it is
inquiring into other crimes or other defendants or has good reason to seek a superseding
indictment. The government's "good faith inquiry into other charges [not included in the
indictment] ... is not prohibited even if it uncovers further evidence against an indicted person."
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033, 1041 (3d Cir. 1980). At least one court
has recognized that, "[a]bsent some clearly indicative sequence of events such as those present in
Simels, a court will be faced with having to take at face value the government's word that the
dominant purpose is proper, even when the subpoena will inevitably produce evidence applicable
to prosecuting the existing indictment pending trial." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
May 9, 1990, 741 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
182. This possibility provoked a concurring opinion in Dresser from Judge Edwards, who
regarded this issue as an unsettled question the resolution of which "must await another day."
Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1391 (Edwards, J., concurring). The question arose in PHE, Inc. v. Dep't of
Justice, 139 F.R.D. 249 (D).D.C. 1991), in which the defendants sought a protective order with
respect to a government civil discovery motion on the ground, inter alia, that an indictment,
which arose out of the same matter, had been returned against them in another federal district.
Although it declined to stay the civil proceeding, the court limited government discovery 'to the
extent that they seek admissions and contentions of the plaintiffs with respect to the material
under indictment in Utah." Id. at 253.
183. McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 665,671-72 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
184. Courts generally do not adopt the position that it is improper to use civil process after a
grand jury indictment even if that use might have a tendency to strengthen the case against
already-indicted defendants. See United States v. Harrington, 761 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), in
which Drug Enforcement Administration subpoenas had been issued to third parties under 21
U.S.C. § 876 after the defendants were indicted but before trial. The government argued that it
was not required to cease its investigation before trial, although it conceded that "it must cease
use of the grand jury." Id. at 1485. The court agreed that no impropriety existed: "The
subpoenas here were not running to the indicted individuals. They were issued to third parties
during a continuing investigation. As such they were entirely legal." Id.
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issuing a protective order to the effect that the fruits of the civil
subpoena should not be disclosed to the prosecutorial arm.8 5
Dresser is, in general, a resounding validation of two
propositions-first, that a civil agency may continue its compulsory
process even when a criminal investigation is concurrently proceeding
and second, that the fruits of the civil investigation may be
transmitted fully to the grand jury, at least up to the point when an
indictment has been returned.' 6  The Dresser court viewed
cooperation between the agency and the grand jury with enthusiastic
approbation.187
One final illustration from the case law confirms the modern
position. In United States v. Educational Development Network
Corp.,1 the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) had received
information pointing to possible fraudulent practices by a contractor
with the Department of Defense. The USAO opened a grand jury file
185. Dresser also argued the other side of the proposition-that to enforce the civil subpoena
would undermine traditional grand jury secrecy principles since the government in its civil
capacity was demanding documents that the grand jury had already received. The court rejected
this argument on the ground that such a procedure did not involve the disclosure of grand jury
records but was based on the SEC's independent statutory entitlement to the documents, which it
was seeking to obtain not from the grand jury but independently through its own legitimate
subpoena power. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1382-83.
186. In Dresser, the court's panel decision had granted enforcement of the subpoena, subject
to a modification that, once a grand jury investigation began, the SEC should not turn over the
fruits of its investigation to the Justice Department. Id. at 1385. The en banc court removed this
restraint, id.; however, one should note that in some situations, a witness gives civil testimony
under a grant of immunity that precludes its use in a criminal prosecution. For example, under
the former Bankruptcy Act, a debtor appearing under subpoena before a bankruptcy court
received automatic immunity with respect to the use or derivative use of her testimony in any
subsequent criminal proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) (1976); United States v. Moss, 562 F.2d 155,
163 (2d Cir. 1977). After the revision of the bankruptcy law in 1978, a debtor must assert the
privilege against self-incrimination, after which he may be compelled to testify only if a federal
district court grants him immunity. 11 U.S.C. § 344 (1988).
187. The court referred to the fact that the SEC's general policy granted the Justice
Department 'continuing access to the entirety of a given investigative file once the Commission
formally grants access," and commented that:
[n]o one would suggest that the grand jurors, unassisted by accountants, lawyers, or
others schooled in the arcana of corporate financial accounting, could sift through the
masses of Dresser's corporate documents and arrive at a coherent picture.... In this
area, as in many areas of great complexity, the grand jurors are assisted-guided and
influenced, in fact-not only by the United State Attorneys assigned to the investigation,
but also by experts provided by the federal regulatory agencies. . . . This expert
assistance is permitted under Rule 6(e), and it promotes the efficiency and rationality of
the criminal investigative process.
Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1383. For support of this conclusion, the court pointed to the legislative
history of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, in which the Senate Committee had stated,
"The Committee expects that close cooperation will develop between the SEC and the Justice
Department at the earliest stage of any investigation in order to insure that the evidence needed
for a criminal prosecution does not become stale." Id. at 1385-86 (quoting S. Rep. No. 114, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977)).
188. 884 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1989).
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on the matter; however, before the grand jury began an investigation,
the Office of Inspector General (IG) of the Department of Defense
(DOD), whom the USAO had kept apprised of the situation, issued
civil investigative demands and thus obtained many documents,
which it then shared with the USAO. As the opinion noted, "The
government candidly admits on appeal that the USAO and DOD
agreed to conduct a joint investigation and to use DOD IG subpoenas
so that the agencies could share the evidence obtained."" 9 Clearly the
agencies deliberately used this tactic to avoid the impact of grand jury
secrecy provisions, which would have made it cumbersome and
perhaps impossible for the USAO to share with the DOD documents
obtained by means of a grand jury subpoena.190
The information gathered during the "joint investigation" was
then presented to the grand jury. The defendants argued that the
USAO had acted in bad faith by using IG subpoenas to gather
evidence during what they characterized as a "joint grand
jury/criminal/civil/administrative/military investigation."' 9' The defendants
relied in part on LaSalle, and characterized the procedures as an "end
run around the constitutional requirement that indictments be
secured only through a grand jury."192 In rejecting this position, the
court held that LaSalle must be read narrowly as a decision under
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, relevant only to an IRS
summons. The court refused to recognize a general rule that
administrative subpoenas issued to develop criminal cases are
unenforceable. 193  Indeed, the court found that legislative history
indicated that Congress expected cooperation between the IG and the
Department of Justice in investigating and prosecuting fraud cases.1 94
189. Id. at 739.
190. The defendants also argued that the procedure followed in that case breached the grand
jury secrecy provisions of F.R.Cr.P. 6(e) in that a grand jury file had been opened. The court
rejected this argument, as well, stating, 'we do not believe Rule 6(e) bars the USAO's criminal
division from participating in other agencies' investigations before it actually begins presentation
of evidence to the grand jury...." Educational Dev. Network, 884 F.2d at 740. See the discussion
of grand jury secrecy in notes 279-99.
191. Educational Dev. Network, 884 F.2d at 739.
192. Id. at 739, 741.
193. Id. at 742 (citing its earlier decision in Donovan v. Spadea, 757 F.2d 74, 77 (3d Cir.
1985)).
194. Educational Dev. Network, 884 F.2d at 743 n.10 (citation omitted). See also United
States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 831 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which approved the use of
Department of Defense Inspector General subpoenas to pursue a joint Justice Department-
Department of Defense criminal investigation. In Aero Mayflower, the appellants made colorable
allegations that the Inspector General was at times merely rubber stamping subpoenas prepared
by the Justice Department while, at other times, the Justice Department modified the content of
the Inspector General's subpoenas so that "the Inspector General was not conducting an
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C. Digesting the Case Law Developments
The cases support a settled recognition of the propriety of civil
investigations of criminal matters with accompanying disclosure to
prosecutors. This recognition does not, however, amount to a
complete assimilation of civil process into the field of criminal
investigation. As noted above, the civil agency must be able to
establish a legitimate purpose for its inquiry that falls within its
statutory mandate. The recipient of a subpoena may challenge a
summons on the ground that no such legitimate purpose is
apparent. 95 In such a case a court might view the agency as nothing
more than a tool for the prosecutor, who prefers to build a case
through the agency and to avoid grand jury secrecy rules. This
problem is unlikely to cross over from theory into practice, however,
because a criminal violation of a regulatory statute nearly always will
also constitute a ground for a civil suit by government or a ground for
administrative sanctions. Furthermore, an agency often can base civil
subpoena power nakedly on its statutory authority to investigate
criminal violations within its bailiwick.
Daunting problems may confront a party who is subject to
parallel civil and criminal proceedings. Fifth Amendment dilemmas
will present themselves,196 as will the possibility of government
obtaining disclosure through civil discovery that would be unavailable
once formal criminal adversarial proceedings commence. 197 Before the
independent investigation but was serving as a mere conduit for an investigation by the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division by lending out the Inspector General's subpoena power." Id. at
1143. The court rejected this argument, noting that the Inspector General had both civil and
criminal investigatory powers and that "[s]o long as the Inspector General's subpoenas seek
information relevant to the discharge of his duties, the exact degree of Justice Department
guidance or influence seems manifestly immaterial." Id. at 1146.
195. See the earlier discussion of Morton Salt in the text accompanying notes 48-49. A good
discussion of this limitation is found in Note, 91 Yale L. J. at 1614 (cited in note 148).
196. In a civil case, an adverse inference properly may be drawn from a party's assertion of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See generally Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308 (1976). Furthermore, in a civil proceeding, the defendant may feel great pressure to
cooperate in order to maintain a modicum of good relations with the government agency in
question and to stave off significant sanctions. For example, under the regulatory provisions
governing Medicare and Medicaid, a health care provider must make records available to federal
investigators. Failure "to grant immediate access upon reasonable request" is a ground for
barring the provider from both programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(12) (1988). Such cooperation
might, however, prejudice the possibility of an effective defense if the government brings a
subsequent criminal prosecution.
197. A criminal conviction may raise the doctrine of collateral estoppel against the defendant
as to particular identical issues at stake in a subsequent civil proceeding. The Matter of Raiford,
695 F.2d 521, 523 (11th Cir. 1983). These disadvantageous impacts might be avoided if the court
permits the defendant to enter a nolo contendere plea in the criminal matter. See F.R.Cr.P.
11(e)(6)(b). On the other hand, exoneration in a criminal proceeding will not necessarily protect
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grand jury has returned an indictment, these problems are
prospective (although they still must be confronted); after indictment,
they become more consequential because they implicate the
established rule that, at this point, government should be restricted to
information it obtains through the rules of discovery applicable to
criminal cases.19 8 The government may manipulate the date of
returning an indictment to an extent; thus, the application of the
principle is subject somewhat to governmental control. This danger,
increasingly persistent as parallel proceedings become common,
requires a deliberate review of the possibility of stronger judicial
control over the ordering of parallel proceedings and further thought
about the conditions that make stays and protective orders
appropriate.
More generally, the issues that surface in these cases raise the
central question of whether any valid constitutional or policy bases
support isolation of the criminal and civil subpoena powers in separate
compartments. Any attempt to ground such an effort in the
constitutional rights of a criminal suspect or defendant seems
unavailing. No due process issue arises because an individual has no
due process right to a state grand jury indictment.19 9 No danger of
chilling the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
presents itself because an individual may assert the privilege as a
basis for refusal to comply with any compulsory process, whether from
the grand jury or by way of civil summons or investigative demand.
Even if the question is confined to the federal jurisdiction, in which
defendants do have a constitutional right to a grand jury indictment,
nothing in the tradition of grand jury practice supports the exclusion
the defendant from a subsequent civil suit in which the burden of proof is lower. United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984). Thus, the defendant has much to lose
and not much to gain.
198. For example, it is always improper to subpoena a defendant before a grand jury for the
purpose of questioning him about a crime for which he is already charged. United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 594 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). A grand jury subpoena should be
quashed if the movant can show that its predominant purpose is to provide information to aid in
the preparation of a pending indictment for trial. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1985). If the court does not quash the
subpoena, an appropriate remedy would be to prohibit the government from calling the grand
jury witness at the trial and, if the defense does call the witness, to prohibit the government from
using her grand jury testimony to impeach her. United States v. Kovaleski, 406 F. Supp. 267, 271
(E.D. Mich. 1976). This principle is unique to grand jury proceedings; courts do not accept the
proposition that continuing investigation through civil process is improper after indictment. See
United States v. Harrington, 761 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985), and the discussion in note 184.
199. The Fifth Amendment federal right to indictment by a grand jury has not been
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and does not apply to
the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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of material gathered by civil process. The right to a grand jury
indictment surely is satisfied by having the grand jury vote a true bill
after it receives evidence, without requiring that the evidence be
developed exclusively through the grand jury subpoena or through
witnesses who appear only before a grand jury and not before any
other agency of government..2 00 The grand jury's exercise of a true
screening function before a citizen is brought to trial is the essence of
the grand jury's importance to the subject's liberty. Questions about
the process by which evidence was gathered in the first place, which of
course must be legal and constitutionally proper, are a separate
matter. These evidence-gathering requirements, however, do not
require an exclusive role for the grand jury.
An attempt to justify the separation by a due process notion
extracted from more general ideas of "abuse of process" or "usurpation
of the function of the grand jury" makes the foundation appear even
more shaky. A purely historical invocation of the grand jury as the
central institution in initiating a criminal prosecution does not provide
a satisfying resolution. The grand jury monopolized this role at a time
when the criminal law was reasonably compact and when a fairly
clear dividing line between criminal and civil proceedings was
apparent. Federal criminal law, now immensely swollen, frequently
overlaps civil penalties; especially in the regulatory fields of
administrative agencies, the same conduct frequently may be
sanctioned by both criminal and civil penalties. Furthermore, the
"civil" penalties often are frankly described as deterrent or punitive in
nature. 20 1 Sometimes the agency ultimately will decide to pursue both
civil and criminal sanctions. Frequently no formal criminal
proceedings will be brought because civil penalties appear adequate,
although strongly punitive.
202
These developments highlight a strong need to keep options
open and to pursue investigations through the medium of whatever
200. Federal law provides virtually no restrictions on the kind of evidence the grand jury
may receive. Indeed, the jury may indict on the basis of hearsay: "[Neither the Fifth
Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which
grand juries must act." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,362 (1956).
201. Although civil penalties often are punitive, criminal penalties in the regulatory area
may encompass many of the consequences that traditionally might be expected from a civil
regulatory process. For example, convictions of health care fraud can result in exclusion from
participation in government-funded health care programs and the loss of licenses, while
convictions for defense contracting fraud can result in debarment from contractual relations with
the government. See ABA Special Advisory Committee on Collateral Consequences, Rinal Report
Collateral Consequences of Convictions of Organizations (ABA, 1991).




agency appears most appropriate or most efficient to carry out the
task. Often the locus of the initiation of the investigation may depend
on chance, on which department or agency gets the first batch of
significant information. Better coordination of procedures for deciding
who then should make the major effort may be desirable, but this is a
question of governmental efficiency and not of the rights of citizens or
entities. Any mandated effort to hold apart the two strands of
governmental inquiry and corrective action now appears anachronistic
and runs counter to the intertwined nature of modern governmental
investigations. Traditional assertions of the need for separation
appear to be little more than an unexamined legacy of the grand jury's
dominant role in criminal investigation in an earlier period.
Assume, for example, that a federal agency or commission or
perhaps the Inspector General's office of a federal department begins
an inquiry into suspected breaches of regulations that, if proven,
almost certainly will also amount to criminal offenses. Even if no
criminal prosecution is brought, civil penalties and other
administrative sanctions likely will have a large deterrent, punitive
impact. Because of its criminal aura, such an investigation might
have been initiated in some branch of the Department of Justice and
been conducted through a federal grand jury. But it happens to be
initiated by an agency, which appears natural and proper since
presumably the agency personnel will have the expertise and
knowledge to conduct the probe effectively. Indeed, for that reason,
the Department of Justice, if it acquires information suggesting that a
probe likely would be a productive expenditure of resources, may well
suggest to the agency that it begin the investigation.
Assume further that at some point in the inquiry the agency
personnel decide not only that civil penalties are indicated, but that
pursuit of a criminal prosecution is warranted, due to the gravity of
the conduct uncovered during the investigation. At this point,
collaboration with prosecutors obviously would be prudent, because
agency personnel may be less sophisticated about the preparation of a
criminal case and might make blunders or omissions that would
prejudice the best presentation of the criminal case. The government
parties may agree that the most efficient way to proceed is to turn the
criminal aspect of the case over to federal prosecutors for further
development through a grand jury's subpoena power. Such a complete
referral should not be required, however, especially if further
compulsory process by the agency must cease with the referral. First,
the agency may have a legitimate interest in pursuing the civil
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penalty aspects of the inquiry. Second, the government parties may
agree that the agency is competent and well-suited to continue to
develop the criminal aspects of the case and "package" the evidence for
the grand jury before later turning it over to the prosecutor for the
formal initiation of the indictment process.
Although such a process generally is not objectionable, it
creates a sensitive situation, not only when an already-indicted
defendant is involved, but also when the target of possible criminal
prosecution is subpoenaed to give oral testimony (as opposed to
producing documents) before an administrative agency. The federal
grand jury may subpoena these targets to testify' °3 because it enjoys a
special historical position that justifies its extraordinary powers. By
comparison, the notion that a citizen who is suspected of crime can be
summoned to testify before an administrative authority has vaguely
disreputable antecedents, evoking traditional rhetoric about Star
Chamber proceedings. The situation sharply raises Fifth Amendment
issues because, while the privilege against self-incrimination has been
considerably eroded with respect to documents, especially the records
of a commercial entity,20 4 it still retains full force with respect to oral
testimony.
These considerations have led courts to scrutinize closely
claims that agencies are entitled to compel the testimony of a target in
a criminal or quasi-criminal investigation. In United States v.
Minker,20 -5 the Supreme Court held that the powers conferred by the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 on immigration officers to
"require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses" did
not extend to subpoenaing a naturalized citizen for this purpose when
the investigation was intended to determine whether good cause
existed for the institution of denaturalization proceedings. Minker,
however, did not rest on any broad principle of the impropriety of such
action but rather on a narrow construction of the key statutory
concept of "witness." The Court did not in principle question
203. "The obligation to appear is no different for a person who may himself be the subject of
the grand jury inquiry.' United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1973). The Court also has
declined to hold that the target is constitutionally entitled to a self-incrimination warning, leaving
this question open for future determination. See note 60 and accompanying text.
204. '[A]n individual cannot rely upon the privilege to avoid producing the records of a
collective entity which are in his possession in a representative capacity, even if these records
might incriminate him personally." Bellia v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974). Further, the
modern position concludes that the privilege protects only against the compulsion to make a fresh
testimonial declaration. Thus, documents that the witness produced voluntarily on a previous
occasion are not subject to the privilege, even though they may contain incriminating statements.
FIsher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
205. 350 U.S. 179 (1956).
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congressional power to provide for the issuance of a subpoena to a
potential target of an investigation, but in essence did conclude that
the statute in Minker did not provide for this possibility with sufficient
clarity.20 In modern cases, courts have not questioned the proposition
that an administrative agency, acting within its statutory powers,
may properly direct a subpoena duces tecum to the target of an inquiry
even when criminal proceedings are possible or even likely. With
respect to subpoenaing a target to give testimony, Minker no doubt
continues to be valid but, properly understood, does not invalidate
such a process. Instead, it only requires that the process be expressly
set out in the governing statute.2 07
Therefore, while issuing administrative subpoenas for
testimony to targets of criminal investigations may not be general
practice, such a practice is not improper (at least before indictment) if
clearly contemplated by the governing statute. Targets will not be
harmed because their rights and privileges are not less with respect to
the compulsory process of the agency than with respect to the
compulsory process of the grand jury. The target of a criminal
investigation might object to an administrative subpoena because he
enjoys greater protection from the citizen composition of the grand
jury. However, the general practice of allowing a witness before an
administrative agency to be accompanied by counsel more than
compensates for any danger posed by an administrative subpoena.
206. The Court concluded that complete clarity was especially important since the statute
conferred the subpoena power broadly on any immigration officer. Id. at 190. The concurring
opinion of Justice Black suggested a rather broader basis; after expressing general uneasiness
about "compulsory questioning by law enforcement officers behind closed doors," Justice Black
asserted that "a police practice so dangerous to individual liberty as this should not be read into
an Act of Congress in the absence of a clear and unequivocal congressional mandate." Id. at 191-
92 (Black, J., concurring).
207. United States v. Hossbach, 518 F. Supp. 759, 766-67 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing and relying
on Minker). In Hossbach, subpoenas were issued to third parties by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) during the course of a criminal investigation. The governing statute, the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 876(a), provides inter
alia that, "in any investigation" under the statute, "the Attorney General may subpoena witnesses
[and] compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses .... " Hossbach, 518 F. Supp. at 765.
The statutory scheme clearly encompasses both the civil regulation of drug dealings and the
enforcement of criminal offenses in that area. Id. It empowers the Attorney General to delegate
his functions to any employee of the Department of Justice; in this connection, the Attorney
General made such a delegation to agents-in-charge in the DEA, under 28 C.F.R. Subpt. R., App.
§ 7(a). Hossbach, 518 F. Supp. at 765-66. The Hossbach court took the position that the DEA
could issue subpoenas under the statute in a purely criminal investigation but, relying on Minker,
concluded that they could not properly direct subpoenas to the targets of the criminal
investigation. Id. at 766. Again, this dictum turns on a construction of the term 'witness" in the
statute rather than on any broader ground. Id.
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The converse case, in which the process has begun with a
grand jury investigation into suspected criminality, poses greater
difficulty. Suppose that ample evidence has been developed before the
grand jury to procure an indictment but that further evidence would
be useful to strengthen the case of a government agency that wants to
press for civil penalties. As noted, once the indictment is returned, the
grand jury may not continue its process solely to strengthen the
criminal case. Arguably, the prosecutor likewise may not properly
delay the formal return of the indictment in order to use grand jury
process to gather further evidence merely to strengthen an agency's
hand in a civil matter because, in the absence of a continuing need for
criminal investigation, such a delay would amount to an abuse of the
grand jury process.
This problem rarely will arise in practice because the task of
demonstrating that the grand jury has no continuing legitimate
criminal investigatory purpose is difficult2°s and because, once a
criminal case has been soundly built, the foundation for civil
proceedings also is likely to be in place. The more vexing question
asks to what extent the product of the grand jury investigation can be
made available to civil attorneys for the government or for an agency
of government. Any such disclosure clashes with the traditional
requirement, reiterated by modern rules and decisions, that grand
jury proceedings must be kept secret. To this problem Part VIII now
turns.
VIII. THE GRAND JURY
The most reiterated and cherished condemnation of the mixing
of civil and criminal process lies in the context of investigations by the
grand jury. United States v. Procter & Gamble209 provides a modern
starting point. In Procter & Gamble, a grand jury conducted an
investigation into antitrust violations but returned no indictment.
The government then brought a civil suit under the Sherman Act 10 to
enjoin alleged violations of the Act, making use of the grand jury
transcript in its preparation of the litigation. The defendants moved
for disclosure of the transcript to assist them in the preparation of
their defense. The Supreme Court reversed an order requiring
208. In order to make such a showing, a party objecting to a grand jury subpoena would have
to have full access to the grand jury file, which is not permitted.
209. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
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disclosure, relying on the traditional policy favoring secrecy with
respect to grand jury proceedings and finding that the defendants had
made no showing of particularized need sufficient to displace the
application of this policy.211 At the same time the Court declared that,
if the government had been using a criminal process to gather
evidence for a civil case, it would have been flouting the policy of the
Sherman Act, which provides that depositions taken under
government civil process in an antitrust case "shall be open to the
public.212 However, the district court had made no finding that
criminal procedure had been "subverted" in this fashion.213
Procter & Gamble is instructive; it states the basic position
that criminal process must not be used for a civil investigative purpose
and also contains a fresh and strong assertion of the importance of
grand jury secrecy. At the same time, the decision does not hold the
two kinds of process wholly separate because it permitted the
government (though not the defendant), in the absence of a finding of
bad faith, to avail itself in a civil proceeding of evidence gathered
through traditional criminal investigatory compulsory process.21 4
211. The Court listed the reasons justifying grand jury secrecy by quoting the enumeration
in United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954):
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure
the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject
to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury
and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled
disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5)
to protect an innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has
been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no
probability of guilt.
Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681-82 n.6 (quoting Rose, 215 F.2d at 628-29). When Procter &
Gamble was decided, exceptions to the grand jury secrecy principle appeared in an early version
of F.R.Cr.P. 6(e). That Rule subsequently was amplified by amendments in 1966, 1977, 1979,
1983, and 1985. The present version of Rule 6(e) is discussed in notes 148-49.
212. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 683 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 30).
213. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 684 (Whittaker, J., concurring). Justice Whittaker
suggested that a desire on the part of government to avoid open hearings and to take evidence ex
parte "probably has often been the real purpose of grand jury investigations in like cases." Id.
214. The question before the Court was the propriety of disclosing the grand jury file to the
defendant. Thus, the holding does not expressly validate use of the grand jury fie by the
government; indeed, it now appears, under the authority of United States v. Sells Engineering,
463 U.S. 418 (1983), and the present version of F.R.Cr.P. 6(e) (see the discussion in notes 148-49
and accompanying text), that the government should apply to the court and must show
particularized need before it can use the file in a civil proceeding. Nevertheless, the tenor of the
Court's opinion seems to find no impropriety in the government's use of the grand jury materials
absent a showing that the government acted with bad faith ab initio. The Court's resolution may
appear perverse, since the grand jury secrecy principle, which the Court advanced as tending
toward the protection of targets and defendants, ultimately was applied to deny the defendant
access to a file that the government had compiled secretly and then was permitted to use against
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Applying the principle of separating criminal and civil
investigatory process in the context of grand jury investigations is not
without difficulty. What kind of showing must a party make to
demonstrate abuse of the grand jury process in this context?
2' 5 Must
she show that the grand jury investigation was a sham from the first
in the sense that the government made a prior commitment to civil
proceedings while it perceived no possibility or only a bare possibility
that criminal proceedings would ensue? Or will it suffice to show that,
although the possibility existed that criminal conduct would be
unearthed, which would lead to an indictment, nevertheless an equal,
perhaps stronger, purpose of the agency was to promote a civil
investigation? The Supreme Court has made no clear statement on
this issue, although language in Procter & Gamble can be interpreted
to approve the first, stronger version of the burden imposed on a party
who challenges government use of the material in a civil context.21 6
The weaker version of the burden surely would be
inappropriate.27  The functioning of grand juries would be inhibited
him. This view of secrecy is one-sided, however. The 'bad faith* or "abuse of process" restriction
on government use seems inconsequential since the government usually will be able to assign
some not wholly implausible criminal investigatory purpose to grand jury activity.
215. A movant might seek a remedy at different stages. One possibility is to petition for
prohibition to halt the grand jury proceedings; another is to move for dismissal of an indictment
that the jury has returned; a third, to move for suppression of evidence. Contempt proceedings
against the prosecutor also are possible. Frequently the issue will arise when a movant has
applied to release grand jury materials for a civil purpose.
216. See the discussion in LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 8.8(c) at 661-63 (cited in
note 2) (noting that the language in Procter & Gamble 'suggests that the Court there was
considering only that situation in which the prosecutor fully anticipated bringing a civil suit and
viewed an indictment 'as merely an unexpected bare possibility") (quoting United States v.
Procter & Gamble, 187 F. Supp. 55, 58 (D.N.J. 1960)). To support this view, the authors cite
Universal Mfg. Co. v. United States, 508 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
April 1978, 581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978); Robert Hawthorne Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue,
406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 8.8(c) at n.35.
These cases interpret the test to ask whether the grand jury was "used for the primary purpose of
obtaining materials relevant only to civil liability." In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 581 F.2d at
1110. In this case, the appellant sought to quash grand jury subpoenas and sought an order to
terminate the grand jury proceedings on the ground that the grand jury proceeding was
instituted only after the appellant had been successful in quashing several IRS administrative
summonses. Id. at 1105. The appellant contended further that the IRS had a history of resorting
to grand juries when its administrative investigations had been thwarted. Id. at 1107.
Nevertheless, the court denied a hearing on these issues, concluding that the petitioner would be
adequately protected by later judicial review of an application for disclosure of the grand jury
proceedings. Id. at 1110.
217. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Miller Brewing Co.), 687 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1982),
appeared to adopt the weaker view of the burden. In Miller Brewing, the court stated, "A grand
jury investigation is not conducted in good faith unless it is used to conduct investigations that
are in their inception exclusively criminal." Id. at 1086. However, the court also found "no
evidence of bad faith from the mere fact that the government conducted a grand jury proceeding
without returning an indictment and later seeks to use the material in a civil investigation....
[Tihere was no intent in the legislative history of Rule 6(e) to generally preclude the use of grand
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seriously if they were prevented from inquiring into possible
criminality simply because it was likely from the outset that a civil
remedy also would be pursued and perhaps preferred, to the exclusion
of criminal proceedings. The stronger burden, while preferable, may
be enormously difficult to discharge. The government rarely will be
unable to make some plausible showing that the grand jury was
charged with an inquiry into possibly criminal conduct. These
assurances ought to be accepted unless they clearly can be
demonstrated to be mere subterfuge. This analysis remains
consistent with the traditional presumption of regularity in grand jury
proceedings 28 and with the traditional freedom of the grand jury to
investigate mere possibilities of crime.
The weaker test runs the risk of compelling the government to
show that, from the first, it had probable cause to believe a crime had
been committed, which would defeat the very purpose of the grand
jury-to uncover the existence of that probable cause. 21 9 Moreover,
the weaker test would compel the government to rebut by showing
that it had made an institutional commitment to a criminal
prosecution if certain facts were uncovered. This situation would be
unfortunate, since the choice between civil and criminal sanctions,
and whether they should be pursued concurrently or whether one
should be followed exclusively, often cannot be made intelligently at
an early stage. These decisions depend upon the exact, final
configuration of the uncovered facts and, beyond that, on the
willingness of a target to repair damage and make restitution,
perhaps even to submit to serious civil sanctions without contest.
Consultation between prosecutors and civil agencies, 'when all the
facts are known and the posture of the target ascertained, ultimately
will be necessary to decide what are the preferred remedies.20 This
jury developed evidence for civil law enforcement purposes, 'assuming that the grand jury was
utilized for the legitimate purpose of a criminal investigation.'" Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-354,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977)).
218. "A presumption of regularity attaches to a grand jury's proceedings and appellants have
the burden of demonstrating that an irregularity occurred." United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d
242,250 (6th Cir. 1976).
219. "The jurors may act on tips, rumors, evidence offered by the prosecutor, or their own
personal knowledge." United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972)). The Court noted further that "a sufficient basis for an indictment may
only emerge at the end of the investigation when all the evidence has been received." Dionisio,
410 U.S. at 15-16.
220. One problem is that such a consultation may be inhibited by the obstacles in F-R.Cr.P.
6(e) that restrain disclosure of grand jury materials. See the discussion in notes 148-49. The
inclusion of agency attorneys in the prosecutor's team will make consultation easier. These
attorneys may consult with their agency superiors but, if this consultation involves the disclosure
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process should be encouraged and not inhibited by the risk of
imputing taint to evidence uncovered by the grand jury.
Auxiliary tests can be helpful in arriving at the proper
conclusion. If a grand jury actually returns an indictment, any
assertion of grand jury abuse will be facially implausible. Therefore,
the question of abuse of process likely arises only when no indictment
has been returned.2 1  If a grand jury hearing is held, important
questions will be whether the prosecutor acted in response to a civil
agency referral, and whether and to what extent civil agency
personnel were involved in the preparation of the case for and its
presentation to the grand jury. Apparently, no federal courts have
found abuse of the grand jury process in this context.
Another subject of scrutiny should be the Court's concern in
Procter & Gamble that government will obtain an unfair advantage in
civil proceedings by amassing a secret file through use of the grand
jury subpoena power.222 No doubt the idea is rooted historically in the
perception that a procedure as intrusive as the pre-trial inquisitorial
subpoena for purposes of investigation can be justified only by the
public necessity to solve and prosecute criminal cases. The pursuit of
a civil remedy, which, until recently, was almost entirely a matter for
private parties seeking to vindicate private rights, was not considered
sufficiently urgent to warrant the use of compulsory process for
investigative purposes.
In addition, the process employed by the grand jury was (and
is) a harsh one, with an uncounseled witness (who may be a target of
the investigation) subject, unless she is very vigilant, to potential self-
incrimination and even to prosecutions for contempt or perjury. To
convert this severe brand of compulsory process to civil use
traditionally appeared unconscionable. Until recent times, because of
the rarity of civil litigation by the government, these propositions
seemed obvious while the danger of abuse seemed remote. In modern
times, however, the huge increase in administrative regulation and
of grand jury materials, the superiors also then become bound by the rules relating to grand jury
secrecy.
221. A showing of good faith on the part of the government "is particularly important where
the grand jury fails to return an indictment. In such case, the likelihood of improper use of the
grand jury process is substantially greater....' In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, 581
F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir. 1978). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Miller Brewing Co.), 687
F.2d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that the failure to return an indictment should not
count at all as evidence of bad faith).
222. This proposition is conventionally accepted: 'The grand jury should not be used by the
prosecutor for the purpose of aiding or assisting in any administrative inquiry." Neil A. Kaplan,
et al., eds., Parallel Grand Jury and Administrative Agency Investigations 542 (ABA, 1981)
(quoting ABA Policy on the Grand Jury (ABA, 1977)).
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public civil remedies has transformed the situation. Government now
has the strongest interest in building good cases for the pursuit of civil
sanctions and remedies. At the same time, the processes of civil and
criminal investigation have become intertwined in many cases. In
these cases, government civil attorneys conduct a large part of the
investigation and often participate in the preparation of the case for
the grand jury, sometimes even acting as specially designated
Assistant United States Attorneys and actually presenting the case to
the grand jury.22  The two streams of investigation and process have
converged and, as a result, the danger of using the grand jury for civil
purposes has become real.
The danger seems less deadly, however, because many
government agencies and departments now enjoy civil compulsory
process nearly equal to the grand jury's powers. If government can
use a civil investigative demand to procure documents or to compel
testimony, what does it matter if they find it more convenient to
funnel the same process through the agency of the grand jury? Many
state jurisdictions do not employ grand juries for investigative
purposes; instead, they conduct criminal investigations through
subpoenas returnable before a magistrate, a procedure that might be
thought virtually indistinguishable from the execution of a civil
investigative demand. The question thus arises whether continued
adherence to the principle that the grand jury must not be used for
predominantly civil purposes amounts to anything more than an
obeisance to no-longer-relevant history.
Observers can suggest some reasons for continuing, legitimate
concern about using grand juries for civil purposes. First, not all
agencies and government departments have compulsory process
powers co-extensive with the grand jury. Inspectors General possess
limited powers for the production of documents and lack the power to
compel testimony. For an agency or office with such restricted powers
to exploit the grand jury's historical plenary process would constitute
an evasion of a legislative decision to accord the agency only a limited
investigative role. Second, even if the agency has power to compel
testimony, it must allow a witness to be accompanied by counsel, a
privilege not accorded under federal grand jury practice. The
intimidating atmosphere of an inquisition without the assistance of
counsel may be justifiable only by the great public interest in solving
and prosecuting crimes. Third, grand jury proceedings are secret,
223. See note 148.
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while a target may have a better chance of discovery of proceedings
before an administrative agency. If government civil agencies are to
have access to grand jury materials, adversarial equipoise may
require enlarging the rights of the defense in a civil matter to have co-
extensive access. Fourth, the use of the grand jury process to further
civil remedies may constitute a breach of secrecy, which chills the
willingness of witnesses to testify or to come forward to the prosecutor
with information.
Although these concerns are legitimate, protecting them
through rules or principles in the abuse of process context would be
nearly impossible because a litigant then would face the extremely
difficult task of showing that a grand jury inquiry was launched with
no legitimate purpose of criminal investigation. Courts are very
reluctant to interfere with the ongoing proceedings of a grand jury.22 4
In recent years these considerations have found expression through
another outlet-the elaboration of the concept of grand jury secrecy. 2 5
Even if a grand jury were used predominantly for the improper
purpose of inquiring into a civil matter, no harm will come if the fruits
of the inquiry are not disclosed to the interested civil agency or party.
Because the grand jury is eminently likely to have uncovered facts
relevant to the possibility of civil proceedings, even when acting with
perfect legitimacy,228 the question of when disclosure is proper becomes
crucial and has generated much recent litigation.
IX. DisLosuRE OF GRAND JURY MATERIALS
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure embodies
the present state of the law with respect to disclosure of proceedings
before the grand jury. In the context of this discussion, the current
rule, produced by a series of amendments over several decades,
224. 'Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with . . . preliminary showings would
assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious
administration of the criminal laws." United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Further,
the Dionisio Court recognized that the grand jury "must be free to pursue its investigations
unhinderedby external influence or supervision...." Id.
225. As the Fourth Circuit explained:
[To hold an evidentiary hearing into prosecutorial motivation with an eye toward
quashing otherwise lawfully issued subpoenas and even terminating the entire process
would be substantial judicial intervention. Nonetheless, such intervention might well be
required if it were the only means of protecting petitioner from the abuse he alleges.
There is, however, a less drastic remedy in F.R.Cr.P. 6(e).
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978, 581 F.2d 1103, 1108 (4th Cir. 1978).
226. In this context, the Supreme Court has described the grand jury as a "storehouse of
relevant facts." Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966).
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provides two principal possibilities of disclosure of grand jury
information. First, disclosure may be made to "an attorney for the
government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty.... "I"
Second, disclosure is proper "when so directed by a court preliminarily
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding' 2 8 (usually referred to as
a (C)(i) order). The Judiciary Committee Notes on these provisions
are ambivalent, stating on one hand that the rules are intended to
affirm the traditional commitment to preventing "misuse of the grand
jury to enforce non-criminal Federal laws" but also asserting that
"[t]here is ... no intent to preclude the use of grand jury-developed
evidence for civil law enforcement purposes."22 9 Clearly, the provisions
were not meant to impose an absolute ban on disclosure with respect
to civil proceedings, but rather were viewed affirmatively as an
adequate mechanism for releasing grand jury information for such
purposes.
The permission to disclose, without an order of the court, to an
attorney for the government in the performance of that attorney's
duty is facially capable of a wide interpretation that might include use
by any attorney on the civil side of the Department of Justice (though
not an agency attorney)230 to prepare civil proceedings or merely to aid
227. F.R.Cr.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i).
228. F.R.Cr.P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i). Rule 6(e)(3)(C) lists other grounds for disclosure: a request of a
defendant based on a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand jury, a disclosure made by an attorney for the
government to another federal grand jury, or disclosure to an appropriate state official upon a
showing that grand jury matters may disclose a violation of state criminal law. F.R.Cr.P.
6(e)(3)(C)(ii-iv). These additional grounds are not pertinent to the subject of this Article and will
not be considered further.
229. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, S. Rep. No. 93-354, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977). The full passage reads:
The Rule as redrafted is designed to accommodate the belief on the one hand that Federal
prosecutors should be able, without the time-consuming requirement of prior judicial
interposition, to make such disclosures of grand jury information to other government
personnel as they deem necessary to facilitate the performance of their duties relating to
criminal law enforcement. On the other hand, the Rule seeks to allay the concerns of
those who fear that such prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of the grand jury to
enforce non-criminal Federal laws by (1) providing a clear prohibition, subject to the
penalty of contempt and (2) requiring that a court order under paragraph (C) be obtained
to authorize such a disclosure. There is, however, no intent to preclude the use of grand
jury-developed evidence for civil law enforcement purposes. On the contrary, there is no
reason why such use is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the
legitimate purpose of a criminal investigation. Accordingly, the Committee believes and
intends that the basis for a court's refusal to issue an order under paragraph (C) to enable
the government to disclose grand jury information in a non-criminal proceeding should be
no more restrictive than is the case today under prevailing court decisions.
Id. (emphasis added).
230. The phrase "attorney for the government" in Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) is a term of art defined in
F.R.Cr.P. 54(c) to include "the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General,
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in a civil investigation. But the Supreme Court resoundingly denied
the viability of such an interpretation in United States v. Sells
Engineering.23' In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the
provision refers only to a government attorney's pursuit of the
criminal aspects of a case and cannot be relied upon to justify
disclosure to a Justice Department Civil Division attorney for civil
investigation or even for civil proceedings initiated or contemplated by
the government.232
The opinion of the Sells Court, delivered by Justice Brennan,
relied principally on historic notions of the importance of grand jury
secrecy, which the Court feared would be undermined by automatic
disclosure to Justice Department civil attorneys for civil purposes,
without a court order23 and without a showing of particularized need.
Such disclosures, the Court feared, would increase the risk of
inadvertent further disclosures and might chill the readiness of
witnesses to come forward. Disclosure also would heighten the danger
that the grand jury would be abused ab initio as an organ for civil
discovery and, even absent such abuse, would actually enhance
government discovery powers beyond the level permissible under the
general rules of discovery in civil cases.2 4
The majority could perceive no important competing interest to
be weighed against the value of grand jury secrecy other than "a
matter of saving time and expense," which it viewed as clearly
subordinate. If the government could not obtain the same information
by some duplicative process, it then could have recourse to the court-
ordered disclosure provision of Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(1).235
The majority opinion in Sells lacks persuasive force in a
number of areas. Although any expansion of the group of those who
a United States Attorney, [and] an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney :...." Thus,
the term does not include government agency attorneys. However, but for the restrictive
interpretation adopted by the Court in United States v. Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. 418 (1983),
discussed in notes 231-34 and accompanying text, it could include all Justice Department
attorneys.
231. 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
232. In Sells, the IRS had begun to investigate the respondents. While this investigation was
ongoing, a federal grand jury subpoenaed many documents that were the subjects of contested
summonses issued by the IRS. The grand jury indicted the respondents for tax fraud and
conspiracy to defraud the United States; the parties negotiated a plea bargain. The government
then moved for disclosure of all grand jury materials to attorneys in the Justice Department's
Civil Division. The respondents opposed the disclosure. Id. at 421-22.
233. The government in Sells adopted the position that no court order was necessary since
automatic disclosure was proper under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i). Sells, 463 U.S. at 427. Nevertheless,
presumably in an effort to clarify the law, the government chose to proceed by requesting
permission from the district court to make disclosure.




gain access to grand jury information must enhance the risk of further
disclosures to some extent, the danger seems minimal in the context of
Sells. First, a wide circle of government personnel already has access
to grand jury material in the course of the preparation of the case for,
and presentation to, the grand jury.26  Second, in practice, no
disclosures are made beyond this circle until the grand jury
proceedings are terminated either by indictment or by the grand jury's
refusal to return an indictment.? At this stage, many of the
conventional reasons for grand jury secrecy, such as a desire not to
inform the target of the inquiry and not to chill witnesses' willingness
to come forward, have either disappeared or have lost some force.
Third, the release of information to government attorneys in
connection with the execution of their duties is not analogous to a
release to the news media. Restrictions could be placed upon
government use and disclosure of information obtained from the grand
jury, just as restrictions are placed upon disclosure by personnel who
assist the prosecutor in preparing the case for the grand jury.
28
What is most troublesome about the majority opinion in Sells is
its brief and cavalier treatment of the burdens placed on government
by the severe restrictions the decision imposes on the government's
use of grand jury material. First, the matter of time and expense
should not be taken so lightly. The civil side of governmental law
enforcement is hardly less important than the criminal side. That
civil government attorneys or a civil agency should be required to
enter into protracted and often contested duplicative proceedings
(including the considerable delay of appellate review) to obtain
material that is sitting in grand jury files seems an exercise in futility,
at least in cases (which will be the vast majority) in which the grand
jury inquiry unquestionably was conducted in good faith.
236. See the discussion of Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(h) in note 148 and accompanying text; the Rule
permits disclosure to any government (including state) personnel who are deemed necessary by
an attorney for the government to assist that attorney in her duty to enforce the federal criminal
law.
237. The dissenting opinion in Sells (written by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor), makes this point. Sells, 463 U.S. at 466 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
238. Government (federal or state) personnel who assist in the preparation of the case are
bound by the general obligation of secrecy and their names must be provided to the district court.
Rule 6(e)(3)(B). If wider disclosure were made to attorneys working on civil matters, the secrecy
obligation of course could not be coextensive, because those attorneys necessarily would not be
using the material for the preparation of a criminal case. However, they could be restricted by
obligations of secrecy with respect to disclosure for any purpose other than the normal functions
involved in preparing the civil case.
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Second, the Court assumes that government will always be
able to obtain the material in some other way, or that, if the
government does not have an alternative method, it does not deserve
to have one. Clearly, government organs outside the prosecutor's
office do not always have alternative means to acquire the material
contained in grand jury transcripts. The civil rules of discovery
presuppose that litigation has been launched, but government often
has a legitimate and pressing need for material in the investigative
stages of a civil matter when discovery is not available. In these
investigative stages, civil branches of government possess an uneven
patchwork of powers. In the immediate context of Sells-government
attorneys in the narrow sense-only the Antitrust Division on the civil
side of the Department of Justice has the power to issue a civil
investigative demand. Outside the Justice Department (where the
"attorney for the government" concept of Rule 6 has no application),
the civil investigative demand does not always include the power to
compel testimony. Therefore, unless the prosecutor discloses grand
jury material to a civil attorney for the government or to personnel of
some government agency, the civil authority may have no inkling of
the existence of serious violations of the civil law.
Further, what behavior amounts to improper disclosure under
the current law remains unclear. May a prosecutor properly state to a
civil attorney that a certain area of activity or the operations of a
certain corporation or individual might be worthy of attention, if she
has learned this information from a grand jury investigation?2 9 Much
social harm may result from gagging the 'prosecutor completely;
almost as much may result from restricting the prosecutor to hints
and nods while preventing her from handing over specific
information. 240 This arrangement reduces law enforcement to an
irrationally complex game.
The uneven distribution of powers of compulsory process cuts
both ways with respect to questions of disclosure of grand jury
materials. On one hand, if a civil government attorney or an agency
has full powers of compulsory process, it has no need for disclosure of
239. One way a prosecutor can alert agency personnel that something of interest to them is
afoot is by bringing the agency personnel into the grand jury investigation to 'assist [her] in the
performance of [her] duty to enforce federal criminal law," under the power conferred by Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii). F.R.Cr.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). The agency personnel then would also be bound not to
reveal specific matters occurring before the grand jury, but it likely would not be improper to use
the information as a basis for beginning an agency investigation. See the discussion of United
States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102 (1987), in the text accompanying notes 244-57.
240. What constitutes disclosure turns on what amounts to 'matters occurring before the
grand jury" under Rule 6(e)(3)(A).
1994] 639
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
grand jury materials. On the other hand, if an agency has full powers
of compulsory process, it is redundant and wasteful of time and money
to compel the agency to exercise a power that is virtually identical to
the power that the grand jury has already exercised. If an agency or a
civil attorney in the Department of Justice outside the Antitrust
Division does not have compulsory process to aid in its investigations,
it has a particularly acute need to be made privy to grand jury
material, as long as the material was obtained in the first place by a
good faith grand jury investigation. Yet if Congress has not given the
government attorney or the agency this power of process, then it
should not be afforded a derivative power by relying on grand jury
investigation. Unfortunately, the majority in Sells failed to notice the
complexities of these contestable issues.
With the growing importance of civil and administrative
remedies and their increasing linkage with criminal penalties, 241 Sells
presented an opportunity to draw the channels of criminal and civil
process closer together. The narrow issue in Sells, an interpretation of
the authority conferred by Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i), could not provide the
means for a broad resolution of questions relating to disclosure of
grand jury materials to government agencies because the reference to
"attorneys for the government" in the Rule does not refer to agency
personnel.24 Statutory amendment would be necessary to sustain a
principle of automatic disclosure that would embrace agencies and
Inspectors General of government departments. A resolution of the
issue in Sells in favor of the government could have paved the way for
such a step in the future; unfortunately, by denying automatic
disclosure even to civil attorneys in the Department of Justice and in
United States Attorney's offices, the Court retrogressively obstructed
the path to reform. The decision also turned back the clock. As the
241. As Chief Justice Burger stated in his dissent in Sells:
Grand jury investigations of criminal activity of course play a major role in protecting the
Nation .... Many civil actions seek precisely the same object, however, and are of at
least equal importance in promoting the public welfare. In a number of areas, Congress
has enacted civil legislation that, together with related criminal law provisions, forms an
integrated law enforcement scheme.... Most significantly for present purposes, the civil
provisions of the False Claims Act at issue here were enacted as part of an integrated
scheme of civil and criminal law enforcement.... There can be little doubt that Congress
expected-and continues to expect-attorneys for the Government to investigate the
possibility of both criminal and civil violations. ...
463 U.S. at 471-72 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
242. "The term 'attorneys for the government' is restrictive in its application.... If it had
been intended that the attorneys for the administrative agencies were to have free access to
matters occurring before a grand jury, the rule would have so provided." In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1962).
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dissent in Sells pointed out, for some decades prior to Sells, grand jury
materials often had been disclosed informally, without court order, not
only to government attorneys but also to agency personnel.243
The complexities and subtle distinctions that Sells overlooked
are addressed effectively in United States v. John Doe, Inc.244  The
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is empowered to
convene grand juries and to conduct prosecutions. In John Doe, after
concluding that evidence gathered by a grand jury did not warrant
prosecution, the same Antitrust Division attorneys proceeded with a
civil investigation in the course of which they served civil investigative
demands.245 The Antitrust Division then considered whether to bring
civil suits under both the Sherman Act and the False Claims Act but
wished to consult attorneys in the Civil Division and in a United
States Attorney's Office who were more familiar with the law and
practice under the False Claims statute.246 To make this consultation
effective, the Antitrust Division thought it necessary to make some
grand jury materials available to the attorneys in the Civil Division
and to the United States Attorney's office and, accordingly, under the
principle announced in Sells, filed a motion under Rule 6(e) for a (C)(i)
order to authorize such disclosure.
243. 'Throughout the 1940's and 1950's, those conducting grand jury investigations regularly
referred matters to other attorneys in the Department of Justice if civil litigation proved
desirable, and, in accordance with Rule 6(e), grand jury transcripts and materials were made
available to the attorneys pursuing the civil suits. This practice appears to have been most
frequent in the antitrust area." Sells, 463 U.S. at 455-56 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). The dissenting opinion contended that this practice continued throughout the 1960s
and 1970s. Id. at 460. As to government personnel outside the circle of 'attorneys for the
government," Chief Justice Burger noted, "[o]n occasion, the use of grand jury materials in civil
actions exceeded the bounds of Rule 6(e). Agency attorneys, who are not within the definition of
attorneys for the government contained in Rule 54(c), were at times allowed access to grand jury
materials for their own purposes without first obtaining a court order .... " Id. at 456. This
contention finds support in a statement made by Judge Paul J. McCormick of the Southern
District of California when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were first considered: "As a
matter of common practice the United States Attorney uses the grand jury transcript rather
freely with investigators and attorneys for the various governmental agencies .... If the rule
contemplates a restriction on the United States Attorney's use of the transcript, I believe he
should be excepted from the provision requiring the permission of the court." Id. at 453 (quoting 2
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Draft: Comments,
Recommendations and Suggestions Concerning the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
355 (1943) (statement of Judge Paul J. McCormick)).
244. 481 U.S. 102 (1987).
245. Id. at 104-05. This action was taken pursuant to the powers granted by the Antitrust
Civil Process Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1988). John Doe, 481 U.S. at 105.
246. John Doe, 481 U.S. at 105. The Civil Division of the Justice Department is charged with
the primary duty to bring claims under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1988), but the
Antitrust Division also may bring such suits if the conduct at the same time violates the antitrust
laws. 28 C.F.R. § 0.40(a) (1993).
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The facts of John Doe raised another issue-whether the
antitrust attorneys themselves properly could refresh their
recollection of the grand jury materials for purposes of deciding
whether to bring civil suits without a (C)(i) order, now that the
criminal purpose of the grand jury inquiry had been abandoned.
Reversing the court of appeals,247 the Supreme Court, with three
dissenters, held that such a refreshing look does not constitute
"disclosure" under Rule 6(e) and therefore no order for such a look is
required.24
While this outcome seems entirely sensible, it casts doubt on
the practical importance and the principled basis of Sells. Doe ensures
that all attorneys who worked on a grand jury investigation may
make use of grand jury materials in investigating or preparing a civil
case. The fact that they have doffed their criminal hats and donned
their civil ones makes no difference. This rule invites planned
manipulation of the grand jury secrecy rules. For example, when both
criminal and civil proceedings are likely, the prosecutor need only co-
opt civil attorneys as assistants in the grand jury phase to legitimize
their continued use of grand jury materials when they later turn to
the consideration and further investigation of the civil aspect.29 Sells
will only have an impact if the attorneys who are to work on the civil
case did not participate in the grand jury phase.
As the dissent in Doe suggested, the potential for manipulation
would be lessened if looking back at grand jury materials were
allowed in the pursuit of a criminal prosecution but not allowed in the
pursuit of a civil investigation unless a (C)(i) order is obtained. This
proposal, however, stretches the irrational aspects of Sells too far and,
in any case, provides an ineffective Chinese wall because the
attorneys would still be entitled to rely on their recollection of the
grand jury materials. A rule to this effect-that reliance on present
recollection is permissible while refamiliarization is barred-represents a
curious half-way house. The only thorough-going solution that would
remain entirely faithful to the principle of Sells would be to bar
altogether attorneys who worked in the grand jury phase from
participating in the civil phase.250 This position, however, is
247. The court of appeals's decision is In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 774 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1985).
248. John Doe, 481 U.S. at 109.
249. As discussed above, Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) permits this interaction.
250. The court of appeals ultimately recognized this issue as the crucial question: 'Since it
would be almost impossible for any attorney in such a position to compartmentalize his thoughts
and litigate a civil case without in some way using his recollection of facts learned during the
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particularly futile in contexts similar to Doe, in which the Antitrust
Division has civil investigative demand powers virtually co-extensive
with the grand jury subpoena power. When such co-extensive powers
exist, an absolute bar would only push the Division into costly, time-
wasting efforts to duplicate grand jury materials (already examined
by some of its attorneys) through its own brand of compulsory process.
The decision in Doe leaves a trail of uncertainties, for while the
Court made it clear that refreshing recollection is not a "disclosure,"
the question remains as to what kinds of acts by attorneys in the
preparation of a civil case would amount to disclosure. Language in
the Court's opinion (and its general logic) obliquely indicate that
grand jury information may not be imparted to other attorneys
working on the civil case who have not obtained a (C)(i) order.2 5' In
addition, while "[m]ere 'use' of grand jury information in the
preparation of a civil complaint would not constitute prohibited
disclosure,"252 the Court's language suggests that if actual excerpts
from grand jury materials were used in the complaint or if the
complaint were even "based on information obtained during the grand
jury investigation," the question of an improper disclosure might
arise.2 5
Doe thus creates a situation of Byzantine complexity.
Attorneys who have worked in the grand jury phase may re-
familiarize themselves with grand jury materials when they move to a
civil aspect of the case. They may not impart any grand jury material
to their colleagues who have not been empowered under a (C)(i) order.
Also, the extent to which the attorneys may "use" information they
have acquired from the grand jury in formulating the complaint is
unclear, although they likely cannot allude to or quote from grand
jury materials in the body of the complaint. This doctrine is
reminiscent of the rules pertaining to the use of immunized testimony
grand jury investigation, we think the real question is whether the prosecutor must be
disqualified from litigating the civil case. Since appellants have expressly declined to present that
issue, we are not called upon to address it.* In re Grand Jury Investigation, 774 F.2d at 43.
251. The Court's validation of the "continued use" of grand jury information extended only to
'attorneys who legitimately obtained access to the information through the grand jury
investigation." John Doe, 481 U.S. at 108.
252. Id. at 110 n.6 (emphasis added).
253. See id. at 110. The Court did not decide this question, since it concluded that '[t]his
hypothetical fear is not substantiated by the record in this case." Id. The holding in Doe is
narrowly drawn: "Without addressing the very different matter of an attorney's disclosing grand
jury information to others, inadvertently or purposefully, in the course of a civil proceeding, we
hold that Rule 6(e) does not require the attorney to obtain a court order before refamiliarizing
himself or herself with the details of a grand jury investigation." Id. at 111. The Court made it
clear that its ruling did not encompass 'any further disclosure to others." Id.
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under Kastigar v. United States,254 with two important differences.
First, Kastigar is properly driven by the great weight that must be
given to the constitutional privilege against compelled self-
incrimination after a grant of immunity. Second, Kastigar establishes
a doctrine of use and derivative use immunity that, while by no means
free from difficulty, clearly does impose extensive and onerous duties
on the prosecution with a consequent heavy burden of proof to
demonstrate its freedom from any significant direct or indirect
exploitation of the immunized testimony.2 55 By contrast, the combined
impact of Sells and Doe, cases that did not rest on a constitutional
mandate but rather stem from historical and statutory concepts of
secrecy and disclosure, leaves considerable confusion about the extent
to which grand jury materials may be used in the preparation of a
civil case.
Whatever the extent of the permissible civil use of grand jury
material by attorneys who assisted in the grand jury phase, clearly
they cannot disclose these materials to other government agencies
that may have a strong interest in pursuing civil or administrative
remedies within their particular spheres of interest and jurisdiction.
Even the grant of a (C)(i) order would not permit broadcasting of the
information.2- The antitrust context of Doe also highlights
questionable aspects of this broader rule. If the Antitrust Division
obtained identical information through the use of its own compulsory
process, the Division properly could pass that information on to
attorneys in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice.2 57
However, grand jury information (although obtainable under the
Division's CID powers) may not be imparted to Civil Division
attorneys unless they have been the subject of a (C)(i) order, thus
forcing a perhaps lengthy and expensive parallel process if the order
cannot be obtained.
254. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
255. Id. at 460-61. The difficulty of overcoming this burden is illustrated by United States v.
North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), in which the court held that a conviction must be reversed if
the material testimony of any witness was significantly shaped, directly or indirectly, by exposure
to the defendant's immunized testimony. Id. at 943-47.
256. See the discussion in Part IX.A.
257. The Antitrust Civil Process Act authorizes disclosure of CID material to duly authorized
employees of the Department of Justice. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1988).
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A. Disclosure Orders Under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)
Many of the difficulties this Article has outlined would
disappear if a (C)(i) order were relatively easy to obtain.
Unfortunately, this is by no means the case. The Rule permits these
orders only when disclosure is sought "preliminarily to or in
connection with a judicial proceeding."25 Not much difficulty is
occasioned by the phrase "in connection with," which is interpreted to
refer to a judicial proceeding already pending.2 59 "Preliminary to" is
more difficult to construe. The Supreme Court discussed this
provision in United States v. Baggot 6° (decided on the same day as
Sells), in which the government had filed a (C)(i) petition seeking
disclosure of grand jury matters for use in a civil tax audit by the IRS.
Although the grand jury proceeding had not resulted in an indictment,
the target had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor counts-no doubt as the
result of a plea bargain.
In Baggot the Court made it abundantly clear that the mere
pursuit of an administrative or civil investigation is not in itself a
sufficient reason for disclosure of grand jury material. The majority
opinion, written by the author of the Sells decision, Justice Brennan,
held that Section (C)(i) refers much more restrictively to a use "related
fairly directly to some identifiable litigation, pending or anticipated."
2 6'
A showing "even that litigation is factually likely to emerge" is not
sufficient.262 An IRS audit of civil tax liability may result in litigation,
but, unless later contested by the taxpayer, the IRS may levy the tax
without resort to any judicial proceeding.
The Court did not go so far as to suggest that a (C)(i) order is
proper only after litigation has commenced. Baggot conceded that
such an order would be proper, for example, when a taxpayer clearly
has expressed an intention to contest a matter in the Tax Court.2 63 If,
on the other hand, the government agency involved in the case likely
will initiate litigation, the Baggot opinion offers only meager
258. F.R.Cr.P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i). This provision dates from the original version of the Rule in
1946. For a comment on the history and genesis of this provision, see generally Note, 91 Yale L.
J. at 1621-25 (cited in note 148).
259. United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 479 (1983).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 480.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 483. The Court adopted the holding in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Miller
Brewing Co.), 687 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the taxpayer had expressed a clear intention
to seek judicial review of the IRS deficiency determination in the Tax Court; the court of appeals
held that the request for disclosure of grand jury materials for that reason was preliminary to a
judicial proceeding.
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illumination. The Court expressly declined to decide "how firm the
agency's decision to litigate must be before its investigation can be
characterized as 'preliminar[y] to a judicial proceeding,' or whether it
can ever be so regarded before the conclusion of a formal preliminary
administrative investigation.."264  While its implications are unclear,
this dictum nevertheless creates a chilling climate for any hopes of
disclosure for purely investigative purposes, even if the investigation
is launched with a strong initial belief that litigation is likely.2 5
Chief Justice Burger, the sole dissenter in Baggot, argued that
the Court's grudging reading of the Rule virtually eliminated the
possibility of disclosure preliminarily to judicial proceedings and in
effect confined disclosure to situations in which the material at least
would be actually used to prepare for litigation. The Chief Justice
would have preferred a test broad enough to cover any situation in
which "there is a possibility that the agency's action, should it
ultimately act, would be subject to judicial review."266 In his view, the
majority was too impressed by the "strawman" threat of abuse of the
grand jury process and ignored the severe impairment of
administrative investigations and pursuit of civil remedies that its
holding imposed. Notably, Chief Justice Burger's approach, while
broader than the majority position, would still preclude disclosure
264. Baggot, 463 U.S. at 483 n.7. The Court added a gloss of possible importance when it
stated:
We need not decide whether an agency's action would always be preliminary to litigation
if it arose under an administrative scheme that does require resort to courts-one in
which, for example, the agency, when it found a probable violation of law, was required to
bring a civil suit or criminal prosecution to vindicate the law and obtain compliance. We
also do not hold that the Government... may never obtain (CQ(i) disclosure of grand jury
materials any time the initiative for litigating lies elsewhere.
Id. at 482-83. However, "[w]here an agency's action does not require resort to litigation to
accomplish the agency's present goal, the action is not preliminary to a judicial proceeding ...."
Id. at 482.
265. The Court also stated that "[tihe focus is on the actual use to be made of the material. If
the primary purpose of disclosure is not to assist in preparation or conduct of a judicial
proceeding, disclosure under (C)(i) is not permitted." Id. at 480 (emphasis in original).
Applications for disclosure by government agencies that appear to be primarily for investigative
purposes have been denied. United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re June 20,
1977, Concurrent Grand Jury Investigation (J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc.), 622 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1980). In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962), provides an example of the
difficulty in obtaining disclosure. In that case, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) applied for
disclosure in order to pursue an investigation of violations of its cease and desist orders. Id. at
443-44. If such violations were discovered, the statute required the FTC to notify the Attorney
General, who then was required to initiate an enforcement proceeding in federal court under 15
U.S.C. § 56. The court denied disclosure on the grounds that no judicial proceeding was actually
pending and 'it is possible that none may result from the investigation." Id. at 444.
266. Baggot, 463 U.S. at 488.
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when judicial review is not a possibility-a position that seems
inescapable under the language of the Rule.
B. Particularized Need
The questions of what constitutes a judicial proceeding and
what may be viewed as preliminary to such a proceeding have not
been the subject of further elucidation in the Supreme Court. Lower
courts that have dealt with the question of what constitutes a "judicial
proceeding" have not carried forward the Baggot analysis in any
significant way.267  However, even if the severely narrow Baggot
reading of a severely narrow rule can be satisfied, the moving party
must clear yet another hurdle. In Sells the Court considered the
appropriate standard for a (C)(i) order and referred to its previous
holdings that a showing of particularized need must be made. In
particular, the Court quoted and reaffirmed an earlier statement that
such a showing must demonstrate that the material sought is "'needed
to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the
267. The often-cited, although not particularly illuminating, definition of a 'judicial
proceeding" in the context of Rule 6 is found in the opinion by Judge Learned Hand in Doe v.
Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958): "The term 'judicial proceeding' includes any proceeding
determinable by a court, having for its object the compliance of any person, subject to judicial
control, with standards imposed upon his conduct in the public interest, even though such
compliance is enforced without the procedure applicable to the punishment of crime." Id. at 120.
The Second Circuit has held that an evidentiary hearing in an attorney disciplinary proceeding
constitutes a judicial proceeding. In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Doe),
760 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1985). However, in Doe, the court denied the request for disclosure on the
ground that it was premature. The appropriate test asks whether judicial review of the
disciplinary proceedings is a routine outcome. Disclosure was granted on this basis in In re Grand
Jury Transcripts, 309 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (S.D. Ohio 1970); In re Disclosure of Testimony Before
the Grand Jury (Troia), 580 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Wolf v. Oregon State Bar, 741 F.2d 250,
253 (9th Cir. 1984). Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe No. 1 v. United States),
932 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1991), which held that a Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission hearing
was not a judicial proceeding since an administrative board determined facts and review by the
Michigan Supreme Court was discretionary and occurred only rarely. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Daewoo), 613 F. Supp. 672 (D. Or. 1985), is of some interest. In Daewoo, the
Customs Service had assessed a civil penalty in excess of six million dollars for illegal activities in
connection with the importation of steel. The government moved for disclosure of materials from
a grand jury inquiry into the same incident. Id. at 676. The court held that since, under the
applicable law (19 U.S.C. § 1592(e) (1930)), the civil penalty could be enforced only through resort
to the courts, the matter was preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Nevertheless, the court denied
the motion since the government had failed to make a sufficient showing of particularized need.
Daewoo, 613 F. Supp. at 683. In United States v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 585 F. Supp. 231 (M.D.
Pa. 1984), the utility moved for disclosure of grand jury materials in connection with
administrative proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The court denied the
motions on the ground that the utility had not shown that the administrative proceeding was
likely to be subject to judicial review. Id. at 233-34. See generally Bruce I. McDaniel, What Is a
"Judicial Proceeding" Within Rule 6(e)(3)(G)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 52
A.L.R. Fed. 411 (1981).
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need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and
that [the] request is structured to cover only material so needed.... 268
The Court proclaimed that this standard is applicable to government
as well as to private parties, although it conceded that the public
interest and the decreased danger of wide dissemination of grand jury
material could be taken into account under the particularized need
concept when the government is the moving party.
269
The particularized need inquiry thus is a balancing test that
includes, on one side, the traditional bevy of reasons that justify the
general principle of grand jury secrecy plus the degree of ease with
which the moving party might obtain the information by other means,
and, on the other side, the interests of justice, particularly protection
against the commission of perjury by a witness in judicial proceedings
that are in process or contemplated.270 In Sells itself (in which the
government had moved for disclosure of grand jury materials to Civil
Division attorneys), the district court had held that disclosure should
be permitted because the materials were "rationally related" to a
contemplated civil suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the action of the
court of appeals in reversing and remanding271 on the ground that this
standard was too relaxed.
The Court appeared to take a somewhat more relaxed posture
toward disclosure to government parties in Doe, in which the
government moved for disclosure to attorneys in the Civil Division
who had not participated in the presentation to the grand jury.
Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Court found particularized need
268. Sells, 463 U.S. at 443 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,
222 (1979)). In Douglas, the Court added that the movant must show need even if the grand jury
had concluded its investigation, since the court must consider "not only the immediate effects
upon a particular grand jury, but also the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand
juries." Douglas, 441 U.S. at 222. This statement refers to the interest in not discouraging the
testimony of witnesses before future grand juries by fear that their testimony might be disclosed.
The party moving for disclosure bears the burden of demonstrating that the need for disclosure
outweighs the need for secrecy. The district court has substantial discretion in ruling on such a
motion as well as the power to "include protective limitations on the use of the disclosed
material...." Id. at 223.
269. Sells, 463 U.S. at 445.
270. In United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958), the Court stated that
"problems concerning the use of the grand jury transcript at the trial to impeach a witness, to
refresh his recollection, to test his credibility . . ." are "cases of particularized need where the
secrecy of the [grand jury] proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly." Id. at 683. This
situation seems to present an extremely strong case for disclosure since, if the witness is to testify
at a trial, most of the reasons for maintaining secrecy as to her grand jury testimony are
dissolved. Under F.R.Cr.P. 26.2, both the government and defense in a criminal trial are entitled
to discovery during trial of the grand jury testimony of a witness who testifies for the other party
at the trial.
271. In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 78-184, 642 F.2d 1184, 1190-92 (9th Cir. 1981).
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and, reaffirming earlier observations in Sells, emphasized the special
aspects of disclosure to government attorneys that, according to the
Court, moderate normal disclosure concerns. These cases present less
risk of further disclosure to third parties or to the general public.
Moreover, the public interest in disclosure to a governmental body
must count for something.22 The Court acknowledged a general
concern that grand juries should not be abused to broaden normal
channels of discovery in civil cases, but stated that the requirement of
showing particularized need was in itself a safeguard against this
possibility.273 The Court remained concerned that discovery broader
than otherwise allowed in litigation actually may be realized by use of
grand jury materials, but this concern was not implicated in Doe
because the government wished to use the material only for
consultation.74 This point undercuts the Court's frequent
pronouncement that particularized need requires a showing of need to
avoid injustice in a pending or contemplated judicial proceeding. 75 It
is hard to see how consultation with respect to the advisability of
bringing a lawsuit can avoid an injustice occurring in that suit. The
Court diluted the concept of injustice to include questions of prudence
and policy as to whether to bring a suit in the first instance. 276
Finally, the Court was not impressed by a point that the court
of appeals had found persuasive-that the government might have
obtained the same materials through civil process under the Antitrust
Civil Process Act. While recognizing that this process could be an
"important factor," the Court agreed with the district court that this
consideration was outweighed by the public interest involved.2 17
272. United States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102, 112-14 (1987) (citing United States v. Sells
Engineering, 463 U.S. 418 (1983)). The Court recognized the importance of Antitrust Division
lawyers obtaining the advice of their colleagues in the Civil Division, who regularly handle actions
of the type contemplated, and the importance of the public purposes served----efficient, effective
and evenhanded enforcement of federal statutes." John Doe, 481 U.S. at 113.
273. John Doe, 481 U.S. at 114-15.
274. The Court stated that "when the Government requests disclosure for use in an actual
adversarial proceeding, this factor... may require a stronger showing of necessity.' Id. at 115.
275. See also In re Grand Jury Testimony (John Doe), 832 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1987), a civil
RICO action in which the court denied disclosure to a private litigant on the ground that it had
not sufficiently shown a danger of perjury or inconsistent testimony.
276. Thus, this portion of the Doe decision also might be taken obliquely to have broadened a
fundamental concept in Rule 6(e): what is preliminary to a judicial proceeding.
277. Lower court decisions in this regard seem somewhat unpredictable and inconsistent. In
In re Sealed Case, 801 F.2d 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court denied disclosure of grand jury
materials to the SEC on particularized need grounds since the SEC had not yet engaged in any
civil discovery and had failed to establish "an inability to obtain through ordinary processes,
timely and diligently pursued, the particular documents, or the particular category of documents,
requested from the grand jury." Id. at 1382. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings ("Operation
Gateway"), 877 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1989), the court stated that the IRS had failed to demonstrate
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The last point is of particular interest to this Article's general
theme. As noted earlier, the possibility of acquiring the information
through civil process could cut the other way. First, the fact that a
statute permits the government to acquire the information through
civil process seems to establish conclusively the general propriety of
such discovery. Second, if the government has such a power, then
why should it be put to the expense and delay of exercising that power
when the information already is available in another government
record? Thus, to view the government's power to acquire the
information in other ways as a reason for denying discovery of grand
jury materials is thoroughly perverse. It would be more
understandable to assert that the government may not broaden its
discovery process by acquiring, via the grand jury, information that it
could not obtain through civil process. Indeed, this point is the most
fundamental policy question that ought to be the subject of attention
in this area. The particularized need test, as presently constituted,
raises this question only in a limited way through the inquiry into
abuse of the grand jury process.
Overall, Doe announces the possibility of a somewhat more
relaxed attitude to the disclosure of grand jury materials in favor of
the government, although the decision hardly endorses extensive
disclosure. Cases in lower courts confirm the impression that the
particularized need standard will not be met lightly, which indicates
that an applicant, especially a private party, often will be unsuccessful
under this test even though the application is clearly connected with
or preliminary to a judicial proceeding.
278
particularized need as to its application for disclosure for purposes of pending tax litigation since
a demonstration of inconvenience and delay are inadequate to meet that standard. See also
Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1987), which held that the saving of time and expense
was not sufficient to establish particularized need (in this, case, for a private litigant) when the
movant had not pursued ordinary discovery or routine avenues of investigation. Id. at 715.
Accord, FDIC v. Ernst & Whinney, 921 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1990). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Larson), 904 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming a district court's order
of disclosure to the IRS for use in a tax court proceeding on the ground that, since the disclosure
was "pertinent," it could not be said that the district court had abused its discretion).
278. In In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials, Grand Jury No. 81-1, Miami, 833
F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1987), the court granted disclosure to the House Judiciary Committee for use
in connection with the Committee's inquiry into the possible impeachment of a federal judge. The
court of appeals recognized that the public has a special interest in disclosure when the movant is
an organ of government. In Hernly v. United States, 832 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1987), the court
denied a private litigant a subpoena to depose an IRS agent whose information was obtained as
the result of grand jury proceedings, on the grounds that the movant had failed to show exactly
what information he expected, that the information was unavailable to him from other sources,
and that disclosure would prevent an injustice. In In re Grand Jury Testimony (Appeal of John
Doe), 832 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1987), the court denied disclosure to a private civil litigant on the
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X. REFORM OF GRAND JURY SECRECY RULES
The Supreme Court's insistence on the importance of grand
jury secrecy has not escaped criticism.2 79 Writing before the decisions
in Sells and Baggot, Professor Charles Wright distinguished between
the strong case for secrecy while the grand jury is conducting an
investigation and the much-diminished force of the arguments against
disclosure once the grand jury has concluded its work.280 Judge Posner
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, although dutifully
following the dictates of the Supreme Court, is less than enthused
with the secrecy principle.281 Some courts have acknowledged that the
reasons conventionally offered to justify secrecy are much weaker
when the grand jury proceedings have concluded, the applicant for
ground that he had not shown particularized need in terms of specific necessity to impeach a
witness or to refresh the memory of a witness who was unable to recall certain facts. In Illinois v.
FE. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1984), the court reversed a disclosure order on the ground
that the movants, defendants in a civil antitrust action in which witnesses had not yet been
deposed, had not shown a need for the material in order to impeach or refresh recollection at trial.
279. Discussions of grand jury secrecy rules, all somewhat critical, are found in the following
commentaries: William B. Lytton, Grand Jury Secrecy-Time for a Reevaluation, 75 J. Crim. L. &
Criminol. 1100 (1984); Marvin G. Pickholz and Joyce Merrick Pickholz, Grand Jury Secrecy and
the Administrative Agency: Balancing Effective Prosecution of White Collar Crime Against
Traditional Safeguards, 36 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1027 (1979); Note, 91 Yale L. J. at 1614 (cited in
note 148); Note, Federal Agency Access to Grand Jury Transcripts Under Rule 6(e), 80 Mich. L.
Rev. 1665 (1982); Gail Heriot, Comment, Civil Discovery of Documents Held by a Grand Jury, 47
U. Chi. L. Rev. 604 (1980); Note, Administrative Access to Grand Jury Material Under Amended
Rule 6(e), 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 295 (1978); Peter C. Hein, Note, Administrative Agency Access
to Grand Jury Materials, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 162 (1975).
280. Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Crim. 2d § 106 at 244-45 (West,
1982). Professor Wright cited the following commentators as critical of the extent of the secrecy
rule: Arthur H. Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 Va. L. Rev.
668, 684 (1962) (characterizing the secrecy principle as "an anachronism that has long outlived
any real necessity); Richard Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 John Marshall J.
Prac. & Proc. 18 (1967); Comment, Secrecy in Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal for a New
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 38 Fordham L. Rev. 307 (1969); Evalyn S. Lipton, Note,
A Reexamination of the Rule of Secrecy of Grand Jury Minutes in the Federal Courts, 34 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 606 (1959); Comment, Grand Jury Minutes and the Rule of Secrecy in Federal Litigation, 55
Nw. U. L. Rev. 482 (1960). See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure at 243 n.2.
Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990), recognized, to an extent, the diminished need for
grand jury secrecy when the jury's work is complete. In Butterworth, the Court upheld a First
Amendment challenge to a state practice according to which grand jury witnesses were bound by
a secrecy obligation even after the jury had been discharged; the Court found that the state had
no compelling interest in imposing secrecy on a witness after the jury was disbanded. Id. at 632-
34. The federal system imposes no secrecy obligation on grand jury witnesses.
281. 'California allows liberal access to grand jury transcripts and the heavens have not
fallen there yet. So little is kept secret nowadays that many participants in grand jury
proceedings, whether as witnesses, jurors, or prosecutors, probably have no expectations of long.
term secrecy." Illinois v. FE. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, 539 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
However, Judge Posner did acknowledge special interests in grand jury secrecy arising from the
facts that "grand jury witnesses testify without counsel present and testify about other people as
well as themselves." Id.
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disclosure is an organ of government, and disclosure would serve a
legitimate governmental interest. 82
In fact, despite the superficially resounding reaffirmation of the
secrecy principle and the restricted nature of disclosure under Rule
6(e) set out by the Court in Sells and Baggot, there has been a certain,
stealthy relaxation of the traditional position, particularly with
respect to disclosure to government attorneys and agencies. As
discussed in Part IX, the Court's decision in Doe, although it did not
depart formally from the earlier cases, appears to have arrived at a
more expansive interpretation of the grounds for a (C)(i) order when
the applicant is an organ of government.
Another important development has been a series of decisions
on the question of what constitute "matters occurring before the grand
jury" under Rule 6(e). This question can arise when the material in
question consists of documents subpoenaed by or presented to the
grand jury but generated independently of the jury, often before the
grand jury was impaneled. The testimony of a witness is the most
basic instance of a matter that occurs before the grand jury, but how
should courts classify reports of an investigation conducted by
government agents before the jury existed, even if their substance has
been presented to the jury, or documents prepared by a private party
that were subpoenaed by the jury? These matters "occur" before the
grand jury in the weak sense that they are presented to the jury and
thereafter constitute a part of the file, but if courts adopt a stronger
test and confine the concept to testimony that is generated and
created by the grand jury's power of subpoena or the course of its
investigation, they need not be so categorized, for they had a prior and
independent existence. Indeed, while testimony of a witness cannot
be disclosed without revealing a portion of the grand jury transcript,
the disclosure of a document, although it uncovers part of the grand
jury file, does not necessarily expose any part of the proceedings
before the jury. Under this view, it is not necessary in these cases
even to apply for a (C)(i) order and the document could be
282. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 800 F.2d 1293 (4th Cir. 1986), in which the grand
jury proceedings had concluded, a trial had been held on the grand jury's indictment, the
defendant had been acquitted, and subsequently sued the government for extra charges arising
out of a defense procurement contract. Id. at 1295. The court noted that the need for secrecy was
much diminished by the conclusion of the grand jury's proceedings and the public airing of much
of the grand jury material in the criminal trial. Furthermore, the criminal defendant (now the
civil plaintiff) possessed a grand jury transcript. Thus, the government was entitled to a (C)(i)
order to help it prepare for the civil suit. Id. at 1300-02.
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communicated to other government agencies or to private litigants
without the permission of the court .2
Some cases have gone a considerable way toward adopting the
weaker view and thus relaxing secrecy requirements with respect to
documents. One line of reasoning asserts that Rule 6(e) has no
application unless disclosure would reveal "what has occurred before
the grand jury."2 8 This approach is not altogether convincing because
in some sense every disclosure will reveal some element of what has
occurred before the grand jury, at least in the minimal sense of
indicating or confirming that a document is one that the grand jury
examined.2 15 Generation of the document prior to and independent of
the grand jury's subpoena provides a more comprehensible test for
disclosure. Adoption of this test, however, would exempt nearly all
documents from the secrecy provisions. 2
283. See the discussion of this topic in Guide on Rule 6(e) After Sells and Baggot 9-17 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice: Office of Legal Policy, 1984).
284. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). Dresser
stated that Rule 6(e) did not intend to draw "a veil of secrecy... over all matters occurring in the
world that happen to be investigated by a grand jury," id. at 1382, and emphasized the fact that
the documents at issue were created for independent corporate purposes unrelated to the grand
jury's investigation. Id. at 1383. Validating the Dresser approach, the same court later held that
the Department of Justice must indicate that the material in question would "elucidate the inner
workings of the grand jury" in order to respond adequately to a request for disclosure of grand
jury information by a Committee of the Senate of Puerto Rico. Senate of Puerto Rico v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Fund for Constitutional Gov't v.
National Archives and Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Accord, Anaya v. United
States, 815 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1987), in which the court stated, "When documents or other
material will not reveal what actually has transpired before a grand jury, their disclosure is not
an invasion of the protective secrecy of its proceedings ...." Id. at 1379. See Russell J. Davis,
Annot., What Are 'Matters Occurring Before the Grand Jury' Within Prohibition of Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 50 A.L.R. Fed. 675 (1980).
285. This point was made squarely in In re Sealed Case, 801 F.2d 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1986), in
which the court observed that "[d]isclosure of which documents the grand jury considered reveals,
at the very least, the direction of the grand jury's investigation and the names of persons
involved.... " Id. at 1381. The court concluded that a (C)(i) order was necessary for release of
grand jury documents to the SEC. The situation would be different if the document was
generated by a government agency prior to a grand jury investigation and only later presented to
the grand jury, while the agency retains a copy. The agency then may properly make use of the
document since the document at all times was legally in its hands, and its further reference to the
document would not reveal anything that took place before the grand jury. Thus, in Sisk v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit, distinguishing Baggot,
held that the IRS could use an agent's report in the preparation of civil litigation, even though the
report had been presented to a grand jury subsequent to its preparation. See also United States
v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), in which the court held that the FBI properly could show
documents to interviewees, even though the documents had been presented to a grand jury, since
they had been created earlier for purposes unconnected with the grand jury and the disclosures
were made for purposes unconnected with the grand jury investigation. Id. at 291.
286. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 851 F.2d 860 (6th Cir. 1988), in which the district
court had permitted disclosure by the prosecutor to government civil attorneys without any
particularized need inquiry on the ground that the materials, which included subpoenaed
confidential corporate records, were not matters occurring before the grand jury. The court of
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Perhaps perceiving the extensive sweep of such an exception,
some courts have found significant the power of the moving party to
obtain the document through its own process. Their theory is,
presumably, that if (a) the document was generated independently of
the grand jury, and (b) the moving party would have a right to obtain
it absent grand jury secrecy requirements, then the secrecy rules are
of insufficient weight to put the movant to the expense and delay of
pursuing its own process. 2 7 Furthermore, if such an exception were
not accepted, then the subject of an inquiry could insulate a document
by surrendering it in response to a grand jury subpoena and keeping
no copies.
These developments represent a significant but limited
movement away from grand jury secrecy requirements.2 88 They have
appeals, in an opinion that presents the fullest and most sophisticated discussion of this question,
reversed and emphasized that the adoption of the district court's position would virtually exempt
all pre-generated documents from the secrecy principle, no matter how confidential they might
be. Id. at 865-66. So extreme an approach would ignore the fact that one justification for the
grand jury secrecy rules is the desire to protect confidential material procured by subpoena.
Andrea M. Nervi, Comment, FRCrP 6(e) and the Disclosure of Documents Reviewed by a Grand
Jury, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 221 (1990), reviews the various standards in this area; the Comment
concludes that disclosure of documents should be allowed when the presumption in favor of
secrecy interests is displaced by a showing (a) that the request lists specific documents that are
identified without reference to the grand jury and (b) that the documents sought were created for
a specific purpose unrelated to the grand jury investigation.
287. See United States v. DiBona, 610 F. Supp. 449 (D.C. Pa. 1985), in which the defendants
opposed a government discovery request on the ground that compliance would breach the grand
jury secrecy provisions. The documents in question were connected with audits performed by the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), which is responsible for auditing defense contract
projects as required by the Department of Defense. The first audit was incomplete because the
defendants failed to provide all their records as required by law. Id. at 451. The defendants
subsequently produced the missing records in compliance with a grand jury subpoena, and the
DCAA performed a second audit, which it presented to the grand jury. Id. The court held that
the second audit could be released to Civil Division attorneys in connection with a civil suit since
the DCAA always had a right to examine all records, to produce an audit based on them, and to
communicate this audit to civil government attorneys. The court concluded, "It cannot be said
that information was illegally disclosed when the party who saw it was authorized by Congress to
see it." Id. at 452. Other cases indicate that documents produced for investigative purposes
before a grand jury was convened are not subject to Rule 6(e) unless their release would reveal
significant aspects of the grand jury's proceedings. See, for example, In re Grand Jury Matter
(Catania), 682 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that the relevant information was developed
earlier by the FBI); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance), 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting
that the information was obtained from an earlier government investigation). See Guide on Rule
6(e) at 9-12 (cited in note 283).
288. In one area-the rights of the defendant in a criminal case-the Supreme Court has
indicated that grand jury secrecy is not momentous. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487
U.S. 250 (1988), the Court held that violations of Rule 6(e) by the prosecutor (including the
improper release of grand jury documents to the IRS) were subject to harmless error analysis and
would not lead to dismissal of an indictment unless "'it is established that the violation
substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict.'" Id. at 256 (quoting United States v.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986)). A defendant cannot take a pretrial appeal from a denial of a
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not been sufficient to remove the constraints on transmission of
information that government at times considers to be major obstacles
to rational law enforcement.2s9 A revolt against the severity of secrecy
rules has broken out in recent years in connection with frauds and
irregularities in the savings and loan industry. In 1988 a House
Committee Report on Government Operations recommended that
Rule 6(e) be amended to allow federal prosecutors to petition for the
sharing of grand jury information with a bank regulatory agency
based upon a showing of "substantial need."2 90 At the same time, the
Report suggested that the difficulty resides not only in the language of
Rule 6(e) but in a habitual tendency of prosecutors to keep
investigations secret, leading to an overly expansive reading of Rule
6(e) by the Department of Justice itself.91
Legislative action resulted in a section of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989292
(FIRRE), now codified in Title 18 of the United States Code. 293 The
new provisions are twofold. First, the statute permits those who
legitimately have acquired grand jury information concerning certain
motion to dismiss on such a ground, since such a ruling is not a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989). Because it is hard to imagine
a situation in which the grand jury itself could have been swayed by the improper disclosure of
grand jury material, the probable result in virtually every case will deny the defendant any
remedy for improper disclosure, although occasionally disclosure might have led to the discovery
of other evidence as to which the defendant then might make a motion to suppress. The
possibility also remains that the prosecutor could be censured or held in contempt for improper
disclosures.
289. A Justice Department monograph quotes a memorandum from the Attorney General to
United States Attorneys that advises that "in order to avoid problems arising from Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . 'where possible, documents should be obtained by
methods other than grand jury subpoenas." Inspector General Subpoenas at 1 (cited in note 110)
(quoting a memorandum of the Attorney General dated July 16, 1986). The monograph suggests
an alternative method: use of Inspector General subpoenas. Id. See the discussion of Inspector
General subpoenas in Part VI.C.
290. H.R. Rep. No. 100-108, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1988). The report gave an example of
"substantial need*: "evidence that a financial institution is almost insolvent." Id. at 107. The
subcommittee characterized the results of the secrecy provisions in one instance as "almost
ludicrous," referring to the following testimony from the Federal Reserve Board: "[Tihe FBI
agent, who was contacted by the staff of a Federal Reserve Bank to report the unusual
circumstances of the reciprocal loans ... could not disclose pertinent information regarding the
State member bank and its suspect president to us because of the legal restrictions in effect due
to Rule 6(e)." Id. at 106. The report then states that '[t]he agencies and the Justice Department
strongly believe that an amendment to Rule 6(e) is necessary to allow for necessary sharing of
such information, and we concur that such an amendment would serve a very important public
interest." Id. at 108.
291. "It has been Congress' experience that the Justice Department very frequently invokes
Rule 6(e) so as not to reveal any information about an investigation, irrespective of whether the
information was learned from a grand jury .... Rule 6(e) is still a convenient excuse for the
Justice Department to reveal little, if anything." Id. at 107.
292. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 505 (1989), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3322 (1989).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 3322.
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banking law violations to disclose it to a government attorney294 for
use in enforcing Section 951 of FIRRE 295 or in civil forfeiture
proceedings connected with corruption, embezzlement, and crimes
connected with banking, credit institutions, and so forth.296 This first
provision, while limited in scope to a particular category of civil
penalties and forfeitures, nevertheless is radical in principle because it
permits disclosure without any application for a court order.
The second provision, while less radical in principle, also effects
a considerable modification of Rule 6(e). This provision permits
disclosure of grand jury materials upon motion by a government
attorney (but not by an agency attorney), during an investigation of a
banking law violation, to personnel of a financial institution
regulatory agency for use in any matter within the jurisdiction of that
agency. 297 A court order still is necessary and the movant must show
"substantial need," a standard intended to be somewhat less exigent
than "particularized need."298 Most notably, this provision eliminates
any requirement that the disclosure be in connection with or
preliminary to a judicial proceeding.
Whether or not the FIRRE provision is the crack that
eventually will cause the collapse of the whole dam of grand jury
secrecy, 299 it certainly focuses attention on the wisdom of retaining the
severe restrictions on disclosure under the present Rule 6(e).
294. "Attorney for the government in this context has the meaning given in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See note 230. Thus, in effect, the term includes civil attorneys in
the Department of Justice but not attorneys for government agencies.
295. This section, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (1989), provides civil penalties for certain
banking law violations. The maximum penalty for a single violation is one million dollars; for a
continuing violation, the maximum is one million dollars a day, up to five million; and the
maximum penalty may exceed five million dollars if the defendant has derived pecuniary gain
from the violation or inflicted pecuniary loss on another. The penalty is enforced by a civil action
brought by the Attorney General, who enjoys full compulsory process powers of investigation by
way of civil investigative demand. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f).
296. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (1986) lists the crimes.
297. 18 U.S.C. § 3322(b) (1989).
298. The section-by-section analysis of the Senate bill explains the term "substantial need" as
follows:
Under the substantial need standard, a court could consider a number of factors.... In
weighing these considerations .. .a court would not be able to deny disclosure merely
because the agency for whom the disclosure is sought may have alternative discovery
tools available to it. On the other hand, the "substantial need" test does not contemplate
that a court would become simply a "rubber stamp" for the government's request for
disclosure. Review under this standard should require a Justice Department attorney to
make more than a showing of mere convenience or simple relevance to matters within the
jurisdiction of the agency.
135 Cong. Rec. S2396 (Mar. 8, 1989).
299. Abill introduced in 1990, similar to the FIRRE provision, provided for the release to the
SEC of grand jury material relating to matters that might constitute a violation of any provision
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XI. REFORM OF RULE 6(e)
In reviewing Rule 6(e)'s disclosure provisions, one might start
by appraising the requirement that the disclosure be in connection
with or preliminary to a "judicial proceeding." Neither the origin of
nor the policy behind this restrictive requirement is clear.300 Perhaps
the restriction was driven by the belief that judicial proceedings would
provide an opportunity for anyone who might be injured by disclosure
to vindicate herself or to challenge the propriety of the disclosure.
This approach seems rather hit-or-miss. Petitions for disclosure made
by the government usually are heard ex parte so that disclosure
perhaps will be made long before any judicial proceeding actually
commences 0 , Challenging the propriety of the disclosure at this later
date does not provide an effective remedy. Of course, a challenge in
the course of judicial proceedings might prevent use of the disclosed
materials in those proceedings. In the absence of judicial proceedings,
however, this interest need not be asserted and cannot, therefore,
provide a reason for requiring that proceedings should be
contemplated before disclosure is mandated.
Alternatively, the "judicial proceedings" requirement exhibits a
concern for truth-finding and accuracy and a consequent decision not
to deprive a court of any element that might contribute to adversarial
equipoise and expose perjury or refresh recollection. These aims
certainly are worthy, but they may not outweigh the list of compelling
reasons for disclosure. Secondly, they are equally relevant when
administrative proceedings, which may implicate powerful public
interests and result in extensive penalties, are likely to ensue.
Courts themselves seem to view the "judicial proceedings"
requirement as a rule searching for a reason. On one hand, courts
sometimes have expanded the "judicial proceedings" requirement
of the securities laws. H.R. Rep. No. 101-975, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1990). The provision
did not appear in the ensuing statute, the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990.
300. One theory as to the origin of the requirement postulates that it stems from Section 126
of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure (ALI Code), which provided a model
oath for grand jurors, including a promise not to disclose proceedings before the jury "except
when required or permitted in the course of judicial proceedings." American Law Institute: Code
of Criminal Procedure: Proposed Final Draft § 126 (ALI, 1930). However, the ALI Code
permitted disclosure of grand jury proceedings "in the furtherance of justice" even outside the
context of judicial proceedings. ALI Code § 145. See the discussion in Note, 91 Yale L. J. at 1622-
25 (cited in note 148).
301. Rule 6(e)(3)(D) provides that petitions for disclosure shall be filed in the district court
where the grand jury convened. The Rule then states that the hearing on the petition may be ex
parte when the petitioner is the government. Hearings on any matter affecting the grand jury




rather loosely to include disciplinary hearings and cases in which no
more than a possibility of judicial review is present. On the other
hand, the courts have applied the rule uniformly to deny disclosure to
an administrative agency for the purpose of administrative
proceedings. This outcome is irrational because it allows disclosure in
some cases in which no judicial proceedings ultimately result and
denies it in other cases in which administrative proceedings, which
possess virtually all of the characteristics of judicial proceedings, °3 2
certainly will result. More generally, unless diluted to the vanishing
point, the requirement denies government agencies the use of grand
jury materials for investigation at a stage when such materials might
be crucially helpful but the agency is unable to assert confidently that
judicial proceedings are contemplated. Given the general requirement
of demonstrating particularized need in the interests of justice, the
further requirement of connection with a judicial proceeding appears
superfluous and obstructive of the important interest in facilitating
administrative investigations and procedures.303  This provision of
Rule 6(e) should be repealed.
The next question is whether such reform would be sufficient.
The most radical conceivable reform of Rule 6(e) would reject
altogether the requirement of a petition and court order and permit
the government to release grand jury materials to designated
recipients for designated purposes. The recipients may include all or
most government agencies that assert a need for the material in the
pursuit of their statutorily assigned mandate. Although sweeping
change may be somewhat attractive, some substantial reasons counsel
against such a radical departure. We cannot so lightly throw off
302. One court explained that:
federal administrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the same
safeguards as are available in the judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in
nature. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976). They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated
from political influence. See § 554(d). A party is entitled to present his case by oral or
documentary evidence, § 556(d), and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together
with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision. § 556(e). The parties are
entitled to know the findings and conclusion on all the issues of fact, law, or discretion
presented on the record. § 557(c).
Butz v. Economrou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (holding that the absolute immunity enjoyed by state
and federal judges also applies to administrative law judges).
303. One of the best studies of the grand jury secrecy provisions concludes that the 'judicial
proceeding" requirement should be satisfied when an administrative agency can show that it is
possible, as a matter of law, that its actions will be reviewed in a subsequent judicial proceeding.
See Note, 80 Mich. L. Rev. at 1680 (cited in note 279). This standard certainly would improve on
the present position, but it does not go far enough, since many administrative proceedings do not
carry the possibility of judicial review. No compelling case can be made for denying all disclosure
of grand jury materials in these situations.
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centuries of tradition associated with the grand jury. The grand jury
is a constitutionally required mechanism for prosecution of serious
crime; it exercises almost unchecked subpoena power and proceeds in
an inquisitorial manner. So mighty an engine should not be devalued
or denigrated in the public eye. Allowing disclosure to government
agencies to go unreviewed by a court risks a decline in esteem for the
grand jury.
This danger is enhanced because many grand jury
investigations are conducted with the assistance of the expertise of
agency attorneys and other personnel.304 Automatic, or virtually
automatic, disclosure might strongly tempt agency personnel and
attorneys to run the grand jury proceedings solely for agency purposes
without any real interest in or realistic pursuit of the possibility of an
indictment, reviving the traditional spectre of employing the grand
jury as a tool for civil purposes. This temptation would be particularly
strong when the grand jury subpoena powers are more extensive than
those of the agency involved in the grand jury investigation. At least
in such cases, the need for judicial examination of possible abuse of
the grand jury process remains strong. Such review is ensured by
requiring an application to the court before disclosure may be made.
One can draw distinctions with respect to the degree of danger
of abuse. For example, one can conceive of an approach under which a
court order would not be necessary in cases in which (a) the grand jury
has returned an indictment and (b) disclosure is sought by a
government agency whose investigatory powers are virtually
coextensive with those of the grand jury. In such a case, the return of
an indictment sufficiently indicates that the grand jury process was
not abused, while the extent of the agency's own powers of subpoena
lessens the importance of any remaining interest in secrecy. However,
saving judicial and other governmental time and resources may not
justify the drawing of such fine distinctions. Public confidence in the
grand jury may be best maintained by a general requirement of
judicial scrutiny prior to any disclosure.
Such scrutiny, however, should not turn on the existence or
contemplation of judicial proceedings. If the "judicial proceeding"
requirement were eliminated, adequate safeguards would remain.
First, courts should not grant disclosure if the grand jury process has
been abused for a purely civil inquiry. Second, the petitioner bears
304. See Part VIII.
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the burden of showing particularized need.3°5  However, the
elimination of the "judicial proceeding" requirement inevitably would
lead to a concomitant modification of the concept of particularized
need. In light of the underlying "judicial proceeding" requirement,
particularized need hitherto has been defined largely in terms of a
need to avoid injustice by countering the possibility of perjury or
refreshing the recollection of witnesses in the actual or contemplated
judicial proceeding.3°6 At the same time, some courts have observed
that it is proper to take into account the facts that the petitioner is an
organ of government and that disclosure would be in the public
interest.30 7
With the elimination of the "judicial proceeding" requirement,
these latter considerations should move into a dominant position.
When a government agency is the petitioner, the showing of need
should be satisfied by a demonstration that the requested material
likely is relevant to a subject of inquiry within the mandate of the
government agency. The underlying principle in this situation always
has been that the need should overcome the historical understanding
of the value of grand jury secrecy. In the great majority of cases, the
grand jury proceedings will have ended and the weight of secrecy
considerations therefore will be much diminished. While the impact
on the conduct of future grand jury investigations remains a
consideration of some importance, it seems speculative and remote to
conjecture that these investigations would be inhibited significantly
by an awareness of the possibility of disclosure to government
agencies in their pursuit of authorized investigations. If that were the
case, witnesses surely would not be significantly more likely to lie and
face perjury sanctions or to refuse to testify and face contempt
sanctions. It is even less likely that subpoenas duces tecum would be
significantly obstructed by this knowledge.
Most serious violations of agency rules also constitute criminal
offenses. Thus, the grand jury subpoena in itself usually will
constitute the major threat to any person who sees herself or a
business entity with which she is associated as a target of the grand
jury inquiry. The concurrent threat that the material may find its
way into the hands of a civil agency that is likely to pursue civil
actions or administrative sanctions is unlikely to cause a person or
305. See Note, 91 Yale L. J. at 1614 (cited in note 148) (recommending the abolition of the
"judicial proceeding' requirement).
306. See text accompanying note 268.
307. See text accompanying note 269.
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entity to risk the sanctions for failing to cooperate with the grand jury.
After all, the most striking characteristic of the grand jury is that it
wields compulsory process backed by powerful sanctions. This fact in
itself virtually guarantees its effective functioning.
Disclosure of grand jury materials certainly widens the circle of
those who may inspect the fruits of compulsory process. Under the old
system, in which the grand jury had an investigatory monopoly of
compulsory process, the justification for its singular possession of this
power was the urgent public need to bring well-grounded prosecutions.
Thus, the classical heart of grand jury secrecy principles was fear of a
considerable indirect extension of compulsory process by disclosing its
fruits rather liberally to civil agencies. The core of the response is
that we have, in the areas of concern noted above, gone a long way
toward erasing any bright lines that once divided criminal, civil, and
administrative proceedings. When civil penalties may be massive and
when the interests they defend are identical with the interests
protected by concurrent possibilities of criminal sanctions, the
reservation of compulsory process to the formally criminal side
becomes increasingly less convincing. The system's acceptance of this
proposition has manifested itself in the increase of compulsory process
vested in the regulatory agencies.
If an agency enjoys compulsory process substantially
equivalent to that of the grand jury, why should the material be
withheld when the agency has the power to obtain it in any event?
The vesting of this power in the agency makes the material vulnerable
to its process and thus powerfully undermines the primary set of
arguments in favor of grand jury secrecy. The denial of disclosure,
which forces the agency into a duplicative effort, is an inefficient,
costly, and time-consuming expenditure of resources. This
wastefulness is sharply inimical to the public interest when civil
intervention may be urgently necessary. The concept of need should
not be confined to a showing that the agency has no other means of
getting the material. The better approach is first, to recognize that
secrecy arguments have very little initial weight when Congress has
made the material accessible to the agency's own process, and, second,
to acknowledge that in such a case the concept of need should be
confined to a showing of relevance to the agency's mandate. This
relevance requirement generally should be satisfied by a showing that
the agency could properly exercise its own process to acquire the




In the other situation, in which the agency or Inspector
General does not have powers of compulsory process that extend to
the materials in question, as when the agency does not have the
power to compel testimony, the case for free disclosure might seem
more difficuli to make. However, to deny disclosure for this reason
alone would be radically severe. Historically, in the typical case of
disclosure of grand jury materials, the petitioner could not acquire the
materials in any other way. Indeed, disclosure would have greatly
diminished importance if it were never permitted in such cases. The
important practical question is what concept of "need" should be
applied when the agency petitioner does not enjoy process that would
reach the materials in question (under the assumption that the
requirement of connection with a judicial proceeding would be
eliminated).
In this context the very inability of the agency to obtain the
material by any other procedure in itself can reasonably be seen as
the basic component of the element of "need." But if this inability
alone sufficiently demonstrates need, grand jury files would be wide
open to fishing expeditions. A petition for release of grand jury fies in
this situation should be required to state the nature of any actual,
contemplated, or foreseeable investigation and to show that such
investigation would be within the statutory mandate of the agency; it
should state exactly what materials are sought and why they would
be relevant. An agency sometimes will be able to make these
showings with considerable particularity because it either will have
participated in the grand jury investigation or will have received
information from a prosecutor prior to the launching of the grand jury
investigation. But occasionally the agency will not have participated
in the investigation. In such cases, perhaps only a federal prosecutor
will be aware of the possible utility of the grand jury materials to an
agency. Under present rules, however, the prosecutor likely would
commit a violation of secrecy by telling the agency enough to permit
them to make an informed application for disclosure. This dilemma
can be avoided by permitting the United States Attorney's office sua
sponte to make an application to the court for release of material to an
agency that they identify as having an interest in the terms described
above.3o8
308. No doubt such a possibility would not always mature. Federal prosecutors sometimes
may want to carry a criminal case into court without the delays that might be occasioned by
parallel civil proceedings. However, this possibility does not seem to present a great danger since,
for the most part, civil proceedings are much more likely to be delayed than criminal ones.
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Under these proposals, a court's power to deny disclosure would
be minimal. Provided a legitimate agency purpose is identified and
some minimal showing of a relevant connection between that purpose
and the grand jury materials is made, the court should order
disclosure. Thus, in the end, the scope of permissible disclosure when
the agency has no power to issue its own subpoena would be
substantially identical with cases in which it has subpoena power.
The avowed object of these reforms should be to facilitate the
exchange of information between organs of government in the public
interest, to acknowledge the convergence of criminal and civil
sanctions, and to move toward a unified theory of compulsory process
in that context. But reforms along these lines would not lay all
questions to rest. Defendants in civil cases request disclosure of grand
jury materials fairly often. Any expansion of the powers of
government agencies to discover grand jury materials for civil
purposes inevitably would lead to strong calls for expansion of the
rights of civil parties to access grand jury files, at least when they are
involved in litigation with the government, which might enjoy this
privilege. While this issue lies outside the scope of this Article, the
changes proposed necessarily would involve re-evaluation of the civil
party's rights in this context in the interest of adversarial equipoise.
XII. THE UNIFICATION OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
The present configuration of statutes, rules, and decisions
regulate civil subpoenas or investigative demands in two senses.
First, the process must relate to a subject matter defined by a statute
as a designated, legitimate field of inquiry. Second, the scope of the
process itself, whether, for example, it is confined to the equivalent of
a subpoena duces tecum or includes the broader power of testimonial
compulsion, and the manner of its enforcement also will be regulated
by statute. The grand jury's investigation itself must have a criminal
investigative purpose and its proceedings generally are subject to
secrecy requirements that are powerfully and restrictively expressed
in the limitation of disclosure for civil purposes to matters in which
judicial proceedings are contemplated or likely. As a result, while
civilly discovered material is virtually unrestricted in its disclosure to
Prosecutors generally have little or nothing to lose by releasing information to civil agencies;
indeed, this cooperation should be encouraged by the government.
19941 663
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
a prosecutor, °9 the system is counterbalanced by powerful restrictions
on the release of grand jury material to government agencies for civil
purposes.
The current approach can be criticized as anomalous. First,
grand jury secrecy provisions can be and frequently are finessed by
allowing an agency with full compulsory process to conduct the
investigation, thereby facilitating the release of material discovered to
other agencies as well as to the prosecutor. Second, if the grand jury
launches and carries on the investigation, the restrictive provisions of
Rule 6(e) may impede or fully balk the efforts of government agencies
to gain access to relevant materials even when the agencies have a
legitimate need for these materials in order to pursue their proper
regulatory goals. An agency may be able to acquire the material by
issuing its own process, but this effort will not always be successful
and in any event would be wasteful, time-consuming, and duplicative.
Third, the position of targets and witnesses will differ according to
whether they are summoned by a grand jury or an agency. A target
subpoenaed by an agency may, if testimony is required, be
accompanied by counsel-a privilege not available before the grand
jury. On the other hand, a target may be comforted by the secrecy
rules that govern the grand jury--both the prohibition against general
publicity and the Rule 6(e) barrier to automatic disclosure to civil
agencies. Thus, in different fields, significantly different rules and
standards apply, although it is increasingly likely that an agency
investigation, to the same extent as a grand jury investigation, may
have a criminal prosecution as both its aim and its outcome.
As a radical means of ironing out these anomalies and
achieving assimilation in the field of compulsory process, the United
States could simply eliminate the grand jury, as the English have
done. This act would clean the slate and allow the construction of new
institutions for criminal investigation that could be deliberately
dovetailed with civil process. However, at least in the federal
jurisdiction, constitutional requirements make pursuit of this idea
unfruitful. The grand jury must be retained federally as a charging
agency; while it continues to function in this capacity, it is unlikely
that government will neglect its powerful investigative potential.
309. "While Rule 6(e) prevents disclosure of what is presented to the grand jury, it does not
prevent an [Inspector General's] agent from disclosing to prosecutors, other agencies or a grand




More modest reforms should, however, be considered; these
reforms should be aimed at unifying the rules governing compulsory
process to the extent that this unification is compatible with its
functional role in modern investigations. The need to identify the
justifications for compulsory process in a particular field and the
legitimate goals of process in different contexts, rather than the mere
historical accretions accumulated by different institutions, should
govern the reform process. Overall, the modern intertwining of civil
and criminal investigations in the regulatory context and the
increased blurring of the division between criminal and civil sanctions
must be prime considerations.
The continued coexistence of grand jury and agency
investigations is bound to create an indistinct and shifting border.
Jurisdiction to launch initial investigations overlaps enormously and a
clean division is difficult to draw. A superficially neat proposal would
allocate to agencies an exclusive power to investigate matters
(including crimes) within their purview while restricting grand juries
to classic crimes and other offenses that do not fall squarely within the
province of an agency endowed with criminal investigative powers.
However, bearing in mind the weight of the historical location of
power to prosecute in the Department of Justice and United States
Attorneys' offices, this idea is impractical and is susceptible to policy
objections.
In the first place, investigations may encompass a cluster of
crimes not all of which fall within an agency's mandate. This fact
often may not appear until the investigation is well under way.
Second, while an agency usually is the proper decisionmaker as to
whether a prosecution is warranted in areas that come under its
regulatory sphere, allowing it to monopolize authority as to these
decisions would be dangerous. Agencies may be overly influenced by
parochial regulatory policy and hence may not pay enough attention
to the moral gravity of the conduct involved; improper influence might
find its way into deliberations. The power of the United States
Attorney to launch an investigation deemed to be in the public
interest and to follow through with an indictment in light of general
principles of criminal justice policy should be preserved.
If grand jury compulsory process and agency process must
continue to coexist, however, one must recognize that the allocation of
an investigation to one organ rather than the other often is accidental,
and at times results from consultation aimed at efficiency and
convenience, rather than from any sharp functional differentiation.
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This recognition creates a strong argument for a high degree of
assimilation in the applicable procedures.
Whenever the nature of a regulatory scheme is such that
violations frequently will amount to crimes or may carry severe civil
penalties that are quasi-criminal in nature, the governing agency
should be accorded full investigatory compulsory process. This power
generally is allocated to an agency; the only major change that this
proposal would effect would be to confer compulsory powers to take
testimony on Inspectors General. This proposal is not meant to
include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, since the FBI is not a
regulatory agency but rather a police force in relation to which the
prosecutorial arm, acting through the grand jury, possesses full
subpoena power.310
If this invitation is accepted, the result will be a full extension
of compulsory process to regulatory agencies, for several reasons.
First, it would be difficult to isolate situations in which criminal
liability is not a possible outcome. Second, even if these situations
could be segregated, the civil and administrative sanctions that may
be imposed often are functionally indistinguishable in their deterrent
and punitive aims and impact from formal criminal sanctions.
Restrictions on agency process powers (as exemplified by the present
lack of compulsory process for oral testimony in Inspector General's
departments) would mean only that the inquiries into criminal
conduct, or conduct that may be sanctioned by quasi-criminal
penalties, sometimes will be half-hearted and incomplete and, at some
point, at least when crimes are suspected, must be referred to a grand
jury. But the propriety of an agency (and of Inspectors General)
inquiring into conduct that may be criminal has long been accepted
and expressly written into governing statutes. The corollary is that
the agency and the Inspector General should have the full powers of
criminal investigation that are traditional in American law. Under
federal law, the Constitution requires that any criminal charge in the
310. In June, 1990, legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives (H.R. 5050)
and the Senate (S. 2735) to confer on the FBI power to issue subpoenas for documents. The ABA's
Criminal Justice Section commented negatively on the proposed bill; the ABA House of Delegates
called for full hearings on the matter. 5 BNA Crim. Prac. Man. at 78 (cited in note 94). Critics
feared that giving the FBI subpoena power would undermine the authority of the Justice
Department and United States Attorneys and might imperil the secrecy of the grand jury. The
Criminal Division of the Justice Department did not support the bill. One should note also that
the FBI has a general mandate to inquire into violations of the federal criminal law so that any
subpoena power it might enjoy would be sweeping in scope rather than confined to the statutory




end must rest on an indictment by a grand jury, but this requirement
can be satisfied both formally and substantially by the agency's
handing a packaged case to the United States Attorney and can be
facilitated by employing specially designated agency attorneys to
assist in the presentation of the case to the grand jury.
Recognition that agencies and Inspectors General already, to a
substantial extent, have become the prime investigators of certain
categories of crime (and, indeed, are best suited to discharge this task)
raises the question of whether public rights and privileges might be
curtailed in any way by such a broad use of compulsory process. In
response, one should note first that the development already is so
advanced that the proposed change is only marginal. It is true that
the existing distribution of process can place a party at a considerable
tactical disadvantage when parallel proceedings are ongoing or likely
to be launched, but the mechanisms for alleviating intolerable
burdens already exist in stays and protective orders.311 Certainly,
close liaison between agencies, the Department of Justice, and United
States Attorneys is desirable to minimize the possible harassment
that might arise when more than one kind of process is directed
against a party. A great deal of informal consultation and
coordination already occurs, but as parallel proceedings flourish-and
no doubt exists that they will be an increasingly conspicuous feature
of the landscape-this liaison should be formalized both to further
efficiency in governmental investigations and to protect the rights of
parties under investigation. Each agency and Inspector General's
office might vest in a senior attorney the responsibility for decisions
concerning the distribution of information to other agencies and to the
Justice Department, for consultation with these bodies to coordinate
investigations and the use of process, and for planning the course of
potential parallel proceedings.
Prosecutors working with grand juries generally must halt
their use of the subpoena once the grand jury has returned an
indictment. As discussed above, the justification for this rule is that a
continued use of compulsory process would ride roughshod over the
controlling principles of criminal discovery once adversary proceedings
311. In February, 1993, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association asked the
Judicial Conference of the United States to consider problems arising out of parallel proceedings,
stressing the significant burdens that such proceedings place on the exercise of Fifth Amendment
rights. The report of the Sections on Criminal Justice and Business Law, on which the delegates
acted, recommends a rule that would create a rebuttable presumption in favor of a complete stay
of parallel civil proceedings and suggests that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
amended to include guidelines for the granting of these stays. See 52 Crim. L. Rep. 1431 (1993).
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are commenced by a formal charge. When an agency investigation is
the main instrument in building a criminal case, the question then
arises whether a parallel rule should be applied in that context.. Two
possible situations must be considered. First, the agency might
protract the criminal aspect of its investigation by delaying referral to
the grand jury and the consequent indictment. No special danger
appears in this situation since -the prosecutor working with a grand
jury enjoys the same power. The prosecutor has no duty to press for
an indictment as soon as he has accumulated a case that is barely
legally sufficient. A rule imposing this duty would be unwise since it
would inhibit perfectly proper governmental efforts to build a strong
case before it commits itself to formal prosecution. One should note
that the rule prohibiting further grand jury investigation after
indictment is not concerned with investigations as such but rather
with the propriety of compulsory process after formal charging steps
have been initiated. Similarly, an agency should not be prohibited
from continuing the criminal aspect of an investigation simply because
it has accumulated a case barely sufficient to support a reference for
criminal prosecution. Indeed, such a position in essence would adopt
the strong and disputed version of the IRS rule, as expressed in
LaSalle, and apply it across the board to agency investigations. 312 The
LaSalle rule either should be confined to the IRS context or, indeed,
be dropped even in that field by further statutory clarification.
A more sensitive situation arises once an indictment has been
returned. Even in this situation, however, the grand jury may
continue to issue its process as long as legitimate possibilities of
indicting others or indicting an already-indicted defendant for
different crimes, perhaps by means of a superseding indictment, exist.
Clearly, the law should extend similar latitude to agencies. Indeed,
agencies can justly claim exemption in many cases from any halting of
their process by citing the independent justification of a need to
accumulate further information with respect to the pursuit of civil
remedies.313
312. See the discussion of LaSalle in the text accompanying notes 127-46.
313. "Further we note that the procedures concerning an administrative enforcement
proceeding, including the issuance of a NOPV [Notice of Probable Violation] and the filing of a
Motion for Discovery, do not limit the authority of the DOE [Department of Energy] to initiate
judicial civil enforcement actions.... Consequently, the commencement of an administrative
enforcement proceeding does not necessarily demonstrate that civil investigations by the DOE are
complete." United States v. Thriftyman, Inc., 704 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1983).
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A question remains as to whether an agency should be
permitted, after indictment, to disclose to the prosecutor any
information obtained through post-indictment use of its process that
the prosecutor could not have procured properly through continued
use of grand jury subpoenas. In this context, the importance of filing
formal charges should have precedence. Formal charging triggers the
right to counsel in the strongest sense3 14 and sets in motion the rules
of discovery in criminal cases. If an agency could transmit to a
prosecutor, after an indictment is returned, information derived from
its process that is material to the prosecution, then the rules of
discovery would be subverted and an irrational distinction established
between two classes of criminal cases. When agencies are involved, a
prosecutor could continue to enjoy a flow of information that would not
be available in a case in which agency process was not involved. This
division would be indefensible.
As discussed earlier, a party involved in criminal proceedings
or in a situation in which criminal proceedings seem likely (such as
when a grand jury is in session or a criminal investigation is in
progress) can request a stay of civil proceedings or civil discovery or
can apply for a protective order with respect to materials produced in
response to a civil subpoena. When the grand jury has returned an
indictment, the case for such relief becomes stronger. Once an
indictment is filed, a protective order should issue automatically as to
any material requested by civil subpoena that the movant can show to
be inappropriate for discovery in the criminal case or no longer subject
to a valid grand jury subpoena. Agencies should elaborate procedures
to insulate such material and shield it from the prosecutor and from
any agency attorney or other government civil attorneys who are
collaborating with the prosecutor in the criminal case.
The processes can be further assimilated by recognizing the
right of a witness (or at least a target) to be accompanied by counsel
when appearing before a federal grand jury. If different government
agencies are charged with substantially identical tasks of criminal
investigation, a compelling reason must be given to explain why our
system should tolerate sharply different procedures affecting
important rights.
The most difficult question with respect to assimilation
remains-the issue of secrecy as to material obtained by the grand
jury. For practical purposes, secrecy has two different meanings in
the grand jury setting, although historically they may spring from the
314. Maasiah v. United Stqtes, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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same roots. In one sense, secrecy refers to the non-public nature of
ongoing proceedings and the consequent strict imposition of a secrecy
obligation on participants, with the exception of witnesses. In a
second sense, secrecy refers more specifically to the requirement that
a party apply for disclosure and make a special showing under Rule
6(e) before grand jury materials may be disclosed, even to a
government agency.
In the context of a release of information to other organs of
government, therefore, a sharply anomalous position has developed
under which an agency often may make disclosures to another agency
that a grand jury could not make without a Rule 6(e) order. As
discussed above, formidable obstacles block a successful application for
such an order. The recommendation made in Part XI therefore should
be adopted, and Rule 6(e) should be substantially modified by
replacing the current obstructive and irrational standard with the
proposed standards, which require no more than a showing of
substantial need by the civil branch. .
A more radical reform would allow disclosures of grand jury
materials to other government officers and agencies upon an internal,
administrative showing of need (which might be subject to later
judicial review), without the necessity of an initiating application to
the court. Under such an approach, only the court's ultimate power to
find an abuse of process would check the sharing of information.
When the agency has subpoena powers coextensive with those of the
grand jury and thus is empowered to obtain the same materials
through its own process, such a solution has much to commend it. But
the nature of the grand jury's process, its existence as an organ of the
court, and the concept that grand jury materials are in the custody of
the court rather than the prosecutor make it difficult to fit so radical a
proposal harmoniously into the existing structure. Retaining judicial
scrutiny of applications for disclosure also can be defended as a matter
of policy as follows: A subpoena or civil investigative demand can
always be challenged, and denial of a challenge can be appealed. But
when a government agency attempts to obtain material from the
grand jury, parties have no effective opportunity for a challenge, for
only in a rare case will a prosecutor perceive a good reason for denying
a request from another government agency. Thus, judicial scrutiny
substitutes for the usual opportunity to challenge a subpoena or civil
investigative demand. But no reason exists for extending judicial
scrutiny beyond the standards usually applied when the court faces a
motion to quash a subpoena. If the agency-applicant can satisfy the
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court that the material is relevant to matters that the agency wishes
to investigate, that the investigation is within the purview of its
statutory mandate, and that the grand jury investigation was not a
mere sham devoid of any genuine criminal law aims, the court should
order disclosure.
Under this approach, and under the general aim of
assimilation, equity might appear to require that a similar approach
(requiring a judicial order) should be applied to disclosure of material
acquired through compulsory process by one agency to another.
However, the agency context is not encumbered with the difficulties
that arise from the grand jury's existence as an organ of the court,
particularly in light of the historical baggage relating to grand jury
secrecy. First, material obtained by agencies is not in the custody of
the court in the way that grand jury material is. Second, when an
agency issues a subpoena, it acts under statutory authority, and the
legislature may be deemed already to have considered the questions of
confidentiality and secrecy. In the absence of statutory restrictions on
agency process, it is proper to assume that the legislature intended no
restrictions. Third, the party responding to an agency subpoena, even
a subpoena that requests testimony, may apply for a protective order
if she can show some special reason for keeping the product secret.
Fourth, appellate review may be had before a court can compel
compliance with agency subpoenas. Fifth, little danger exists that an
investigation by one agency will be used as a sham to further the
investigative aims of another agency. Free agency disclosure to other
government entities should be permitted.
XIII. CONCLUSION
The time is now ripe for a consciously fashioned coordination of
federal compulsory process. In regulatory fields, criminal, civil, and
administrative remedies now should be viewed as an armory of
weapons not decisively distinguishable in their aims and functions.
Their particular deployment in an individual case is governed by
strategic and tactical considerations that often do not embody clear
differences in remedial purpose nor clear differences in impact on the
citizen or entity. Consultation, coordination, and efficiency should be
the prime ideals for government departments and agencies in the
employment of compulsory process. This aim can be achieved to an
extent by administrative arrangements; statutory intervention will be
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necessary with respect to modernizing the rules about access to grand
jury materials.
